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ABSTRACT 
INFORMATION ASYMMETRY, ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE, AND PRIVATE 
GIVING: CAN PERFORMANCE RATINGS BUILD TRUST IN NONPROFITS? 
By 
IURII DAVYDENKO 
August 2020 
 
Committee Chair: Dr. Dennis R. Young 
Major Department: Public Management and Policy 
 
Nonprofit performance report cards, such as charity ratings, have evolved in the third sector 
as an attractive tool for addressing accountability concerns and improving the sector's 
effectiveness and efficiency. These performance monitoring services intend to increase the 
quality of philanthropy by helping donors allocate contributions to high-quality charities and 
getting organizations to improve their performance. However, we know little about how 
performance report cards as a policy instrument fulfill their expectations in the nonprofit sector.  
This research offers a comprehensive study of charity ratings that addresses three sets of 
questions. First, it explores the information content of charity ratings and assesses the degree of 
coherence among performance grades assigned by different rating services. The analysis of data 
shows that the informational content of charity performance ratings is lower than it appears on 
face value, and competing rating systems often send mixed signals to donors. 
 Second, it examines whether and how conventional metrics embedded in charity ratings, 
particularly composite ratings and overhead spending ratios, influence perceived performance, 
trust, and giving decisions in individual donors. The findings show that individuals consider both 
ratings and overhead ratios when making decisions but give the ratings more weight. The study 
also reveals distinct patterns in donor reactions to low and high values on each of the two 
measures, interactions between them, and a moderating role of altruism, general trust, and 
mission valence.   
Finally, the study investigates how rated nonprofits respond to their ratings. It proposes that 
a public charity will react to an exogenous shock - the release of its charity rating by improving 
its measured performance, especially if it (1) initially gets a poor rating, (2) is in a highly 
competitive subfield, (3) relies more heavily on donations. The empirical tests show that public 
charities only respond in a limited way to being publicly rated, meaning limited effectiveness of 
the existing tool to elicit performance improvements in nonprofits. At the same time, the 
statistically and practically significant findings for the charities that initially receive the lowest 
ratings show that third-party nonprofit performance monitoring has some potential. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
In the spirit of American individualism and freedom to pursue common purposes, for 
many decades, the voluntary sector in the U.S. has enjoyed unprecedented levels of 
independence from government interference along with generous economic privileges. Costing 
the Treasury tens of billions of dollars in lost revenue annually, such autonomy and support 
reflected a deep societal belief in the nonprofit sector’s high purpose and a great degree of public 
faith in its self-regulation capacity and accountability (Kelly, 1998; Salamon, 2012). However, in 
the last several decades, big concerns over charitable organizations’ abuse of public trust have 
grown, inviting an increased governmental regulation of the sector and challenging its favorable 
nonprofit tax treatment.  
Numerous investigations uncovering fraud, tax-avoidance, self-dealing, excessive costs, 
commercial activities, accounting manipulations, excessive accumulation of tax-exempt wealth, 
distortion, incomplete information, and other practices that do not benefit society, have 
undermined nonprofit credibility (Kelly, 1998). The most common charitable organizations’ 
abuses involve overvaluing donated products and allocating fundraising expenses to the program 
category to keep the reported overhead cost low, disguised profit distribution through high 
salaries and benefits, excessive endowments, unfair competition, and unrelated business 
activities. Kelly (1998) argued that “Self-regulation has not worked up to this point” (p. 184), 
and “the era of giving charitable organizations the benefit of the doubt was over” (p.220).  
The ongoing shift of public and government attention towards the increased scrutiny in 
the nonprofit sector have created an environment where, besides a more onerous regulatory 
burden, nonprofits are increasingly expected to prove their public value. Kelly (1998) argued that 
now charities “must explain themselves, demonstrate their service is worth the cost, and defend 
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their essential character” (p.185). Concerns over nonprofit performance accountability have 
pushed the adoption of performance measurement and monitoring in the nonprofit sector 
organizations (Carnochan, Samples, Myers, & Austin, 2014). As a result, the recent decades 
have witnessed a proliferation of performance measurement and monitoring systems intended to 
equip nonprofits with tools that should demonstrate what difference the dollars entrusted to them 
make and their key stakeholders with means to make informed choices. One of these instruments 
– internet technology-empowered charity ratings as an implementation of performance 
monitoring report cards – is the object of interest in this research. 
Performance accountability tools in the nonprofit sector are supposed to improve 
performance through two mechanisms. First, performance information should inform key 
nonprofit stakeholders, particularly funders, about organizational or program quality, so that they 
could make justified decisions regarding their willingness to financially or otherwise support 
organizations. This mechanism would contribute to better and more efficient outcomes by 
helping markets to “weed out” poorly performing operations (Gormley & Weimer, 1999). 
Second, nonprofits can (and, advocates of performance measurement assert, should) use 
information produced in the process of performance measurement to help manages and 
governing boards identify opportunities for improvement and survive competition for resources 
(Poister, Aristigueta, & Hall, 2014; Wholey & Hatry, 1992).  
Despite the pressure towards greater performance accountability and improvement, the 
embracement of performance measurement in nonprofits has been easier said than done. The 
nonprofit performance revolves around an organization’s ability to convert its inputs efficiently 
to mission-related, social outcomes (Gormley & Weimer, 1999), while, at the same time, 
addressing the challenge of survival and sustainability. Measuring multidimensional nonprofit 
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performance is notoriously difficult, and organizations often see it as a resource drain and an 
unjustified burden (MacIndoe & Barman, 2012). As a result, organizations have been slow to 
adopt performance measurement and tend to implement it rather superficially. The general 
public’s limited ability to obtain and interpret complex performance information across diverse 
entities and a variety of measurement approaches further diminish the promise of performance 
measurement to alleviate information asymmetry in the nonprofit sector and facilitate 
performance-based accountability (Herzlinger, 1995). 
Organizational report cards are a policy instrument that could relieve nonprofits of the 
burden of performance measurement and information dissemination while holding the potential 
to strengthen bottom-up accountability and self-regulation. Gormley and Weimer (1999) define 
organizational report cards as “a regular effort by an organization to collect data on two or more 
other organizations, transform the data into information relevant to assessing performance, and 
transmit the information to some audience external to the organizations themselves” (p.3). The 
researchers highlight the following three elements that distinguish report cards from other 
instruments of performance accountability. First, they are external assessments and thus carry the 
cost of performance measurement. Second, they assume regular assessment. Third, they are 
designed for an external audience to facilitate easy access, comprehension, and comparison of 
performance across organizations and over time.  
A common approach in report cards is to transform performance information in ratings or 
rankings. Many such ratings and rankings have recently spread in education, healthcare, 
childcare, restaurant, finance, and other industries to inform customer choices and rated 
organizations’ behavior (Gormley & Weimer, 1999; Jin & Leslie, 2003; Lewis, 2014; Sharkey & 
Bromley, 2014). By taking advantage of the advancements in information technologies, 
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charity/nonprofit ratings have evolved in the last two decades. These report cards focusing on 
nonprofit organizations’ performance accountability are produced by third-party evaluators – 
charity/nonprofit rating agencies also commonly addressed as charity watchdog organizations. 
Like credit rating agencies that evaluate potential borrowers in the private and public sectors 
(such as Moody’s, Fitch, or Standard & Poors), charity raters are independent, private, and self-
sustaining organizations.  Numerous watchdog agencies grade and distribute information on 
thousands of nonprofits in the US and abroad (Rowe, 2012) in order to facilitate nonprofit 
accountability. Some of them produce and disseminate nonprofit performance report cards in 
accordance with the definition of this policy tool1. 
Charity ratings are a potentially powerful monitoring instrument for facilitating nonprofit 
performance accountability and stimulating organizational improvements. Charity raters collect 
and analyze information about NPOs’ performance using objective criteria and deliver it to the 
public in a convenient for decision-making letter or star grade scale. Unlike commercial service 
agencies, however, charity raters are often nonprofit organizations themselves funded through 
voluntary contributions. The nonprofit status might indicate not only the public’s demand for 
such performance information but also the potential ability of the nonprofit sector to produce at 
least partial remedies for its “voluntary failure2.” In most cases, access to charity ratings and the 
underlying data is free or relatively low cost. With such an approach to the design and funding of 
the nonprofit report cards, charity raters effectively make their performance assessments 
accessible to individual donors.  
 
1 Not all charity ratings are performance report cards as defined by (Gormley & Weimer, 1999), but in this 
research, the terms “nonprofit report cards” and “charity ratings” will are used interchangeably. 
2 Nonprofit inability to address market failures due to covert distributions, productive inefficiencies, and other 
reasons 
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Performance measurement experts have often criticized charity ratings. These criticisms 
are justified, and charity performance report cards may not have the potential to address all 
nonprofit accountability needs or may fail to deliver according to expectations.  Gormley and 
Weimer (1999) argued that “the design and use of organizational report cards involve a number 
of generic problems that undercut their value as a policy instrument” (p.7). They pointed to three 
potential challenges that may weaken report cards: assessment problems, consumer reception 
problems, and organizational response problems. Assessment problems reflect limitations of 
measurement, as failure to assess performance comprehensively may affect usefulness of the 
information report cards provide to their users and lead to undesirable behaviors. Reception and 
organizational response problems are related to a variety of potentially dysfunctional responses 
of consumers of the information and targeted organizations. The researchers explained that 
reception problems may arise due to “weak motivation”, “cognitive limits”, and “informational 
inequalities” (p. 15), while response problems may include “nonparticipation”, “cream 
skimming”, “manipulating the numbers”, and “blaming the messenger” (p. 13). 
Nonprofit performance report cards have been available to the public for more than three 
decades, and the field continues to evolve. Charity ratings can be a useful instrument for 
improving self-regulation of the nonprofit sector and strengthening its credibility. However, the 
research on nonprofit ratings is fragmented and inconclusive. It offers limited insights into how 
performance report cards as a policy instrument fulfill its expectations in the nonprofit sector, 
particularly in terms of its impacts on the behavior of intended audiences. Given the increasing 
coverage and salience of ratings in the nonprofit environment and the limited research available 
on this topic, many essential questions merit theoretical and empirical examination. By focusing 
on some of these questions, this research is organized into three parts:  
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1. Informational Content and Comparability of Charity Ratings. This descriptive section 
determines the main drivers of the variation in charity ratings and assesses the degree 
of coherence among assessments delivered by different charity rating agencies.   
2. Individual Donor Response to Third-Party Charity Ratings. Using experimental data, 
I examine whether and to what extent donors respond to information about charity 
ratings.  
3. Public Charity Response to External Performance Ratings. Using observational data, 
I examine how rated nonprofits respond to their ratings.  
 
A few additional caveats are in order. Because the nonprofit sector is represented by 
different categories of organizations with diverse purposes, underlying business models, legal 
structures, and management practices (Salamon, 2012), it is important to clarify the boundaries 
of the population of nonprofits that this research is relevant to. Following Hansmann’s and 
Weisbrod’s classical ideas about the rationale for nonprofit organizations, the interest in this 
research is on voluntary donative organizations that produce services with public good 
characteristics and those whose operations can be characterized by information asymmetry 
between nonprofits and their donors. From the legal perspective, these are voluntary corporations 
that are bound by the nondistribution constraint, generate public benefits, and receive public 
support. In relation to the first criterion, this research applies to organizations that are legally 
prohibited from distributing surplus among their founders.  The second criterion further restricts 
the population of interest to public-serving (charitable) organizations that “benefit an indefinite 
class of individuals” (Powell & Steinberg, 2006, p. 2) as opposed to mutual benefit or, in 
Salamon’s terms, member-serving organizations (Salamon, 2012). The third criterion requires 
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that a nonprofit has substantial support from individuals, the importance of which follows from 
the theory of nonprofit demand and, on the other hand, from a greater severity of information 
asymmetry that individuals suffer in comparison to institutional stakeholders.  
One setting where this research would be especially relevant is online giving.  Even 
though online giving only accounts for about ten percent of the total giving (E. Brown & Martin, 
2011; MacLaughlin, 2015; NPTrust, 2015), it has a strong potential for growth.  Today’s broad 
spread of the internet and mobile applications, development of e-payment options, deep 
penetration of online social networks into individuals’ personal and professional lives, the rise of 
big data analytics, and development of highly sophisticated algorithms of behavioral analysis 
online allow business managers to achieve impressive business goals3. Such internet tools could 
greatly facilitate online fundraising in the nonprofit business and help public charities attract 
substantial amounts by reaching large online audiences and providing them with the right 
information. Research, in turn, shows that online giving has grown persistently during the last 
decade at substantially higher rates than giving through traditional channels (NPTrust, 2015; 
Rovner, Loeb, McCarthy, & Johnston, 2013). Virtually every charity now has a website, so, from 
the policy perspective, charity ratings might be an efficient and less intrusive, incentive-based 
regulation tool (Gormley & Weimer, 1999). Relatively little scholarship providing insights into 
determinants of online giving behavior has been produced. The question of how the digital 
medium can complement physical interaction between organizations and individuals that care 
about and willing to support a cause to reduce uncertainty and facilitate trust is of crucial 
 
3 What Can Companies Predict From Your Digital Trail? http://www.npr.org/2015/09/14/440305167/what-can-
companies-predict-from-your-digital-trail  
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importance. Charity ratings are inherently an online tool, which might be part of a productive 
online relationship between nonprofits and their funders. 
The nonprofit sector is responsible for a significant share of the whole economy and 
many socially essential functions. Public perceptions of nonprofit organizations’ goals and 
performance may have substantial implications for future confidence in the third sector entities, 
their role, resource base, structure, and viability. Understanding the behavior of nonprofit 
organizations and their constituents conceptually and empirically might suggest which tools can 
effectively push the sector to perform at the maximum of its potential. This research is looking to 
gain insights on important aspects of donor and organization behavior in the presence of charity 
performance rating information.   
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CHAPTER 2: CONTENT AND COMPARABILITY OF CHARITY RATINGS 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Organizational report cards have substantially proliferated in many markets and areas of 
public life over the past few decades. Scholarly research has documented the growth of 
performance report cards and their impact on school choice, funding, and expenditures (Figlio & 
Kenny, 2009; Jin & Whalley, 2007a, 2007b); hospital choice, revenue, and patient volume 
(Pope, 2009), and a variety of other outcomes in the private and public sectors (Gormley, 2003; 
Gormley & Weimer, 1999; Johnson & Kriz, 2002; Zhe Jin, Kato, & List, 2010). Charity ratings 
have also noticeably proliferated, and evidence is mounting that they may influence the behavior 
of various nonprofit stakeholders too (A. L. Brown, Meer, & Williams, 2014; Chhaochharia & 
Ghosh, 2008; Gordon, Knock, & Neely, 2009; Sloan, 2009).  
Despite the strong theoretical rationale for report cards in facilitating the bottom-up 
accountability and their widespread proliferation, this policy instrument’s designs are not always 
effective (Gormley & Weimer, 1999). One of the major reasons performance report cards may 
not live up to the expectations originates in methodological challenges of performance evaluation 
they face. Gormley and Weimer (1999) explained, “Fundamentally, these problems arise because 
of limitations in data and theory: not all relevant variables can be measured, and theoretical links 
between variables that can be measured and those that are conceptually appropriate are often 
weak” (p. 7). In the nonprofit literature and media space, this issue is framed as a matter of 
“watching the watchdogs” (Eng, 2011; Kelly, 1998) or “rating the raters” (National Council of 
Nonprofit Associations and the National Human Services Assembly, 2005). 
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The notion of performance measurement in the nonprofit sector revolves around multiple 
dimensions of organizational and program performance, such as effectiveness, efficiency, 
quality, equity, etc. (Poister et al., 2014).  Designing performance measurement systems, 
therefore, involves considering multiple categories of measures in the chain between inputs and 
outcomes. Among others, these include measures of inputs, outputs, productivity, efficiency, 
service quality, customer satisfaction, outcomes/impacts, cost-effectiveness.  Because 
comprehensive measurement is unfeasible, system designers face the challenge of choosing 
which measures to use and which to ignore (Gormley & Weimer, 1999; Poister et al., 2014). 
Gormley and Weimer (1999) warned that in designing performance report cards “the choice is 
often between an imperfect report card and no report card at all” (p. 10). 
Since performance report cards aim to reduce multidimensional organizational 
performance to a user-friendly, comprehensible measure or set of measures (e.g. overall 
performance scores or ratings), the potential of a report card to alleviate information asymmetry, 
its credibility, and effectiveness, therefore, depend on the amount of information incorporated in 
its composite performance indicators. However, it is not always clear what pieces of information 
such systems truly reflect. For instance, research from health-care industry shows that even when 
a rater claims it uses multiple factors in its evaluation methodology, the ranking can be driven 
almost entirely by a single measure (Pope, 2009). Do nonprofit raters fall in the same trap? 
Because charity ratings have also been criticized for reliance on overly simplistic measures of 
financial efficiency pulled from 990 forms, particularly the overhead ratio (Lowell, Trelstad, & 
Meehan, 2005; National Council of Nonprofit Associations and the National Human Services 
Assembly, 2005), the first question this study seeks to answer is: what drives variation in charity 
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ratings? By exploring this question, this research will investigate whether charity ratings 
incorporate more performance information than using just efficiency ratios would reveal.  
Another issue with the report cards in the category of assessment problems relates to 
consistency among various raters and choosing among them. Different raters that emerged at 
different times use different rating approaches.  Various raters often claim they do a better job 
evaluating charities. Not only nonprofit agencies, their associations, and the media sometime 
attack charity ratings (Kelly, 1998; Lowell et al., 2005), charity watchdogs criticize each other 
(Charity Watch, 2012; O'Donnell, 2012). USA Today, for instance, questioned the credibility of 
Better Business Bureau’s ratings for approving of charities that get an F from The American 
Institute of Philanthropy's Charity Watch and a zero-star rating from Charity Navigator 
(O'Donnell, 2012). The Charity Watch, on its website, brings users’ attention to the fact that F 
rated charities get certified by Independent Charities of America (Charity Watch, 2012) and 
publishes scathing criticism of Great Nonprofits – a community-sourced rater (GreatNonprofits, 
2015).   
Existence of different charity certifiers using different assessment methodologies is not a 
problem per se. In fact, competition among raters may have benefits (Lizzeri, 1999). At the same 
time, if the assessments of organizational quality are inconsistent across different rating service 
providers, users may face the question of choice among them, and the cost of information search 
as well as uncertainty may increase. As an example, a study of information intermediaries in 
municipal debt markets shows that receiving split ratings by municipal borrowers affects the cost 
of capital (Johnson & Kriz, 2002). In other word, this means that market participants consider 
multiple ratings in their decision making. An increased information search and processing cost 
with respect to nonprofit performance ratings may lower the usefulness and use of charity 
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watchdogs as quality certifying services for users of such information and decrease the policy 
instrument’s regulatory potential. Therefore, the second question in this research asks: How 
consistent are the performance assessments delivered by competing charity raters to nonprofit 
constituents? The answers to these questions are not obvious and will inform our understanding 
of the informational role of nonprofit quality certifiers, including their rating methodologies, the 
content of ratings, and interrater consistency.  
The next section provides a brief overview of the U.S. based nonprofit report cards. The 
following section formulates hypotheses about content and comparability of charity ratings. The 
Data and Methodology describes the empirical approach chosen for this analysis. The final 
section presents and discusses the findings, conclusion, and directions for further research. 
 
2.2 Overview of Nonprofit Rating Agencies 
  This section provides brief descriptive profiles of the third-party assessment services in 
the nonprofit sector that are consistent with the definition of performance report cards. The 
literature and internet search aimed at identifying nonprofit information intermediaries yielded 
eight U.S. based institutions that supply nonprofit performance information to facilitate the third 
sector’s accountability and improve decision making. This overview will focus on four of those 
evaluators, including (1) BBB Wise Giving Alliance, (2) Charity Watch, (3), Charity Navigator, 
and (4) Impact Matters. The other four identified watchdog organizations – GuideStar, Great 
Nonprofits, Give Well, and Forbes – are not included in the overview, as their information 
products are missing key data transformation elements that are inherent to performance report 
cards. Specifically, GuideStar and Give Well do not transform the information they collect in a 
form that facilitates easy interpretation and comparison of organizational performance. The Great 
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Nonprofits merely provides community-sourced qualitative reviews and reports aggregated 
community ratings as opposed to measuring objective performance. Finally, Forbes only ranks 
top 200 charities based on donations received along with reporting their total revenue, 
fundraising efficiency, and program spending.  
Although GuideStar is not a watchdog and doesn’t evaluate or rate charities, it’s 
important to note it is the largest so far database of nonprofit data maintaining online profiles on 
1.8 million IRS-recognized nonprofits and providing free access to Forms 990. Nonprofits can 
optionally provide additional information to their profiles on GuideStar and, based on the amount 
of provided information, earn one of its transparency seals – bronze, silver, gold, or platinum 
(GuideStar, 2020; GuidStar, 2020) as the Table 2.1 below shows: 
 
Table 2. 1:  Transparency seals from GuideStar 
Bronze 
 
Silver 
 
Gold 
 
Platinum 
 
Provide basic 
information about an 
organization to be 
found 
Be transparent about  
Its finances to build 
trust 
Share its goals and 
strategies 
Share its quantitative 
measures of progress 
and results to show 
the difference it makes 
  
 
Table 2.2 below summarizes the key characteristics of the four rating agencies. Besides 
the general credentials of each agency, the table shows how their services fit the definition of the 
organizational report card and the differences in their measures, scale, scope, and cost of access 
for the public.  
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Table 2. 2:  Summary of defining characteristics of nonprofit rating agencies 
 (1) 
BBB Wise Giving 
Alliance  
(2) 
Charity Watch 
(CW) 
(3) 
Charity Navigator 
(CN) 
(4) 
Impact Matters 
(IM) 
Web Address give.org charitywatch.org charitynavigator.org impactmatters.org 
Nonprofit Form 501(c)(3) 501(c)(3) 501(c)(3) 501(c)(3) 
Scope National National National National 
Total Revenue / 
Expenses 
2,154,985/2,410,923 
(FY 2018) 
550,990/574,040 
(FY 2018) 
3,915,429/3,521,729 
(FY 2018) 
779,004/870,852 
(FY 2018) 
Established 1918/1977-2001 1992 2001 2017 
Commitment to 
transparency on 
GuidStar.org 
NA Bronze Platinum Gold 
Organizational 
focus 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
External assessment  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
External audience Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regularity Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Data transformation  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Reported Measure Binary 
(Meets Standards / 
Standard is Not met) 
Ten-point ordinal 
scale 
(letter grades 
from A+ to F)  
Five-point ordinal scale 
(zero to four-star rating) 
Five-point ordinal 
scale 
(one to five-star 
rating) 
Number of rated 
organizations 
1300 670 9000 1080 
Type of rated 
organizations  
Nationally soliciting 
charities  
 
501(c)3, 501(c)4, 
501(c)19,  
public support > 
$1M 
 
U.S. based registered 
501(c)3, 
filing ≥ 7 years, 
revenue > 1M, 
public support ≥ $0.5M, 
40% revenue, 
fundraising exp. > 1% 
Nonprofits that 
directly deliver 
services to people 
Exceptions Hospitals, houses of 
worship, and 
educational 
institutions 
Houses of 
worship, PACs, 
clubs, colleges, 
hospitals, or other 
local institutions 
 
Land trusts, hospitals & 
their foundations; 
universities; schools & their 
foundations; sorority & 
fraternity foundations; 
donor advised funds; 
charities with CN 
advisories, fiscal sponsors 
Advocacy or systems 
change programs, 
religious 
organizations, 
community 
associations 
Selection Based on inquiries 
from constituents & 
charities 
Does not accept 
requests from 
charities 
If the criteria met, requests 
from the public are 
accepted through online 
voting  
Consider requests 
from the public, but 
cannot rate individual 
nonprofits 
Cost of Access to 
Report Cards for 
Users 
Free of charge 
 
Top Rated 
Charities – Free; 
Full Access - 
Paid Membership 
($50 annually) 
Free of charge Free of charge 
Additional paid 
services 
Accreditation Seal – 
Paid License 
NA NA Impact Audits4  
 
 
 
4 According to the Forms 990 for FY2017 and FY2018, Impact Matters had programs service revenue for Impact 
Audits 
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BBB’s Give.org 
The first nonprofit watchdogs – the National Charities Information Bureau (NCIB) and 
the Philanthropic Advisory Service (PAS) of the Council of Better Business Bureau – date back 
to 1918 and 1977 correspondingly (Kelly, 1998). Each year, the two agencies audited 100-200 
nationally soliciting charities (except hospitals, churches, and educational institutions) against 
their standards in finance, governance, transparency, and adherence to ethical and social norms. 
They distributed their findings on whether the audited charities were meeting the standards in the 
form of publications – educational brochures and summaries – as a free service to the public.  
In 2001, the NCIB and PAS merged to form the BBB Wise Giving Alliance (BBB’s 
Give.org) (Better Business Bureau, 2020)  – a 501(c)(3) organization that seeks “to help donors 
make informed giving decisions by verifying if charities meet the 20 BBB Standards for Charity 
Accountability [and] strengthen charity practices” (BBB Wise Giving Alliance, 2019). Being the 
oldest nonprofit information intermediary, the BBB’s Give.org assesses 1,300 nationally and 
over 10,000 locally soliciting charities. The evaluation reports are provided to the public at no 
cost through give.org (BBB Wise Giving Alliance, 2020). The charities that meet the BBB’s 
standards can purchase a license to display a BBB Accredited Charity Seal in their fundraising 
materials.  
BBB’s Give.org evaluates charities against 20 standards in the five following groups: 
1. Governance and oversight (five standards). This set of standards assumes that a 
charity has an active and independent volunteer board, as well as the institutions and 
procedures required to prevent it from potential self-dealing.  
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2. Measuring Effectiveness (two standards). This set of standards requires that an 
organization has measurable goals and a process of measuring its effectiveness in 
fulfilling its mission. 
3. Finances (six standards). This is a set of standards for financial metrics, including 
program expenses (≥65%), fundraising expenses (≤35%), size of the unrestricted net 
assets available as well as budgeting and reporting practices. 
4. Fundraising and Information Materials (five standards). Includes standards that 
ensure accuracy, completeness, and timeliness of a charity’s communications to the 
public through solicitations, informational materials, annual reports, website 
disclosures, and marketing disclosures. It also includes the requirements related to 
donor privacy and addressing complaints.  
When BBB’s Give.org finds that a charity meets its 20 standards, it assigns the 
organization “Meets Standards” grade. Otherwise, the organizations receive the “Standards Not 
Met” or “Unable to Verify” status. An example of the summary of the report card is presented 
below: 
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Figure 2. 1: Summary of a report card from BBB’s give.org.  
retreived may 31, 2020 from  https://www.give.org/charity-reviews/national/animal-
protection/american-humane-in-washington-dc-105. Screenshot by author.    
 
Overall, BBB’s Give.org relies on a comprehensive set of meaningful indicators of the 
nonprofit organization’s quality, but the binary scale of its reported summary measure that 
doesn’t allow one to distinguish between organizations within the passing or failing groups of 
charities appears to be its major shortcoming.  
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CharityWatch 
The next oldest and, at the same time, smallest in terms of its evaluation capacity charity 
rater is the American Institute of Philanthropy (AIP) currently operating as CharityWatch.  The 
agency rates mainly 501(c)3 public charities and some broadly soliciting 501(c)4 social welfare 
organizations and 501(c)19 veteran’s organizations. Also, it focuses on nonprofits “that receive 
$1 million or more of public support annually, are of interest to donors nationally, and have been 
in existence for at least three years” (CharityWatch, 2020b). The rating agency produces report 
cards for nearly 670 nonprofits and publishes them on its website. The service, however, is not 
entirely free of charge. The watchdog provides free public access to the report cards of its nearly 
250 top-rated charities. Full access to CharityWatch reports requires purchasing a $50 annual 
membership.  
According to CharityWatch, its mission is to “maximize the effectiveness of every dollar 
contributed to charity by providing donors with the information they need to make more 
informed giving decisions” (Charity Watch, 2020). The report card published by the watchdog, 
however, focuses on organizational efficiency rather than effectiveness. It includes a 
CharityWatch Grade, financial measures determining the grade, information on whether the 
charity meets the CW’s transparency and governance benchmarks, and additional descriptive 
information that may be material to donor decision making. The efficiency grade CharityWatch 
assigns each nonprofit it evaluates is a letter grade on an 11-point ordinal scale from A+ to F. 
The rater calculates the letter grade based on two financial efficiency measures – the program 
spending percentage and the cost to raise $100. According to the CharityWatch’s rating 
methodology, the agency assigns the final letter grade to a charity based on the average of the 
two measures using the CW’s own scale after applying a system of adjustments that result from 
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in-depth evaluations of an organization’s financial reports, audited financial statements, tax 
forms, and other financial and nonfinancial documents and inquiries. The rating summary of the 
report card is shown below: 
 
Figure 2. 2:  Summary of a report card from Charity Watch.  
Retreived May 31, 2020 from  https://www.charitywatch.org/charities/animal-welfare-institute. 
Screenshot by author. 
 
The adjustments that CharityWatch makes to the measures of efficiency and the resulting 
efficiency grades appear to be the hallmark of CharityWatch rating methodology. The evaluator 
makes adjustments so that they reflect the charity’s practices of treatment in-kind (non-cash) 
donations of goods and services (to capture charities’ potential inflation of the value of such 
assets), joint cost solicitation expenses (to capture a possible reporting of solicitation spending as 
program spending), and reserved assets (to capture excessive asset hoarding). CharityWatch 
claims that the extraordinary level of scrutiny they apply to their evaluations make their ratings 
“the most stringent in the sector” as opposed to “other charity information services [that] use 
simplistic or automated systems to generate ratings” (CharityWatch, 2020a). Nonetheless, 
CharityWatch clearly states their ratings reflect their opinion (CharityWatch, 2020c), whereas 
Lowell et al. (2005) criticized the CW ratings for lack of transparency and “gotcha” mentality. 
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Charity Navigator 
Charity Navigator’s mission is to “make impactful philanthropy easier for all” by helping 
donors make informed giving decisions. It was established in 2001 and is currently the largest in 
terms of revenue and rating capacity nonprofit evaluator. It assigns performance ratings to 
approximately 9,000 registered as 501(c)(3) public charities with the annual revenue over $1 
million (including at least $0.5 million in public support accounting for at least 40% revenue) 
that have been filing with the IRS for at least seven years. The criteria also require at least 1% of 
expenses to be allocated to fundraising. The agency provides its information services to the 
public free of charge and does not accept contributions from the rated charities (Charity 
Navigator, 2020c).  
According to its methodology (Charity Navigator, 2020a), Charity Navigator assigns 
charities three numeric scores on a scale of 1-100 and three star-ratings on a five-point scale: 
• Overall score and rating 
• Financial score and rating 
• Accountability and transparency score and rating.  
All the mentioned scores and ratings are included in the main section of the CN’s report card as 
shown below: 
 
 
Figure 2. 3: Summary of a report card from Charity Navigator.  
Retreived May 31, 2020 from  
https://www.charitynavigator.org/index.cfm?bay=search.summary&orgid=6082. Screenshot by 
author. 
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The CN’s overall score is obtained by applying the following mathematical transformation the 
two component scores: 
𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 = 100 −  √
(100−𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒)2+ (100−𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦&𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒)2 
2
  
 
Each of the star-ratings is determined based on the corresponding performance score using the 
conversion scheme presented in Table 2.3: 
 
Table 2. 3: Charity Navigator's overall rating and overall score 
Overall Rating: 
    
0 Stars Donor Advisory 
Overall Score: ≥ 90 80 - 90 70 - 80 55 - 70 < 55 N/A 
 
The CN’s star ratings also have a qualitative interpretation as presented in Table 2.4. 
 
Table 2. 4: Qualitative interpretation of the CN's star ratings 
No. of 
Stars 
Qualitative 
Rating 
Description 
 
Exceptional Exceeds industry standards and outperforms most charities in its 
Cause. 
 
Good Exceeds or meets industry standards and performs as well as or 
better than most charities in its Cause. 
 
Needs 
Improvement 
Meets or nearly meets industry standards but underperforms most 
charities in its Cause. 
 
Poor Fails to meet industry standards and performs well below most 
charities in its Cause. 
0-Stars Exceptionally 
Poor 
Performs far below industry standards and below nearly all 
charities in its Cause. 
CN 
Advisory 
No Rating Serious concerns have been raised about this charity which 
prevents the issuance of a star rating 
 
Charity Navigators uses seven financial performance metrics to compute a charity’s financial 
score. Each performance metric is measured by a score on a scale of 0 to 10. All the scores and 
30 points are added up so that that top possible score is 100 points. The financial metrics are 
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obtained from the Form 990 that charities file with the IRS and include four measures of 
financial efficiency (PM1-PM4) and three measures of financial capacity (PM5-PM7): 
• PM1: Program Expense Percentage 
• PM2 Administrative Expense Percentage 
• PM3: Fundraising Expense Percentage 
• PM4: Fundraising Efficiency 
• PM5: Program Expenses Growth 
• PM6: Working Capital Ratio 
• PM7: Liabilities to Assets Ratio 
 
When evaluating a charity, the CN assigns the scores on each of the measures according 
to its financial score conversion and tables, which are available to the public (Charity Navigator, 
2016a). Charity Navigator explains the conversion system by the need to recognize operational 
differences across different types of charities. Before assigning a score to financial efficiency 
metrics, Charity Navigator also claims that it makes joint cost allocation and indirect cost 
allocation adjustments. At the same time, nothing is mentioned about adjustments related to the 
valuation of in-kind donations.   
The CN calculates a charity’s accountability and transparency score by evaluating the 
charity against its 20 performance metrics using the data from its Form 990 and website (Charity 
Navigator, 2020b). The performance metrics are based on a set of good governance practices, 
policies, and reporting requirements. A charity’s score is calculated by subtracting a certain 
amount of points from the base score of 100 for each performance metric that the charity does 
not meet according to the CN’s table (Charity Navigator, 2020b).  
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On face value, the CN report cards appear to rely on a more comprehensive set of 
performance measures than the previously discussed two rating systems while also offering a set 
of user-convenient composite measures of overall organizational performance as well as its 
dimensions. At the same time, reliance on the form 990 data and, hence, arguably an 
oversimplistic treatment of nonprofit performance remain the main weaknesses of the CN 
evaluations. To address this issue, the Charity Navigator includes descriptive impact information 
to its report cards by sourcing it from partner services, including GuideStar, ImpactMatters, 
GlobalGiving, and Classy. This outsourced information, however, does not impact the CN 
ratings.  
 
ImpactMatters 
A startup nonprofit rating agency, Impact Matters, emerged in 2017, aiming to improve 
nonprofit accountability and donor decision-making  by calculating and reporting organizations’ 
impact and cost-effectiveness (ImpactMatters, 2017).  At the outset, the agency started providing 
two services focusing on “service delivery” nonprofits – guided impact reporting (extracting self-
reported data estimates of the cost-effectiveness from nonprofits) and nonprofit impact audits (an 
independent assessments of cost-effectiveness). At the end of 2019, ImpactMatters announced 
the start of its rating service. 
Currently, the agency reports on 1,080 nonprofits. Its report card includes an overall star-
impact rating on a five-point scale, an estimate of the charity’s cost-effectiveness, and a 
governance check as shown in the figure 2.4. below. 
24 
 
 
Figure 2. 4:  Summary of a report card from Impact Matters.  
Retreived May 31, 2020 from  
https://www.impactmatters.org/ratings/?q=United+Food+Bank+and+Services+of+Plant+City. 
Screenshot by author. 
 
The overall rating is assigned based on the following criteria: 
5 stars: The rated program is highly cost-effective. 
4 stars: The rated program is cost-effective. 
3 stars: The rated program does not meet ImpactMatters’ benchmark for cost-
effectiveness. 
2 stars: After being given an opportunity, the nonprofit chose not to publish impact 
information. 
1 star: There are indications of governance or financial health issues at the nonprofit. 
 
In summary, ImpactMatters takes a different rating approach compared to the other three 
agencies by attempting to fill the information gap their report cards have been most criticized for. 
Among the potential shortcomings of the impact-based ratings could be their limited 
comparability across causes, complexity of evaluation, susceptibility to error, dependence on the 
available impact-related information in public sources, higher cost, and limited evaluation 
capacity and pool of nonprofits to choose from  (ImpactMatters, 2020a, 2020b, 2020c).  
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2.3 Content and Comparability of Charity Ratings: Hypotheses 
Third-party raters analyze information known to private parties and reveal it to other 
interested uninformed parties. Typically, they obtain one summary score that aggregates a certain 
amount of performance information to accomplish this task (Scanlon, Chernew, Sheffler, & 
Fendrick, 1998). Such information reflects various dimensions of performance, which are 
measured, transformed into index scores, and assigned some normative values – ratings. 
Consequently, raters are supposed to make many important decisions as to the content of their 
ratings, including data sources, sampling, selection of measures, and methodology of computing 
ratings. As a result, different rating systems might reveal different amounts of information, be 
driven by different factors, and, more importantly, be ultimately in disagreement with each other. 
Scanlon et al. (1998) noted that “such disagreements may undermine the public’s confidence in 
these instruments” (p.13) and cause underutilization of such systems by their potential users in 
their decision making.  
Some research supports these assumptions. For instance, Lizzeri (1999) studied the extent 
of information revelation and strategic manipulation by quality certification intermediaries. He 
argued that a monopoly certifier is motivated to reveal only a minimal amount of information by 
providing a simple pass/fail certificate based on a minimum quality standard. However, as the 
number of intermediaries grows, competition between them leads to full information revelation. 
Interestingly, the oldest charity rating agency, the BBB Wise Giving Alliance, uses a very 
similar rating scale – Meets Standards/Standards Not Met (Gordon et al., 2009). Later entrants to 
the market of rating charities - the American Institute of Philanthropy, or the Charity Watch, 
offer progressively more elaborate rating scales.  
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Zhe Jin et al. (2010) conducted an experimental study of the informational role of 
certification intermediaries in the context of sportscard grading markets. Consistent with the 
points made above, they found that the first professional certifier provides less information for 
uninformed parties than new entrants who differentiate from it by offering finer grading 
approaches and more precise signals about quality. 
Pope (2009) studied patient response to US News and World Report (USNWR) hospital 
quality rankings. USNWR claimed that it ranked 2000 eligible hospitals based on: (1) a survey of 
physicians, (2) the hospital-specialty’s mortality rate, and (3) a combination of other hospital 
characteristics. The methodology stated that each factor contributed one-third to the final score.  
However, the author showed that statistically the reputation score explained over 95 percent of 
the variation in the score almost entirely driving the rankings, and mortality rates accounted for 
less than one percent. In that regard, they concluded that “reputation scores” (which are much 
more variable than risk-adjusted mortality rates) represent more of the final score than the claim 
of one-third. Thus, the continuous quality score that is provided for each hospital can be 
essentially thought of as an affine transformation of the reputation score.” (p.1156).  
The largest rater, Charity Navigator writes that it calculates an organization’s final score 
based on two factors – financial health and accountability/transparency – and that seven financial 
health indicators contribute equally to the financial health score. Hence, it is reasonable to expect 
that: 
H1: The accountability score explains a substantial portion of the variation in the final 
score assigned to a charity 
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H2: Program expenses, administrative expenses, fundraising expenses, fundraising 
efficiency, primary revenue growth, program expenses growth, and working capital ratio 
contribute equally to the final score assigned to a charity. 
 Scanlon et al. (1998) present another useful piece of research underscoring the 
importance of studying the information role and comparability of performance rating agencies. 
This research team examined health plan ratings and rating consistency across different plans. 
They discovered that although on the whole plan ratings were positively correlated, the extent of 
agreement varied substantially. They write that “the correlations in scores were often weak [and] 
in several cases there was dramatic disagreement among report cards” (p. 13). Such 
disagreement among report cards, in turn, might send mixed signals to uninformed parties and 
undermine the confidence in the instrument. Charity ratings would be most useful and effective 
if ratings assigned by different agencies did not contradict each other: 
H3: Charity ratings issued by major rating agencies will be highly correlated and 
consistent 
Overall, the reviewed literature on the comparability of external quality/performance 
certifiers admits that we still know little about the behavior of professional certifiers, and few 
studies have compared external raters  (Scanlon et al., 1998; Zhe Jin et al., 2010). Even less is 
known about the behavior of charity raters. Except for the two descriptive studies by Lowell et 
al. (2005)  and National Council of Nonprofit Associations and the National Human Services 
Assembly (2005), there is no scholarly research comparing charity rating agencies.  
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2.4 Data and Methodology 
This analysis focuses on the whole population of the charities rated by Charity Navigator 
(CN) for the fiscal years 2000-2018. These data are available in open access at the Charity 
Navigator website, and the dataset was obtained using automatic data extraction techniques that 
involved data scraping directly from the website using R statistical software. The resulting 
dataset overall contains 102534 observations for 8640 charities rated based on financial data for 
FYE 2000-2018. The distribution of the ratings based on fiscal years (FY) is presented in the 
Appendix A.   
In addition to the CN data, the analysis will also utilize the American Institute of 
Philanthropy's Charity Watch (CW) ratings to answer the questions related to the comparability 
of charity ratings. Access to all CW ratings is provided to paid CW members only through the 
rater’s password-protected website. The dataset that includes ratings on 595 charities obtained 
from the source website after purchasing a membership by using a similar set of web scraping 
techniques. Unlike Charity Navigator that provides historical data on its ratings, the Charity 
Watch makes available only its most recent ratings. The obtained dataset contained ratings 
assigned to charities based on their financial data for fiscal years 2012 – 2018 with the 
overwhelming majority of ratings based on the FYE 2016 – 2018 financial reports. The 
distribution of the CW sample across fiscal years is presented in the Appendix A.  
The CN and CW are the two largest quality certifiers that offer some of the most 
elaborate report cards and ratings with multiple point scales. Both heavily rely on forms 990 for 
performance information. Both provide their rating data on their websites with names and unique 
identification numbers of the charities they rate and description of their rating methodologies.  
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 This research focuses on Charity Navigator ratings to address the first question regarding 
the extent to which charity ratings reveal information to their users. To obtain star ratings, the 
CN computes continuous scores on each of the following composite dimensions of charity 
performance: accountability and transparency scores, financial scores, and overall scores. 
Charity Navigator claims that the financial score is determined as an additive index of 7 
measures equally determining a charity's financial score and rating.  
To see what performance dimensions and measures represent the variation in the final 
score and, thus, drive the ratings, this analysis followed the approach Pope (2008) took for 
determining the drivers of hospital rankings. The continuous performance score is regressed first 
on all of the variables described by CN methodology and on each component separately. In 
addition, given there are eight potential drivers of the final ratings in the methodology of Charity 
Navigator, this analysis conducts a hierarchical linear regression by successively adding more 
predictors to the model. The statistics of interest in this analysis is the coefficient of 
determination (R-squared), which shows how much variation in different variables – components 
of the overall score contribute to the variation in final scores and charity ratings (the technique is 
identical to the forward model selection based on R-squared). This analysis would allow a 
comparison of the contribution of different determinants of the composite scores to the rater’s 
claims regarding the content of the summary grades.  
Two additional analyses will answer the second question regarding the consistency of 
different rating systems. One approach used by Scanlon et al. (1998) to compare health plan 
ratings is to compute the Spearman rank correlation coefficient for the examined rating systems. 
The magnitude of the estimated correlation coefficient will indicate the extent of agreement 
among the raters, and the ratings are hypothesized to be highly correlated. Zhe Jin et al. (2010), 
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however, argued that, because different ratings (grades) are ordinal and due to different grading 
cutoffs are not readily comparable, computing the raw rank correlation is not a very robust 
approach. Therefore, an additional analysis in this section will follow the method Zhe Jin et al. 
(2010) adopted to compare alternative certifiers in the market of sportscard grading.  
In the context of charity rating, this analysis uses a sample of 210 charities that is an 
intersection of the two rating data sets – Charity Navigator and the Charity Watch. This analysis 
will examine if the two raters agree on the relative performance of any two charities (A and B for 
further convenience) selected from the sample. The two raters, the CN and CW, will be defined 
as strongly consistent if they agree that the performance of the charity A is superior or equal to 
that of charity B (pA≥pB). If one of the raters decided that pA>pB, but the other rated pA<pB, then 
the two are strongly inconsistent. The final alternative, when one of the raters decided that pA>pB 
but the other rated pA=pB, than the two raters are weakly inconsistent for this pair of charities. 
Such a comparison will be made for all distinct pairs of n charities (the total number of pairs can 
be calculated as n!/2(n-2)! ). The results of all the comparisons will be recorded and percentages 
in which the raters are strongly consistent, strongly inconsistent, and weakly inconsistent will be 
calculated. This analysis will provide an informative description of the degree of consistency 
among the two raters.  
 
2.5 Findings 
Because this study examines how much each component in the structure of the CN rating 
contributes to explaining the variation in the rating grades, the available data were further 
restricted to the observations that included the Accountability and Transparency rating, which 
31 
 
Charity Navigator introduced in September 2011 (Charity Navigator, 2016b). As a result, the 
restricted dataset that included ratings using the CN methodologies 2.0 and 2.1 contained 69,409 
observations for 8640 charitable agencies. After recalculating all the Overall Scores from the 
Financial score and Accountability and Transparency score using the formula that Charity 
Navigator uses ( 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 = 100 −  √
(100−𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒)2+ (100−𝐴&𝑇 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒)2 
2
 ), the 
analysis found that Overall Scores in 1018 observations published for 543 agencies did not 
match the recalculated scores (Appendix A, Figure A.5). Along with observations with missing 
ratings, the total number of 1093 observations (1.6 percent of all available observations) were 
also removed from further analysis.  
According to the CN methodology (Charity Navigator, 2020a), the Overall Score is 
obtained using a nonlinear, but identical for the two components transformation of the Financial 
Score and Accountability and Transparency Score, so the R2 from the linear model that includes 
both variables will be less than 100 percent, but the contributions of each component can be 
estimated relative to it. The results are presented in Table 2.5. They show that, when the R2 with 
both components of the score equals 96 percent, the Financial Score alone explains 58 percent in 
the variation, and the Accountability and Transparency Score alone explains 51 percent of the 
variation in the Overall Score. Out of the total explained variation, the contribution of the 
Financial Score into the overall measure appears to be larger by only 20.8 percentage points, and 
it can be concluded that both measures have substantial and comparable influence over the 
composite score.  This finding is consistent with the first hypothesis that the accountability score 
explains a substantial portion of the variation in the final score assigned to a charity. 
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Table 2. 5:  Relative contributions of the Financial Score and Accountability and Transparency 
Score in explaining the variation in the Overall Score 
 Model Adjusted 
R2 
Improvement 
in R2  
Contribution  
(percent) 
1 Overall Score ~ Financial Score 0.58  60.4 
 Overall Score ~ A&T Score 0.51  53.13 
     
2 Overall Score ~ Financial Score + A&T Score 0.96 0.38 100 
 
Table 2.6 presents the results of conducting the hierarchical linear regression for the 
Financial Score using a stepwise adjusted R2-based forward selection. The first step regresses 
the Financial Score on each of the components alone. The adjusted R2s are recorded and 
compared to find the largest one to select the model for the next step, and the procedure is 
repeated until reaching the full model that includes all the components of the Financial Score. 
The predictors that make the largest increments in adjusted R2 in each step are highlighted in the 
table.     
The first interesting result that follows from this analysis is that the full model, despite 
being additive, with all the predictors included, explains only 54 percent of the variation in the 
Financial Score. The remaining variation in the Financial Score thus can probably be explained 
by the normative conversion schemes and adjustments that Charity Navigator applies to the raw 
financial measures to obtain the converted scores that then added up to convert to a 100-point 
scale. Thus, it would be fair to conclude that the Financial Score is only partially (54 percent) 
objective.  
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Table 2. 6:  Hierarchical linear regression using R2-based forward model selection 
Step Model Adj. 
R2 
% 
1 Financial Rating ~ Program Expenses 0.33  61.1 
 Financial Rating ~ Administrative Expenses 0.14  
 Financial Rating ~ Fundraising Expenses 0.22  
 Financial Rating ~ Fundraising Efficiency 0.25  
 Financial Rating ~ Program Expenses Growth 0.18  
 Financial Rating ~ Working Capital (WC) Ratio 0.01  
 Financial Rating ~ Liabilities to Assets (LA) Ratio 0.03  
    
2 Financial Rating ~ Progr. Expenses + Admin. Expenses 0.34  
 Financial Rating ~ Progr. Expenses + Fundr. Expenses 0.34  
 Financial Rating ~ Progr. Expenses + Fundr. Efficiency 0.37  
 Financial Rating ~ Progr. Expenses + Progr. Expenses Growth 0.45 83.3 
 Financial Rating ~ Progr. Expenses + Working Capital Ratio 0.36  
 Financial Rating ~ Progr. Expenses + LA Ratio 0.36  
    
3 Financial Rating ~ Progr. Expenses + Progr. Expenses Growth + Admin. Expenses 0.46  
 Financial Rating ~ Progr. Expenses + Progr. Expenses Growth + Fundr. Expenses 0.46  
 Financial Rating ~ Progr. Expenses + Progr. Expenses Growth + Fundr. Efficiency 0.49 90.7 
 Financial Rating ~ Progr. Expenses + Progr. Expenses Growth + WC Ratio 0.48  
 Financial Rating ~ Progr. Expenses + Progr. Expenses Growth + LA Ratio 0.48  
    
4 Financial Rating ~ Progr. Expenses + Progr. Expenses Growth + Fundr. Efficiency + Admin. Exp. 0.49  
 Financial Rating ~ Progr. Expenses + Progr. Expenses Growth + Fundr. Efficiency + Fundr. Exp. 0.49  
 Financial Rating ~ Progr. Expenses + Progr. Expenses Growth + Fundr. Efficiency + WC Ratio 0.52 96.2 
 Financial Rating ~ Progr. Expenses + Progr. Expenses Growth + Fundr. Efficiency + LA Ratio 0.52 96.2 
    
5 Financial Rating ~ Progr. Expenses +                                  Progr. Expenses Growth + Fundr. 
Efficiency + WC Ratio + LA Ratio 
0.54 100 
 Financial Rating ~ Admin. Expenses + Fundr. Expenses + Progr. Expenses Growth + Fundr. 
Efficiency + WC Ratio + LA Ratio 
0.54 100 
 
Table 2. 7:  Relative contributions of the reported Program Expense Ratio and Fundraising 
Efficiency in explaining the variation of the Charity Watch grades 
 Model Adjusted 
R2 
Improvement 
in R2  
Contribution  
(percent) 
1 Overall Score ~ Fundr. Efficiency 0.34  97.14 
 Overall Score ~ Progr. Expenses  0.27  77.14 
     
2 Grade ~ Progr. Expenses + Fundr. Efficiency 0.35 0.01 100 
 
 
The next interesting finding is that two variables - Program Expenses and Program 
Expenses Growth are the major drivers of the variation in the Overall Score as the two variables 
jointly account for 83.3 percent of the variation explained by the model with all predictors 
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included. Along with the Fundraising Efficiency, the three efficiency measures explain over 90 
percent of the variation in the Financial Score. Also, when the Program Expenses variable is 
included in the model as an explanatory variable, the Administrative Expenses and Fundraising 
Expenses do not add any explanatory power to the set of predictors, which is consistent with the 
fact that the Administrative Expenses variable is a linear combination of the former two 
measures. Overall, this analysis disconfirms the second hypothesis that the seven financial 
measures that the rating agency uses in its calculation of the Financial Score equally contribute 
to the final score assigned to a charity.  
 The first step in conducting the consistency analysis for the two charity raters was 
converting charity ratings assigned by each rating agency to a numeric scale. Charity Navigator 
rates nonprofits on a five-point scale from zero to four stars. The numeric values were assigned 
accordingly in the range between zero and four. Charity Watch’s grading scale is different from 
the one used by Charity Navigator. It uses 11 letter-grades from the lowest “F” grade to the 
highest “A” grade. The letter-based performance grades by the CW were converted into numeric 
grades using two approaches. First, letters were converted to 11 numeric grades from 0 – 10 to 
preserve the native CW scale. The second conversion adapted the CW scale to the CN scale 
converting the 11-point letter scale into a five-point numeric scale to make it similar to the CN 
scale. The distribution of the original grades and the converting schemes are provided in Figures 
A1-A4 and Table A1 of the Appendix A.  Analyses of consistency were conducted for both 
converted scales. Consistency analyses could be conducted only for the ratings assigned to the 
same charity for the same fiscal year. Therefore, the two datasets were intersected based on those 
two variables. After the three matching nonprofits that had split CN ratings were removed, the 
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final sample contained 210 matching charities that yielded 21,945 unique pairs of ratings for 
consistency analysis. 
 Table 2.8 below shows that the association between the CN and CW score is moderately 
strong regardless of whether the native or converted numeric scale is used for the CW ratings. In 
fact, the Pearson correlation coefficient is even somewhat higher when the CW rating is 
measured on the native 11-point scale.  
Table 2. 8: Pearson correlation coefficients between the CN and CW performance grades. 
 CN grade ~ CW Grade (on 
the native 0-10 scale) 
CN grade ~ CW Grade (on 
the adapted 0-4 scale) 
Pearson Correlation 
Coefficient 
0.54 0.51 
 
 
When the rating grades assigned by the two alternative agencies are compared on their 
native measuring scales, the consistency analysis, results of which are presented in Figure 2.5 
and Table 2.9, shows that grades for only 50.2 percent of all distinct pairs of charities in the 
sample are strongly consistent according to the definition. Another 35.6 percent of grade 
comparisons in the sample show weak inconsistency in the assigned overall performance grades, 
whereas 14.2 percent of the compared grades fall in the category of strongly inconsistent. 
Converting the CW 11-point letter scale to a five-point numeric scale that is consistent with the 
CN grading scale lead to increased distances between CW’s grades could eliminate differences 
in the CW grades for some of the compared charities in the sample. This, in turn, would lead to 
an improvement in inter-rater consistency. The second column in Table 2.9 shows that the 
overall consistency only slightly improved as the percentage of strongly inconsistent grades 
decreased by 2.4 percentage points, almost entirely moving to the weakly inconsistent category. 
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The percent of strongly consistent grades improved by only 0.1 percent, leaving the consistency 
rate at 50.3 percent.  
 
Figure 2. 5:  Inter-rater consistency in charity performance grades 
 
Table 2. 9:  Cross-rater consistency in rating grades 
 Consistency (Percent) 
when CW Grade on the 
Native 0-10 Scale 
Consistency 
(Percent) when CW 
Grade on the Native 
0-10 Scale and 
observations with 
errors in the CN 
Overall Rating 
removed 
Consistency (Percent) 
when CW Grade on the 
Converted 0-4 Scale 
Strongly 
Consistent       
50.2 44.6 50.3 
Weakly 
Inconsistent       
35.6 39.5 37.9 
Strongly 
Inconsistent 
14.2 15.9 11.8 
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2.6 Conclusions and Implications 
Modern information and computer technologies have created favorable conditions for the 
charity rating industry, but from the capacity perspective, it still appears to be in its nascent state. 
As follows from this study, not only the major charity rating agencies rate a relatively small 
fraction of the reporting to the IRS nonprofit agencies, the assigned performance grades are 
mainly driven by a rather limited set of measures, even if it looks different on the surface. 
This analysis focuses on the informational content and consistency of the major charity 
raters that rely on the same data source – Form 990. In the case with Charity Navigator, the 
largest issuer of charity ratings that evaluates and assigns performance grade to over 9000 public 
charities, the two components that make up the overall performance score are the Financial 
Score and the Accountability and Transparency Score with the former contributing 60.4 percent 
and the latter 39.6 percent to their joint explanatory power. Out of seven predictors of the 
Financial Score, two (Administrative Expenses and Fundraising Expenses) appear to add no 
informational content to the model and are redundant. Another pair of measures jointly adds only 
five percent to the informational capacity of the model. As a result, the financial score is mainly 
driven by three efficiency measures, which collectively focus on charity program spending 
levels. In other words, the informational content of the charity performance ratings is lower than 
it appears on face value. By contrast to the CN, the grades provided by the Charity Navigator are 
almost entirely driven by the measure of fundraising efficiency, while the two measures used in 
the calculation of the rating explain only 35 percent of the variation in the assigned grades.  
The analysis of inter-rater consistency conducted in this study also shows that there might 
be a variation in the signals that different rating agencies send to donors about the same charities 
at the same point in time based on the same information sources.  From the perspective of a 
38 
 
potential donor, this may make the process of information search about charitable performance 
costlier as it requires considering alternative options, learning about details and differences, and 
choosing among raters. Both low informational content and a too low level of consistency among 
evaluations provided by alternative raters can also have negative impacts on public trust in 
charity performance monitoring systems. 
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CHAPTER 3: INDIVIDUAL DONOR RESPONSE TO CHARITY RATINGS 
3.1 Introduction 
According to long-established theories, the prohibition from distributing the operational 
surplus to owners makes private nonprofit organizations a trustworthy alternative to 
opportunistic businesses – in other words, a vehicle to overcome the contract failure5 (Steinberg, 
2006). Because of the non-distribution constraint plus entrepreneurial sorting6 (Young, 2013), 
those in control of an organization will be less motivated to compromise on quality or quantity. 
However, as in traditional market exchange relations where information asymmetry between 
buyers and sellers about quality leads to market inefficiencies (Akerlof, 1970), information 
asymmetry concerning organizational performance allows low-quality nonprofit institutions to 
attract donor resources for unproductive and sometimes even not well-intended  uses (Charity 
Watch, 2018; Kelly, 1998; Salamon, 2012).  Repeated high-profile reputational failures 
involving ineffectiveness, fraud, wastefulness, and lavish spending on executive perks 
(Attkisson, 2009; Goldberg, 2015; Hoffman, 2006) and the growing negative perceptions about 
nonprofits undermine public confidence in and future support of these institutions (Interactive, 
2006; Kelly, 1998; Light, 2008; Peng, Kim, & Deat, 2019; Rhode & Packel, 2009; Salamon, 
2012). As it becomes increasingly evident to the public that the nonprofit status does not prevent 
organizational leaders from pursuing selfish ends or running inefficient operations, public 
disenchantment with the third sector leads to questioning the rationale behind nonprofit tax 
 
5 According to Hansmann’s theory of the nonprofit enterprise (Hansmann, 1980) when “the quantity or quality of 
service cannot be verified, markets take advantage of informational asymmetries” (Steinberg, 2006, p. 119) 
6 According to (Young, 2013), “entrepreneurs of different motivations and styles sort themselves out by industries 
and economic sectors in a way that matches the preferences of these entrepreneurs for wealth, power, intellectual 
or moral purposes, and other goals with the opportunities for achieving these goals in different parts of the 
economy” (p.3) and “participants in nonprofit agencies tend to have personal goals and attitudes more consistent 
with maintaining the quality and integrity of services than do participants in other sectors” (p. 128) 
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privileges and the adequacy of nonprofit accountability (Herzlinger, 1995; Hoffman, 2006; 
Kelly, 1998; Salamon, 2012; The Washington Post, 2018). 
While government has limited capacity to protect public interest by enforcing nonprofit 
fiduciary duties (Gilkeson, 2006), making performance information available to the public could 
facilitate accountability and establish a basis for trust in nonprofit institutions without turning to 
intrusive regulatory methods (Moxham, 2009; Salamon, 2002). Such a decentralized approach 
requires sophisticated performance measurement and impact evaluation, which is challenging to 
implement in the nonprofit practice, and few nonprofits actually use it (Brody, 2002; Ebrahim & 
Rangan, 2010; Lampkin et al., 2007; Lynch-Cerullo & Cooney, 2011; Moxham, 2009; Rowe, 
2012). Furthermore, most individual donors have limited ability to process complex performance 
reports (Gormley & Weimer, 1999; Lampkin et al., 2007). As a result, information asymmetry 
remains between a nonprofit and its donors regardless of its use of performance measurement.  
Mechanisms that could effectively facilitate performance-based accountability in the 
nonprofit sector thus should satisfy demands that go beyond traditional performance 
measurement. Besides valid and comprehensive analysis, they must provide independent, 
objective, and regular assessment. In addition to that, information must be relevant, 
comprehensible, easily accessible to nonprofit donors. In theory, systems that have potential to 
accommodate such conflicting demands are known as organizational performance report cards 
(Gormley & Weimer, 1999). Some researchers have argued that nonprofit performance report 
cards (typically known as nonprofit watchdog groups or charity ratings) offer excellent 
performance standards for advising donors and may become a potentially powerful monitoring 
instrument to address accountability and performance concerns (Gilkeson, 2006; Herzlinger, 
1995). At the same time, the tool can only be effective if intended users meaningfully and 
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consequentially refer to the metrics embedded in charity ratings to inform their donative decision 
making. Nonetheless, the scholarly literature does not agree the regulatory effectiveness of 
nonprofit rating systems. 
This study examines the effects of performance report cards on individual behavior. In 
particular, since performance information is subject to biased interpretation by individuals 
(Bækgaard & Serritzlew, 2015), this study draws on the model of the perceptual determinants of 
donor behavior (Sargeant, Ford, & West, 2006), the theories of the nonprofit supply, and the 
broader literature on nonprofit performance measurement and performance report cards to 
examine how measures presented in charity ratings affect individual giving decisions. It also 
explores the mediating role of donor perceptions of nonprofit performance and donor trust in 
nonprofit organizations as well as the moderating effects of certain donor characteristics.  The 
research simultaneously focuses on two salient measures that rating agencies and the broader 
public heavily rely upon – a charity’s overhead spending ratio and its composite performance 
score. Additionally, it investigates a potential interaction between them. By reporting the 
findings from a randomized survey experiment that recreated a realistic decision-making 
situation, this study extends our limited scholarly understanding of individual reactions to 
nonprofit performance measures, the mechanisms facilitating them, and, therefore, the regulatory 
potential of publicized performance grades. Furthermore, the results of this research suggest 
significant practical implications for future performance monitoring policies and measurement 
practices, including the content, design, and use of nonprofit performance report cards.   
The next section overviews the theoretical and empirical literature on the relationship 
between nonprofit performance and individual charitable giving. The following section 
formulates several testable hypotheses about how donors respond to performance measures in 
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charity ratings. The Methodology and Measurements sections describe the experiment to test the 
hypotheses. The final section presents and discusses the findings, directions for further research, 
and limitations. 
 
3.2 Performance, Trust, & Individual Donor Behavior 
A wide variety of extrinsic and intrinsic factors drive individual giving behavior. The classic 
theories focus on public benefits, private benefits, and the price of charitable giving  (E. Brown 
& Slivinski, 2006; Vesterlund, 2006). Public benefits are altruistic, driven by a desire to create 
common goods and see the needs of others fulfilled (e.g., caring about others). Private benefits 
accrue to the donor. They include “warm glow” or feeling good about making a donation, 
prestige, self-esteem, recognition, avoiding guilt, or scorn, etc. Altruistic donors probably care 
more about the quantity and quality of services provided, which would drive donors’ concerns 
about organizational performance and influence giving decisions. But E. Brown and Slivinski 
(2006) write that even “warm-glow motive [is] centered on inducing output rather than simply 
donating dollars” (p. 145). Similarly, deriving good reputation is more likely by supporting an 
organization with a good performance record rather than one with a poor standing. 
Hirschman (1970) provides a useful conceptual framework that describes the behavior of the 
customer facing a decline in an organization. According to the theory, when absolute or relative 
quality of a provided product declines, the dissatisfied customer has only two options – 
economic (“exit”) or political (“voice”). Exit implies the customer’s withdrawal from the 
relationship. Voice is an attempt to actively change the organization’s practices. Voice is a 
relatively costly, and, unless exit is unavailable or the individual is a member of the organization, 
43 
 
exit is the prevalent reaction. The framework also categorizes customers as alert and inert with 
respect to quality. If an organization has a mix of alert and inert customers, revenue, as 
Hirschman (1970) explains, “will normally decline steadily as quality drops” (p. 23) without 
causing too much damage that would lead to the firm’s immediate failure.  
However, when deep information asymmetry is present, as in the context of most public 
charities, individual donors cannot observe and compare the quantity or quality of services 
provided. Therefore, Sargeant et al. (2006) emphasize the importance of donors’ perceptions of 
the organization, its output, management, performance, and various benefits they might derive by 
supporting a nonprofit. Perceptual factors can also be divided into perceptions of private and 
public benefits from making a donation (Sargeant et al., 2006).  
Drawing on social exchange theory, Sargeant et al. (2006) further distinguished three 
categories of perceptual benefits: demonstrable, emotional, and familial. Demonstrable benefits 
refer to selfish economic considerations, such as perceptions of one’s improved standing in the 
donor’s social group and may result from the visibility of giving.  Emotional and familial 
benefits are associated with donors’ emotional experiences. Their argument states that a 
charitable act can evoke positive emotions, desirable mood changes, or good feelings, and might 
be an indication of donor commitment to a particular cause. Sargeant et al. (2006) did not find 
evidence supporting the demonstrable benefits argument, but they found emotional and familial 
benefits to be significant and direct (bypassing trust) drivers of individual willingness to donate.  
Potential donors use various information cues to shape their beliefs about how a nonprofit 
will use a charitable gift and fulfill its fiduciary obligations. Such beliefs are viewed as trust (in a 
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specific nonprofit organization), and this construct mediates the relationship between perceived 
performance and giving behavior, as the Figure 3.1 below shows. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. 1:  Perceptual Determinants of Charitable Giving 
 
Trust and perceptions of performance drive donor decisions. Individuals are concerned 
about the extent to which nonprofits help people, spend money wisely, behave ethically, and run 
programs well  (Interactive, 2006; Light, 2008). Positively perceiving a charity’s performance 
increases trust in that organization (Sargeant et al., 2006) Individuals’ perceptions of higher 
quality of information about how donor money is used can impact giving via trust  (Sargeant et 
al., 2006). In one 2013 survey, 81 percent of  respondents saw impact as the most essential factor 
in deciding whether to donate, 75 percent looked for online information about nonprofits, 57 
percent made a donation after watching an online video, and 47 percent researched across 
nonprofits before donating (Google, 2013).  
According to the research focusing on nonprofit efficiency, donors incorporate 
performance concerns in their decision-making. Donor perceptions of nonprofit efficiency 
influence both their evaluation of an organization and their propensity to give (Bennett & Savani, 
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2003). Private donors are particularly sensitive to organizational overhead costs – the share of 
income spent on administration and fundraising. A 2008 survey on charitable confidence7 
revealed that s majority of Americans believe that charities waste money as well as serious 
public concerns about nonprofit spending and inefficiency even among strong charity supporters 
(Light, 2008). The majority of people are concerned about how much charities spend on 
administration and marketing and think that most charities spend more than they should (Bennett 
& Savani, 2003). Charities that spent more of their donor contributions directly on programmatic 
activities and actively informed the public about this were more successful in attracting 
donations. They wrote that “value for money was cited more frequently as a factor in choosing 
charities than were specific charitable objectives” (p. 328), implying crucial importance to 
donors of the quality of a charity in terms of its efficiency and effectiveness. More recent 
research provides some experimental evidence indicating the unpopularity of overhead costs 
among donors. For instance, Gneezy, Keenan, and Gneezy (2014) concluded that nonprofit 
supporters tend to avoid organizations with high overhead ratios, which the authors argued hurts 
organizational outcomes. Other experimental findings suggest a more complex relationship. 
Information that a charity is efficient leads some donors to give more since their money creates 
more value, but leads others to give less since they can achieve the same value at a lower cost 
(Butera & Horn, 2014). 
Studies of e-philanthropy also indicate that trust has a big influence on donative 
intentions  (Burt & Dunham, 2009). Drawing on  personal psychology and e-commerce 
literature, Burt and Dunham (2009) argued that those with a higher level of dispositional trust 
 
7 Conducted for the Organizational Performance Initiative at New York University’s Robert F. Wagner School of 
Public Service 
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(trusting others) might be more likely to trust a nonprofit. Transactional trust (a donor’s 
perception of how their donation will be used - performance) can be improved by providing 
relevant and rich information about the organization and its activities (Burt & Dunham, 2009; 
Burt & Gibbons, 2011).  
Overall, the theory argues that various dimensions of nonprofit performance have strong 
relevance to donor decision-making. Some nonprofit supporters not only demonstrate a passion 
for their cause, but also consider an organization’s efficacy in carrying out their missions (Hart, 
Greenfield, & Haji, 2007). Hence, under complete information, organizational performance 
would be a significant factor stimulating some potential donors to prioritize their donations to the 
uses that promise the highest value of benefits that accrue to beneficiaries per dollar contributed. 
In practice, however, potential donors must rely on various information cues such as overhead 
ratios, annual reports, marketing communications, articles in mass media, and other sources of 
incomplete and often biased information. Even in the presence of robust and objective 
performance measurement systems and reports, substantial information asymmetry between 
nonprofits and their supporters would likely remain due to the cost of processing sophisticated 
performance evaluations (Lampkin et al., 2007). The following section discusses nonprofit 
performance ratings as a potentially significant information cue that can shape individual 
perceptions of charity performance and thus influence their giving decisions. 
 
3.3 Performance Ratings and Donor Reactions: Research Hypotheses 
Third-party quality certification services have emerged in recent decades to provide an 
independent, objective, comprehensive, easy-to-interpret, low-cost-to-access, and convenient 
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tool to assess nonprofit performance. If individuals care about nonprofit performance in their 
donative calculus, as the theory argues, and if they regard charity ratings as a valid source of 
such information, they will use the evaluations provided in those ratings to inform their 
perceptions of nonprofit organization performance when making giving decisions. Quality 
ratings have proven to be a useful informational instrument for improving efficiency in many 
sectors of social-economic activity including debt markets, restaurants, healthcare, and sport 
cards (Capeci, 1991; Jin & Leslie, 2009; Jin & Whalley, 2007a; Johnson & Kriz, 2002; Luca, 
2011; Pope, 2009; Zhe Jin et al., 2010), Charity rating agencies too can serve as quality 
certification intermediaries that correct resource allocation in the nonprofit sector based on 
organizational performance. Such rating services could reduce the cost of performance 
information search and interpretation to a potential donor. This, in turn, would “lubricate” donor 
decision-making processes and help guide the flow of charitable dollars towards “good” 
organizations. 
Nonprofit scholars started studying the impacts of the third-party nonprofit performance 
report cards more than a decade ago, but do not agree on whether charity rating systems affect 
giving decisions or not. the available to date literature is split on the question of whether charity 
rating systems affect giving decisions or not. Using organization-level data, Chhaochharia and 
Ghosh (2008) found that the charities that received the lowest ratings from the American 
Institute of Philanthropy received fewer contributions. The authors concluded that the tool 
provides informational value to donors and reduces information asymmetry. Sloan (2009) found 
that New York charities with “pass” grade from the Better Business Bureau’s Wise Giving 
Alliance received an increase in contributions compared to those that did not have a rating. At 
the same time, the “did not pass” label did not affect donations. Using a random sample of 405 
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charities rated by Charity Navigator, Gordon et al. (2009) found evidence that a change in ratings 
is associated with a corresponding change in donations.  Brown, Meer, & Williams (2014) 
conducted a laboratory experiment to explain charity choice and willingness to donate, where 
they varied whether nonprofit performance ratings were displayed. They concluded that third-
party ratings influence charity choice and suggested that they may also increase donations. Peng 
et al. (2019), in their experimental study of nonprofit reputation, found that the availability of a 
third-party accreditation increases contributions. 
In contrast to the findings cited above, a few other researchers concluded that charity 
ratings are irrelevant to donative decision making. Specifically, one of the earliest attempts to 
evaluate the effects of third-party performance grades on private giving is by Silvergleid (2003), 
where the author concluded that the AIP grades did not significantly influence donation levels. 
Using organization-level data for 90 nonprofits in the state of Washington, Szper and Prakash 
(2011) tested whether charity ratings affected charitable giving and found no evidence 
supporting the hypothesized relationship. Interestingly, the qualitative analysis they conducted 
revealed that the sampled charities did not believe that rating information enters donative 
decision making either. Finally, the results from the most recent experimental study also cast 
doubt on the signaling effectiveness of nonprofit rating systems. Tremblay-Boire and Prakash 
(2017), in their study of the effects of charity participation in a voluntary regulatory program, 
found no evidence that the availability of a three-star grade provided by Charity Navigator 
influence individual willingness to donate.  
Overall, the nonprofit theory expects charity supporters to consider third party 
performance auditing as a strong information cue about nonprofit organization quality. However, 
the sum of available empirical evidence can neither confirm nor reject the argument. This 
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unsatisfactory outcome may have multiple reasons. First, variation in salience and credibility of 
specific rating systems (e.g., AIP, BBB, Charity Navigator, etc.) over time, research question 
focus (e.g., charity choice vs. propensity to donate), or research designs (pass/not pass rating vs. 
no information, average rating vs. no information, third-party accreditation vs. no accreditation) 
may create different contexts that lead to the inconsistent findings. Second, the analytical 
methods and data (regression analyses using organizational level data; laboratory experiments; 
survey experiments) can make a difference too. For instance, Hirschman’s (1970) framework 
well explains why observational model could fail to prove ratings’ effectiveness. In particular, 
Hirschman explains that “no matter what the quality elasticity of demand, exit could fail to cause 
any revenue loss to the individual firms if the firm acquired new customers as it loses the old 
ones” (p. 26). This behavior is consistent with the highly-inefficient segment of charities who 
invest a relatively large proportion of their revenue in fundraising, including through contracting 
paid solicitors (Kelly, 1998).  Also, an experimental study could fail to detect the hypothesized 
affect if the experimental stimulus is not strong enough. According to Hirschman’s (1970) 
theory, a certain level of deterioration in an organization’s service may not be sufficient to 
trigger a customer’s withdrawal. 
Because the lack of consensus presented in the literature findings can be context-
dependent, this study conducts a focused, in-depth examination of nonprofit performance report 
cards to clarify the nexus between performance measures embedded in charity ratings and giving 
allocations. First, it sets to determine whether there is a causal relationship between the key 
measures embedded in third-party charity ratings and donor perceptions of a rated organization’s 
performance, donor trust, and willingness to donate. Second, the uncertain findings from the 
extant literature suggest that even if rating information affects donative decisions, those effects 
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are probably not drastic and may be nonlinear. To capture potentially subtle effects of the rating 
signaling on individual giving decisions, this study focuses on the extreme values of a rating 
performance scale. Finally, to gain a more accurate perspective on the ratings’ potential to make 
a difference, this research is focusing on individual willingness to donate to a nonprofit agency 
captured through conditional giving levels rather than charity choice. Hence, the first set of 
hypotheses relating star-rating performance cues with individual willingness to give posits that: 
 
H1a: Providing information about a public charity’s low overall performance rating will 
decrease donor perceptions of the charity’s performance. Information about a public charity’s 
high overall performance rating will increase donor perceptions of the charity’s performance. 
H1b: Providing information about a public charity’s low (high) overall performance rating will 
generate a lower (higher) degree of trust in that organization 
H1c: Providing information about a public charity’s low (high) overall performance rating will 
lead to a lower (higher) willingness to donate to that charity  
 
Public opinion surveys show that nonprofit efficiency concerns individuals, and a large 
body of academic literature focuses on issues related to nonprofit overhead spending. A 
contentious scholarly debate regarding the appropriateness of the overhead cost as a performance 
measure continues. Bennett and Savani (2003) argued that public reaction to charities’ levels of 
overhead cost has been irrational.  Gneezy et al. (2014) wrote that it could hurt nonprofits’ ability 
to fulfill their mission as it creates barriers to investing in nonprofit infrastructure and 
management capacity. Brooking’s report wrote that rating agencies and IRS punish capacity 
building by using that label (Light, 2008). Although the academic and professional communities 
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tend to agree on the many shortcomings and side effects of using the overhead cost as a measure 
of efficiency, it is still broadly used8 and may remain a substantial factor in donor decision 
making (E. Brown & Slivinski, 2006; Gneezy et al., 2014; Light, 2008; Rhode & Packel, 2009; 
Sargeant et al., 2006). Because individuals interpret performance information through the lens of 
their preexisting personal beliefs and, in turn, the overhead cost is a measure that individuals 
easily relate to and may have strong beliefs about, potential donors are expected to respond to the 
level of nonprofit overhead spending: 
 
H2a: Providing information about a public charity’s low (high) overhead cost will increase 
(decrease) a donor’s trust in the charity  
H2b: Providing information about a public charity’s low (high) overhead cost will generate a 
higher (lower) degree of trust in that organization 
H2c: Providing information about a public charity’s low (high) overhead cost will lead to a 
higher (lower) willingness to donate to that charity  
 
Third-party performance ratings intend to offer more comprehensive and balanced 
indicators of an organization’s quality than any measure such as the overhead ratio alone. 
Besides a variety of financial health and efficiency ratios, they incorporate measures of 
transparency, accountability, and governance in their evaluation methodologies and demonstrate 
attempts to improve their measurement methodologies (Charity Navigator, 2016b). Typically, 
raters’ grades, as composite measures, already incorporate information on a charity’s overhead 
cost. Given this fact, it would be reasonable for users of charity ratings to discount the overhead 
 
8 Charity raters typically report overhead ratios along with the composite star- or pass-grades. 
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indicators entirely while using performance ratings. On the other hand, measures of the overhead 
cost may seem to be more transparent, relatable, and convincing to individuals. Although the 
indicators of overhead spending in raters’ report cards do not add any additional information to 
the composite measures, their mere presence on a report card may have significant moderating 
influence:      
 
H3a: Providing the information about a charity’s low (high) overhead cost strengthens (weakens) 
the effect of its low (high) charity rating on the perceived organizational performance.  
H3b: Providing information about a low (high) level of overhead cost moderates the effect of the 
low (high) charity rating on the level of trust in the nonprofit. 
H3c: Providing information about a low (high) level of overhead cost moderates the relationship 
between an organization’s low (high) charity rating and a donor’s willingness to donate. 
 
Drawing on social exchange theory, Sargeant et al. (2006) distinguished three categories 
of perceptual benefits: demonstrable, emotional, and familial. Demonstrable benefits refer to 
selfish economic considerations, such as perceptions of one’s improved standing in the donor’s 
social group and may result from the visibility of giving.  Emotional and familial benefits are 
associated with donors’ emotional experiences. Their argument states that a charitable act can 
evoke positive emotions, desirable mood changes, or good feelings, and might be an indication 
of donor commitment to a particular cause. Sargeant et al. (2006) did not find evidence 
supporting the demonstrable benefits argument, but they found emotional and familial benefits to 
be significant and direct (bypassing trust) drivers of individual willingness to donate.  
53 
 
According to Hirschman’s (1970) framework, nonsubstitutability among two products is 
an important factor that prevents the customer from exit. Considering that nonprofit donors may 
derive emotional benefits (Sargeant et al., 2006), this suggests that the influence of performance 
ratings on donative allocations among charities may vary depending on which of the causes 
under consideration appear to be more emotionally appealing to the donor. Therefore, in a case 
of deciding between two similar charities, emotional benefits are likely to be similar for the two 
(close substitutes), and performance ratings should drive the willingness to donate through 
perceived performance and trust in the organization. If a person cares more about a particular 
cause or mission – in other words, derives emotional or familial benefits from supporting the 
cause – then this commitment (mission valence) will affect one’s willingness to donate beyond 
the influence of performance and trust:  
H4: Relationship between charity ratings and giving behavior will be stronger when 
mission valence is weak 
Lastly, Grimmelikhuijsen and Meijer (2012) draw on social psychology to argue that 
preexisting characteristics of people, such as knowledge, beliefs, and attitudes, affect how 
individuals process and interpret information. Cognitive dissonance theory, as well as the theory 
of motivated reasoning (Bækgaard & Serritzlew, 2015; Grimmelikhuijsen & Meijer, 2012), 
argue that individuals interpret new information in ways that confirm their prior beliefs about the 
world and discount evidence that does not fit their beliefs. Such biased processing means 
different people will interpret the same information differently. Specifically, individuals with 
high levels of general trust in nonprofits would be less sensitive to the influence of external 
performance evaluations than those who are less trusting. At the same time, more altruistic 
54 
 
individuals must care more about nonprofit output, so they should be more sensitive to 
performance grades: 
H5a: The effect of performance rating information will be weaker for individuals with a 
higher level of general trust in quality of nonprofits  
H5b: The effect of performance rating information will be stronger for more altruistic 
individuals 
 
3.4 Methodology 
I use a randomized survey experiment to test the proposed hypotheses. A mixed 
experimental design employed in this study relies primarily on four conservative between-
subject comparisons but also takes advantage of two within-subject measures with controlling for 
order effects. The experiment was embedded in an online survey and delivered to a sample 
provided by Qualtrics Panels using the Qualtrics online survey platform.  
The experiment randomly assigned participants into four groups. Each group received a 
performance report card with information describing two of four charities with national or global 
missions and difficult to measure outcomes9. Two of the charities had the lowest (one-star) 
overall performance rating but a low (1 to 10 percent) overhead spending level, and the other two 
had the highest (four-star) rating but a relatively high overhead cost (32-35 percent). Each 
participant received a report card on one Low-Rating-Low-Overhead (LRLO) and one High-
Rating-High-Overhead (HRHO) organization. To manipulate the variables of interest, the report 
 
9 The charities were selected from the pool of organizations publicly rated by Charity Navigator and, to satisfy the 
stated criteria, represented medical research and children education policy and relief related causes. 
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card in each of the experimental groups displayed a different set of performance indicators as 
information heuristic for subjects to form their perceptions of organizational performance, 
determine how much they would trust each organization, and choose how to allocate the budget 
among the two competing agencies. In the no-treatment condition (T1) where the report card 
included only the charities’ names, classification categories, corresponding causes, mission 
statements, self-described accomplishments, and total revenue level. The second treatment (T2 - 
Overhead) also included the overhead spending ration but not the performance rating. The third 
(T3 - Rating only) condition included the base information plus the performance rating, but not 
the overhead ratio. Finally, the Rating and Overhead (T4) condition displayed both the overhead 
ratios and the charity ratings in the report card. The experimental conditions are summarized in 
Table 3.1 (the complete report cards for the four selected charities are presented in Appendix B, 
Table B.1). 
For examining hypothesis H4, the study implements an experimental manipulation of 
mission valence into the research design. To that end, the four available nonprofit pairs were 
selected so that in two of them, both charities addressed somewhat similar causes (e.g., medical 
research). In the other two pairs, the organizations served fundamentally different purposes (e.g., 
medical research and children education policy).  
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Table 3. 1:  Experimental conditions 
T0: 
No-treatment 
Condition 
T1: 
Overhead  
Condition 
T2: 
Rating  
Condition 
T3: 
Rating & Overhead 
Condition 
 Base information 
 No Ratings 
 No Overhead 
 Base information 
 Overhead exp. 
 No Ratings 
 Base information 
 No Overhead exp. 
 Charity Ratings 
 Base information 
 Ratings 
 Overhead exp. 
Example 
CHILDREN’S RELIEF 
MISSION 
 
Base information 
 
 
 
 
 
STAND FOR CHILDREN 
LEADERSHIP CENTER 
 
Base information 
 
CHILDREN’S RELIEF 
MISSION 
 
Base information + 
Program expenses: 99.1% 
Overhead: 0.8% 
 
 
 
STAND FOR CHILDREN 
LEADERSHIP CENTER 
 
Base information +  
Program Expenses: 64.7% 
Overhead: 35.2% 
CHILDREN’S RELIEF 
MISSION 
 
Base information + 
 
 
 
 
STAND FOR CHILDREN 
LEADERSHIP CENTER 
 
Base information +  
 
CHILDREN’S RELIEF 
MISSION 
 
Base information + 
Program expenses: 99.1% 
Overhead: 0.8% + 
 
 
STAND FOR CHILDREN 
LEADERSHIP CENTER 
 
Base information +  
Program Expenses: 64.7% 
Overhead: 35.2% 
 
 
 
Participants were informed that the goal of the survey was to study which public charities 
individuals trust and feel confident deserve charitable contributions. The instructions told the 
subjects that the researcher had $100 to donate to charity and asked the subjects to decide how to 
allocate the money between the two organizations. Participants were told that the researcher 
would allocate the $100 based on their recommendation10. Then, the experiment proceeded to the 
section where the subjects were randomized into their experimental conditions and allocated 
their donations. Lastly, the participants answered a series of questions about their perceptions of 
 
10 After the completion of the research project, each of the organizations would actually receive the proportional 
share of the amount based on the average allocations 
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both charities, their behavioral characteristics (personality trust, altruism), and demographics. 
The survey also included a set of quality check questions to make sure the survey participants 
paid attention and meaningfully answered to the questions. The resulting study sample included 
873 subjects, and its characteristics, including the break downs by treatment groups, are 
presented in Appendix B, Table B2. 
In summary, the experimental approach allows significant flexibility in meeting  research 
data needs and can deliver exceptional internal validity, including the establishment of causality 
(Charness, Gneezy, & Kuhn, 2012; James, 2011). A distinctive characteristic of this 
experimental strategy to further strengthen the internal validity of the findings is that it 
approximates a realistic decision-making situation when an individual who is asked to make a 
consequential donative decision is facing a budget-constrained choice among real nonprofits. 
 
3.5 Measurement 
The primary outcome of interest in this research is the donation allocation preference 
(willingness to donate). The behavior was induced and measured by asking the participants to 
allocate a designated amount of money between two charities after reading their performance 
report cards. Specifically, the question stated the following: “Please tell us how you would prefer 
to allocate $100 to the two charities (you can split the amount in any proportion you want so that 
the total donation does not exceed $100)”. The participants entered their dollar allocations into 
the survey form.  
The theoretical argument constructed in this paper also refers to a few intervening and 
moderating behavioral constructs, including perceived performance, dispositional (personality) 
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trust, preexisting trust in nonprofits in general, trust in a specific nonprofit organization, 
emotional and familial benefits. Sargeant et al. (2006) describe trust as “the extent of donor 
belief that a charity will behave as expected and fulfill its obligations” (p. 2). Burt and Dunham 
(2009) defines it as “an expectation (a trust) that a donation made to an aid agency for a specific 
crisis or cause will be used towards that specific crisis or cause” (p. 126). This research will rely 
on a five-item scale used by both groups of authors to measure trust in a specific nonprofit 
organization. The question items are listed in Appendix B. Each item in this measure is rated on 
a 5-point Likert scale where 1 = Strongly Disagree to 5 = Strongly Agree. The trust score is 
obtained by averaging the scores on each of the items and ranges between 1 and 5. This construct 
demonstrated a high level of internal consistency (α = 0.94). Following  the work of Burt and 
Dunham (2009), dispositional (personality) trust describes one’s “tendency to attribute 
benevolent intent to others (e.g., to believe that others have good intentions), and suspicion that 
others are dishonest (e.g., to suspect hidden motives in others—reverse-scored)” (p. 129). 
Altruism, in turn, is defined as a measure of selflessness and concern for others. Both measures 
are captured using items from the International Personality Item Pool (2007) (L. R. Goldberg et 
al., 2006). The measure for trust in nonprofit organizations, in general, is borrowed and adapted11 
from Grimmelikhuijsen and Meijer (2012).  Finally, perceived performance and utility are 
measured using multi-item scales from Sargeant et al. (2006) with some modifications 
appropriate for the context.  
 
 
11 The original variable measured trust in governments in general 
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3.6 Findings 
3.6.1 Perceptions of Overall Performance 
Figure 3.2 and Table 3.2 show that the mean levels of perceived overall nonprofit 
performance within the reference group (T1) were nearly at the same level for the paired 
organizations with different overhead ratios and third-party performance grades. In the decision 
setting where both performance measures of interest were excluded from consideration, both the 
Low-Rating-Low-Overhead (LRLO) and High-Rating-High-Overhead (HRHO) charities 
averaged at 3.75 on a five-point scale. In treatment T2, where the overhead spending ratios were 
embedded into the report cards, the level of confidence in an organization’s overall performance 
increased for the low-overhead (LO) and lowered for the high-overhead (HO) charity. Both 
changes were statistically significant at the one-percent level. In terms of practical significance, 
the size of the effects (as measured by Cohen’s d) is different for the low- and high-overhead 
nonprofits. When the overhead is presented, the effect size for an LO entity is 0.47 (moderate) 
and for the HO entity is -0.3 (rather small). As presented in Table 3.3, the within-treatment 
difference for the overhead group is highly significant based on a paired t-test, and the effect size 
is 0.68, which is moderately large according to the normative convention.  
In the group where the charities’ star-rating was the only additional decision cue added to 
the report card (T3), the experiment yielded a similar within-group effect size (d=0.68). 
However, this effect is comprised of a highly-significant and moderately-strong (d=0.54) 
decrease in the level of confidence in the performance of the low-rating (LR) charity and a 
substantially smaller-size increase (d=0.22) in confidence for the high-rating (HR) organization, 
which appears to be significant only at the five-percent level.  
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Finally, the results for group T4 show the level of perceived performance that is 
statistically not different from the baseline condition. In other words, the contrasting values of 
the two performance indicators offset each other: a low overhead ratio remedied the negative 
effect of the low rating, whereas a high overhead damaged the potential perceptual improvement 
from the high third-party performance rating.  
 
Figure 3. 2:  Differences in perceived overall performance across treatments 
 
Table 3. 2:  Differences in perceived overall performance across treatments 
  Low-Rating-Low-Overhead 
(LRLO) 
High-Rating-High-Overhead 
HRHO 
(Intercept) 3.75 *** (0.06) 3.75 *** (0.06) 
Treatment T2 (O) 0.35 *** (0.08) -0.25 ** (0.08) 
Treatment T3 (R) -0.43 *** (0.08) 0.16 * (0.08) 
Treatment T4 (RO) -0.07 (0.08) -0.07 (0.08) 
Observations 873 873 
R2 / adjusted R2 0.107 / 0.104 0.033 / 0.030 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05   ** p<0.01   *** p<0.001 
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Table 3. 3:  Within-group differences   
Treatment Test statistic df P value Alternative hypothesis Mean of x 
T1 -0.05 207 0.96 Two sided -0.002  
T2 -7.61 224 0.00 * * * Two sided -0.602 
T3 8.36 213 0.00 * * * Two sided  0.589   
T4 -0.06 225 0.95 Two sided -0.004 
 
To get a more elaborate picture of the differences in perceptions of nonprofit 
performance, the following analysis separately examines the two individual performance 
indicators that comprise the composite performance score - perceived impact and perceived 
efficiency spending money - using the ordinal logistic regression analysis. 
 
3.6.2 Perceived Impact 
Table 3.4 provides the results of the ordinal logistic regression analysis for the perceived 
impact as the outcome variable. Looking at the cut-points, we can see that the log-odds that 
individuals in the no-treatment group (T1) express a certain level of agreement (from Strongly 
Disagree to Strongly Agree) about an organization’s capacity to make an impact are nearly 
identical for the LRLO and HRHO organizations. The coefficients on T2 show that presenting a 
low-overhead ratio statistically significantly increases an individual’s propensity to agree with 
the impact statement. By contrast, the effect of presenting the high-overhead information does 
not reach statistical significance. According to the estimates for T3, the information about a 
charity’s low star-rating significantly lowers individual propensity to agree with the impact 
statement. At the same time, the information about a charity’s high rating does not lead to a 
significant change in individual perceptions of the organization’s capacity to make an impact. 
Finally, presenting both the low rating along with low overhead on the report card (T4) has a 
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significant effect in the same direction as in T3 condition but with a smaller magnitude, thus 
confirming the moderation effect of the low overhead (the difference T4 - T3 also remains 
significant). By contrast, presenting the high rating along with a high overhead makes no 
significant difference in the individual propensity to agree with the impact statement compared 
to the no-treatment group or rating-only group. 
 
Table 3. 4:  Perceived impact across treatments (ordinal logistic regression) 
 
LRLO HRHO 
Predictors Log-Odds Std. Error Log-Odds Std. Error 
T2 (O) 0.36 * 0.18 -0.23  0.18 
T3 (R) -0.87 *** 0.18 0.12  0.18 
T4 (RO) -0.45 * 0.18 0.10  0.18 
1|2 -4.04 *** 0.25 -4.83 *** 0.40 
2|3 -2.48 *** 0.16 -2.85 *** 0.19 
3|4 -0.98 *** 0.13 -0.92 *** 0.14 
4|5 1.13 *** 0.14 1.10 *** 0.14 
Same models with T3 (R) as the reference group: 
T1 (NRNO) 0.87 *** 0.18 -0.12  0.18 
T2 (O) 1.23 *** 0.18 -0.35 * 0.18 
T4 (RO) 0.42 * 0.18 -0.02  0.18 
1|2 -3.17 *** 0.24 -4.95 *** 0.40 
2|3 -1.61 *** 0.15 -2.98 *** 0.19 
3|4 -0.11  0.13 -1.04 *** 0.13 
4|5 2.00 *** 0.15 0.98 *** 0.13 
Observations 873 873 
Cox & Snell's R2 / Nagelkerke's R2 0.058 / 0.063 0.006 / 0.006 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05   ** p<0.01   *** p<0.001 
 
Figure 3.3 visually demonstrates how the log-odds estimates translate into predicted 
probabilities for each level of donor confidence in a nonprofit’s capacity to make an impact on 
its cause. The left facet shows the probability changes across the treatment groups for the LRLO 
condition (all statistically significant effects), and the right panel shows the probabilities for the 
HRHO entity (insignificant differences). 
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Elaborating on the insights from the regression output, the left facet shows noticeably 
broader variations in the predicted probabilities corresponding to each response level across the 
treatment groups for the LRLO compared to the HRHO entity displayed in the right facet of the 
figure. For instance, we can see how the inclination to Strongly Agree increases while 
uncertainty (Neither Agree nor Disagree) diminishes widening the spread between the two from 
five to 16.5 percentage points for a LO-charity once the overhead ratio shows up in the report 
card. Showing the low rating leads to even wider differences across all levels of propensity to 
agree with the impact statement: the probability of Strongly Agreeing drops by 12.5 percentage 
points from 24.4 percent to 11.9; the probability of Somewhat Agreeing drops from 48.4 to 41.0 
percent; the probability of Neither Agreeing nor Disagreeing increases from 19.4 to 30.4 
percent; and the probability of Somewhat Disagreeing increases from 6.0 to 12.7 percent. The 
availability of both performance indicators makes a similar, although weaker, effect to that 
caused by the low rating only, suggesting a moderation effect. Finally, the right facet shows that 
the probability changes across the treatments for the HRHO entity are substantially smaller, 
which indicates that neither a high rating improves nor a high overhead significantly erodes 
individual perceptions of an organization’s capacity to make an impact.  
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Figure 3. 3:  Probability differences in perceived impact across treatments 
 
3.6.3 Perceived Efficiency 
Table 3.5 presents the ordinal logit estimates for the treatment effects on perceived 
efficiency. This measure appears to be more sensitive to both high and low values on both 
performance indicators of interest, although the influence of the overhead ratio prevails. 
Compared to the no-treatment condition, reporting a low overhead tends to give individuals more 
and a high overhead less confidence in a nonprofit’s efficiency spending money, although the 
size of the coefficient is twice smaller for the HO-agencies. Information about charity ratings 
also affects the perceived efficiency: one’s awareness of a charity’s poor star-rating lowers their 
confidence in organizational efficiency, and the high rating increases the propensity to agree with 
the efficiency statement. Finally, introducing both a low rating and a low overhead 
65 
 
simultaneously works in the same direction as a low overhead alone, although yields a smaller-
size coefficient, which, along with the statistically significant difference T4(RO) - T2(R), 
confirms the moderation effect of a low rating on the relationship between the Overhead cost 
and Perceived efficiency. 
 
Table 3. 5:  Perceived efficiency across treatments (ordinal logistic regression) 
  LRLO HRHO 
Predictors Log-Odds Std. Error Log-Odds Std. Error 
T2 (O) 1.28 *** 0.18 -0.64 *** 0.18 
T3 (R) -0.75 *** 0.18 0.55 ** 0.17 
T4 (RO) 0.41 * 0.17 -0.26  0.17 
1|2 -3.70 *** 0.25 -3.70 *** 0.23 
2|3 -2.23 *** 0.16 -2.00 *** 0.15 
3|4 -0.04  0.12 -0.11  0.12 
4|5 1.53 *** 0.14 1.58 *** 0.14 
Same models with T2 (O) as the reference group: 
T1 (NRNO) -1.28 *** 0.18 0.64 *** 0.18 
T3 (R) -2.03 *** 0.19 1.19 *** 0.18 
T4 (RO) -0.86 *** 0.18 0.38 * 0.18 
1|2 -4.97 *** 0.26 -3.06 *** 0.23 
2|3 -3.50 *** 0.18 -1.36 *** 0.14 
3|4 -1.31 *** 0.14 0.53 *** 0.13 
4|5 0.26 * 0.13 2.22 *** 0.15 
Observations 873 873 
Cox & Snell's R2 / Nagelkerke's R2 0.136 / 0.146 0.053 / 0.057 
Standard errors on parentheses. * p<0.05   ** p<0.01   *** p<0.001 
 
As in the previous case, in the reference condition, the initial probabilities describing the 
propensity to agree with the positive efficiency statement are similar for the two agencies with 
contrasting measured performance (Figure 3.4). Thus, the most likely responses are Neither 
Agee Nor Disagree (39.3% for LRLO and 35.4% for HRHO), Somewhat Agree (33.2% and 
35.7%), and Strongly Agree (17.8% and 17.0%) for the two paired charities. Switching from T1 
to T2, the probability ranking of response levels reverses for the LO organization to Strongly 
Agree (43.6%), followed by Somewhat Agree (35.2%), and then by Neither Agee nor Disagree 
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(18.3%). For the HO agencies, the probability ranking of the response levels remains almost the 
same except for Somewhat Disagree (↑) and Strongly Agree (↓) switching places. The 
probability to Neither Agree nor Disagree increased from 35.5% to 42.6% and the probability to 
Somewhat Agree dropped from 35.7% to 27.3%. In T3, the one-star rating weakened donor 
confidence in a nonprofit’s efficiency relative to the no-information condition as the probability 
of declaring uncertainty raised from 39 to 49 percent and the probability of Somewhat Agreeing 
and Strongly Agreeing dropped from 33 to 24 and 18 to 9 percent respectively. A five-star 
rating, in turn, added some confidence as individuals ended up being nine percentage points 
more likely to Strongly Agree and nine percentage points less likely to be uncertain regarding an 
organization’s efficiency. Finally, in T4, some improvements in the probabilities to Strongly 
Agree and Somewhat Agree with the efficiency statement can be observed for the LRLO-charity, 
even though they are smaller. For the HRHO, the probabilities become close to those in T1 as the 
effects of the rating and overhead offset each other.  
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Figure 3. 4:  Probability differences in perceived efficiency across treatments 
 
3.6.4 Donor Trust 
Figure 3.5 and table 3.6 show the differences across the treatments for Donor Trust in a 
nonprofit agency. As was the case with the perceived performance, learning about a low charity 
overhead statistically significantly increases donor trust in an agency relative to the reference 
condition. At the same time, a high overhead does not make a significant difference in trust. The 
estimates also show that having a five-star rating does not lead to a significantly different level of 
trust, whereas a one-star rating negatively affects donor trust. Finally, when both performance 
measures are presented in the report card, a low overhead ratio and a high rating offset each 
other’s effects. The results partially confirm hypothesis H1b, H2b, and H3b. 
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Figure 3. 5:  Donor trust across treatment groups 
 
 
Table 3. 6:  Donor trust across treatment groups 
  LRLO HRHO 
(Intercept) 3.80 *** (0.06) 3.84 *** (0.06) 
T2 (O) 0.31 *** (0.08) -0.15 (0.08) 
T3 (R) -0.47 *** (0.08) 0.09 (0.08) 
T4 (RO) -0.12 (0.08) -0.08 (0.08) 
Observations 873 873 
R2 / adjusted R2 0.096 / 0.093 0.011 / 0.008 
Standard errors on parentheses. * p<0.05   ** p<0.01   *** p<0.001 
 
3.6.5 Donation Preference 
As we can see in Figure 3.6, the reference group allocated the budget among the two 
agencies so that, on average, $45 went to HRHO and $55 to LRLO charities. Adding the 
performance measures to the report card leads to a statistically significant redistribution of 
donations among the charities (Table 3.7). Thus, facing the information on charity overhead 
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spending, experimental participants in T2 reallocated the estimated $6.25 more to the LO 
organization widening the revenue gap between the two charities by the estimated $12.5. The 
difference is significant at the five-percent level and confirms hypothesis H2c. The availability of 
the star-ratings on the report cards instead of the overhead measures yielded an even stronger 
effect with the estimated point difference of $19.06 relative to the reference condition in favor of 
the highly-rated charity. The effect is highly significant and supports hypothesis H1c.  Finally, 
reporting both measures again shifts donations to a highly rated charity, although its high 
overhead ratio attenuates the difference. The resulted difference is also highly significant, thus 
confirming hypothesis H3c. 
 
Figure 3. 6:  Donor willingness to donate across treatment groups 
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Table 3. 7:  Willingness to donate across treatments 
  LRLO 
(T1 is ref. group) 
HRHO 
(T1 is ref. group) 
LRLO 
(T2 is ref. group) 
LRLO  
(T3 is ref. group) 
(Intercept) 55.34 *** (2.54) 44.66 *** (2.54) 61.60 *** (2.60) 36.28 *** (2.48) 
Treatment T1: NRNO   -6.25 * (2.65) 19.06 *** (2.67) 
Treatment T2: O 6.25 * (2.65) -6.25 * (2.65)  25.32 *** (2.63) 
Treatment T3: R -19.06 *** (2.67) 19.06 *** (2.67) -25.32 *** (2.63)  
Treatment T4: RO -8.92 *** (2.63) 8.92 *** (2.63) -15.18 *** (2.58) 10.14 *** (2.61) 
Pair P2 3.44 (3.01) -3.44 (3.01) 3.44 (3.01) 3.44 (3.01) 
Pair P3 -1.38 (2.61) 1.38 (2.61) -1.38 (2.61) -1.38 (2.61) 
Pair P4 -3.15 (2.55) 3.15 (2.55) -3.15 (2.55) -3.15 (2.55) 
Observations 873 873 873 873 
R2 / adjusted R2 0.112 / 0.106 0.112 / 0.106 0.112 / 0.106 0.112 / 0.106 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05   ** p<0.01   *** p<0.001 
 
As presented in Tables 3.8-3.9, adding the measures of perceived performance and trust 
to the equation weakens the coefficients on all the treatment variables. In particular, controlling 
for either of the two variables renders the overhead condition to become statistically 
insignificant, suggesting that individual willingness to donate to a nonprofit is affected by its 
overhead spending entirely through perceptions of performance and trust, as the theory argues. A 
similar mediating effect is present on the path between the star-rating and giving behavior. 
However, even after accounting for perceived performance and trust, a highly significant direct 
effect remains. 
Table 3. 8:  Willingness to donate across treatments (Low-Rating-Low-Overhead) 
  Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 
(Intercept) 55.34 *** (2.54) 50.91 *** (3.69) 11.42 * (5.05) 21.30 *** (4.89) 
Treatment T2 (O) 6.25 * (2.65) 6.28 * (2.65) 1.87 (2.52) 3.26 (2.56) 
Treatment T3 (R) -19.06 *** (2.67) -18.81 *** (2.66) -14.07 *** (2.54) -14.75 *** (2.59) 
Treatment T4 (RO) -8.92 *** (2.63) -9.14 *** (2.63) -8.59 *** (2.47) -8.12 ** (2.53) 
PairP2 3.44 (3.01) 2.23 (3.02) 2.90 (2.83) 2.15 (2.89) 
PairP3 -1.38 (2.61) -0.77 (2.62) -0.32 (2.46) -1.05 (2.51) 
PairP4 -3.15 (2.55) -3.73 (2.55) -2.05 (2.40) -3.41 (2.44) 
Emotional utility 
 
-1.19 (0.94) -1.96 * (0.89) -1.55 (0.91) 
Familial utility 
 
3.71 *** (1.10) 2.82 ** (1.04) 2.01 (1.07) 
Familiarity 
 
-0.65 (1.26) -2.10 (1.19) -1.63 (1.22) 
Perceived performance 
  
11.97 *** (1.11) 
 
Trust 
   
9.46 *** (1.08) 
Observations 873 873 873 873 
R2 / adjusted R2 0.112 / 0.106 0.124 / 0.115 0.228 / 0.219 0.196 / 0.187 
Standard errors on parentheses. * p<0.05   ** p<0.01   *** p<0.001 
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Table 3. 9:  Willingness to donate across treatments (High-Rating-High-Overhead) 
  Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 
(Intercept) 44.66 *** (2.54) 32.29 *** (3.58) 2.87 (4.84) 8.14 (4.88) 
Treatment T2 (O) -6.25 * (2.65) -5.82 * (2.62) -3.27 (2.53) -4.68 (2.55) 
Treatment T3 (R) 19.06 *** (2.67) 19.28 *** (2.64) 17.55 *** (2.54) 18.49 *** (2.57) 
Treatment T4 (RO) 8.92 *** (2.63) 9.62 *** (2.61) 10.12 *** (2.51) 10.08 *** (2.54) 
Pair P2 -3.44 (3.01) -4.03 (2.99) -3.77 (2.87) -3.84 (2.91) 
Pair P3 1.38 (2.61) 1.12 (2.60) 0.97 (2.50) 0.69 (2.53) 
Pair P4 3.15 (2.55) 2.97 (2.52) 1.71 (2.42) 2.56 (2.45) 
Emotional utility 
 
2.94 ** (0.95) 1.71 (0.92) 2.39 ** (0.92) 
Familial utility 
 
1.36 (1.10) 0.32 (1.06) 0.30 (1.08) 
Familiarity 
 
1.26 (1.36) -0.61 (1.32) 0.33 (1.33) 
Perceived performance 
  
10.14 *** (1.18) 
 
Trust 
   
7.75 *** (1.10) 
Observations 873 873 873 873 
R2 / adjusted R2 0.112 / 0.106 0.139 / 0.130 0.207 / 0.198 0.186 / 0.177 
Standard errors on parentheses. * p<0.05   ** p<0.01   *** p<0.001 
 
Table 3.10 presents the results of testing the moderating effects of mission valence, 
general trust in nonprofits, and altruism on the relationship between the charity rating and 
willingness to give. First, the statistically significant at the five percent level coefficient on the 
interaction term for T3 and the indicator of similar causes (the interaction terms for T2 and T4 
are marginally significant) confirm that mission valence influences the relationship between 
measured performance and giving decisions. As the table shows, when donors consider two 
nonprofit agencies addressing similar causes, the performance penalty (or reward) significantly 
shrinks in the conditions that involve the overall rating and might potentially increase in the 
overhead condition compared to the donation allocations among agencies with more disparate 
missions. However, the sign on the coefficient in treatment T3 delivers a finding that contradicts 
the hypothesized relationship as the highly rated charity gets a significant cut to its performance-
based gain.   
Second, the estimates also show that the moderating effect of general trust is significant 
in the rating only condition: as the level of individual trust in nonprofits in general increases, the 
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performance-based penalty/reward tends to shrink. This fully confirms hypothesis H5a that those 
who have relatively high levels of confidence in nonprofits tend to discount external 
performance rating information more heavily.  
Finally, the moderating effect of altruism is also significant in the rating-only treatment 
group. However, the sign of the coefficient suggests that highly altruistic individuals tend to be 
less responsive to this performance measure than those with lower levels of altruism. This result 
is the opposite of the presented theoretical argument, so hypothesis 5b cannot be confirmed in its 
current formulation.  
Table 3. 10:  Willingness to donate across treatments 
 Model 1  
(Mission Valence) 
Model 2  
(General Trust) 
Model 3  
(Altruism)  
LRLO HRHO LRLO HRHO LRLO HRHO 
(Intercept) 56.51*** (2.54) 43.49*** (2.54) 58.88*** (11.37) 41.12*** (11.37) 78.13*** (14.22) 21.87 (14.22) 
Treatment T2(O) 2.01 (3.35) -2.01 (3.35) 19.29 (15.12) -19.29 (15.12) 4.12 (20.97) -4.12 (20.97) 
Treatment T3(R) -23.93*** (3.55) 23.93*** (3.55) -60.26***(15.27) 60.26*** (15.27) -61.44 ** (20.60) 61.44** (20.60) 
Treatment T4(RO) -13.27*** (3.44) 13.27*** (3.44) -8.99 (15.23) 8.99 (15.23) -30.92 (19.97) 30.92 (19.97) 
Similar Cause -3.97 (3.82) 3.97 (3.82)     
T2(O) *  
Similar Cause 
10.19 (5.50) -10.19 (5.50)     
T3(R) *  
Similar Cause 
10.74 * (5.37) -10.74 * (5.37)     
T4(RO) *  
Similar Cause 
9.98 (5.34) -9.98 (5.34)     
General Trust   -1.05 (2.86) 1.05 (2.86)   
T2(O) *  
General Trust 
  -3.50 (3.81) 3.50 (3.81)   
T3(R) * 
General Trust 
  10.65 ** (3.87) -10.65 ** (3.87)   
T4(RO) * 
General Trust 
  -0.09 (3.88) 0.09 (3.88)   
Altruism     -5.67 (3.42) 5.67 (3.42) 
T2(O)*Altruism     0.45 (5.00) -0.45 (5.00) 
T3(R)*Altruism     10.27 * (4.97) -10.27 * (4.97) 
T4(RO)*Altruism     5.26 (4.80) -5.26 (4.80) 
Observations 873 873 873 873 873 873 
R2 / adjusted R2 0.116 / 0.109 0.116 / 0.109 0.124 / 0.117 0.124 / 0.117 0.113 / 0.106 0.113 / 0.106 
Standard errors on parentheses. * p<0.05   ** p<0.01   *** p<0.001 
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3.7 Conclusions and Policy Implications 
The growing prominence of nonprofit performance report cards has motivated a scholarly 
interest in estimating their efficacy. This study relies on a 4*2 mixed factorial design involving 
four between-group comparisons and two within-subject measures with a realistic decision 
setting to obtain answers to a few related questions. First, what effects do measures provided in 
charity ratings have on individual giving? Second, what perceptual determinants of charitable 
giving play a role in individual reactions to those measures? And third, how do individual 
characteristics affect the donor response to third-party nonprofit performance ratings?  
As theorized, both composite star-ratings and efficiency ratios affect donor decision 
making. Contrasting values on either of the two measures can make a statistically significant 
difference in donor perceptions of those organizations’ performance, levels of trust in them, and 
allocations of charitable contributions among them. However, “bad” ratings and “good” 
overhead ratios affect perceptions differently than “good” ratings and “bad” overheads. The 
study shows that donors are particularly sensitive to visibly low overhead spending ratios and the 
extremely poor composite rating while, at the same time, being not responsive to the excellent 
rating or relatively high overhead costs. Regardless of its questionable informational value, a low 
overhead ratio appears to effectively send a positive signal about organizational performance, 
including both effectiveness and efficiency, to individual donors. A high overhead ratio 
somewhat detracts from the perceived overall performance too, but its effect is smaller in 
magnitude and only significant in donor perceptions of organizational efficiency. Similarly, 
when considering the composite charity rating, a top star-grade might or might not improve 
donor perceptions of nonprofit performance in comparison to the no-information condition. A 
poor rating, however, damages the perceived performance. The patterns are similar for donor 
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trust in a nonprofit agency: a low overhead ratio increases trust, whereas knowing about a high 
overhead does not make individuals trust a nonprofit less. By contrast, the poor overall rating 
damages trust in a nonprofit while a high rating does not add to it in comparison to the no-
information condition. Donor reactions suggest their high a priori expectations of nonprofit 
performance but low expectations of measured efficiency. As a result, individual donors 
demonstrate a willingness to punish a charity for poor overall rating by reallocating some of the 
charitable contributions to a more highly rated institution along with an inclination to reward a 
high measured efficiency. When the two indicators are simultaneously presented in the same 
report card, which is typically the case in practice, they interact and may send users contradicting 
signals. In donative decisions, however, the effect of the composite rating prevails.  
Cumulatively, the findings suggest complex, nonlinear patterns in donor reactions to 
performance rating information and point to the importance of the content and design of 
nonprofit performance report cards. Not only do donors demonstrate asymmetrical uninformed 
expectations of nonprofit overhead spending and overall ratings, they tend to adjust their 
donative decisions according to those expectations and other individual characteristics such as 
general trust in nonprofits. Since quality rating agencies may play a role in shaping those 
expectations, it is important that they do it mindfully and cautiously, especially with respect to 
practical meaning and significance of different overhead spending ratios and differences in star-
ratings.  
The empirical confirmation of the interaction between the two performance measures is a 
disturbing finding with further practical implications since the overhead spending ratio is already 
incorporated in the rating. The fact that the effect of a poor overall performance rating can be 
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mitigated by advertising a low overhead ratio is worrying because it might push low-performers 
to engage in manipulating its reported overhead costs.  
Such perceptions of the overhead ratio have three important ramifications for the 
nonprofit performance measurement. First, a better measure of organizational efficiency in the 
nonprofit sector is needed. Second, when incorporating the overhead ratio in a performance 
assessment models, its interaction with the overall performance grade must be accounted for in 
the design of nonprofit performance report cards so that it could be minimized if not eliminated. 
Third, this research indicates that individual donors may have a tendency to associate nonprofit 
efficiency with the overhead ratio while seeing the star-rating as a measure of its mission-related 
effectiveness. Since this is not entirely the case, the public either seems not to realize that a 
charity's performance rating already reflects its cost ratio or does not agree on the weight the 
measure has in the composite indicator, which is less plausible. Regardless of the reason, the 
phenomenon warrants more public education regarding the informational value of the overhead 
spending ratio as a performance indicator and its role in determining the overall rating. 
 
3.8 Limitations and Future Research Directions 
Although this study offers a systematic and focused inquiry into the individual-level 
effects of measures embedded in charity performance report cards and thereby advances our 
understanding of their regulatory potential, the paper is still only a first step to understanding the 
properties of this tool. The findings presented in this paper and its limitations point to new 
directions for research. First, by focusing on the extreme values of charity ratings and overhead 
ratios, this study has not explicitly modeled the relationship between the studied performance 
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indicators and outcomes. The experiment has been able to quantify some behavioral effects of 
the two studied performance measures, discover the likely nonlinear nature of the relationships, 
and confirm some interaction patterns. At the same time, further effort is required to reveal the 
form of the nonlinear patterns and all possible interactions in the whole range of the performance 
scales. Extending this work would allow us to make predictions outside of the scope of this 
analysis, for example, for nonprofits that score in the middle of the scale, and extend the scope of 
inquiry to understanding how such interactions as High-Rating-Low-Overhead or Low-Rating-
High-Overhead further improve or damage individual perceptions and giving decisions. Second, 
the detected direct effect of performance ratings on donations bypassing perceived performance 
and trust points to new paths that charity composite performance ratings might operate through. 
Investigation of these new mechanisms requires additional theoretical inquiry and further testing, 
thus promising a more elaborate understanding of the ways publicized performance indicators 
influence the outcomes. Finally, further studies can focus on explaining the moderation role of 
mission valence, altruism, and other personal level characteristics. To this end, further 
examination of the mission valence can be improved through new research designs, including 
improved measurement of the concept, while investigating the role of altruism would benefit 
from additional theoretical work. 
When considering the results of this study, it is also important to recognize the limitations 
that are inherent to the experimental design. Even though the experimental condition employed 
in this study was designed to strengthen its internal validity through approximating to a realistic 
decision-making situation, the experimental setting nonetheless remained artificial. In particular, 
the budget that experimental subjects allocated among competing charities was not their own 
money even though the decisions were consequential. Also, the subjects operated under a 
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constrained choice since the experimental design did not involve the option not to donate. 
Finally, the external validity of the study is limited by the characteristics of the panel provided 
by Qualtrics.  
 
 
CHAPTER 4: PUBLIC CHARITY RESPONSE TO PERFORMANCE RATINGS 
4.1. Introduction 
There are different types and shapes of performance measurement systems (Barnow & 
Heinrich, 2010; Poister et al., 2014; Rowe, 2012). Barnow and Heinrich (2010) remind us that 
program evaluations, performance reports, benchmarking, report cards/consumer reports, and 
disclosure requirements are some of the existing approaches. Also, performance measurement in 
the public and/or nonprofit sector organizations, in the traditional sense, can be initiated and used 
by various actors/stakeholders and for multiple purposes. The spectrum of purposes is broad and 
includes responding to pressures for evidence of program effectiveness, improving 
communications, increasing public accountability, building public trust, recognizing good 
performance, making cross organizational comparisons, judging value created, supporting 
strategic planning, learning, allocating resources, and improving management and program 
outcomes (Behn, 2003). This list can be further continued, although most of the items are going 
to be only means to the one ultimate purpose, which is improving performance (Behn, 2003; 
Poister et al., 2014). In that regard, Poister et al. (2014) write that “expectations that performance 
management should contribute to higher levels of organizational performance and, in particular, 
better outcomes is almost universal among both proponents and critics of the performance 
movement” (p. 413).  
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Nonprofit performance report cards (third-party charity ratings) can be thought of as 
external performance monitoring systems because they are not initiated or implemented by the 
nonprofit (Gormley & Weimer, 1999). The purposes of report cards and performance 
measurement systems substantially overlap. One common goal is accountability to society and 
the contributing public for integrity, stewardship, and effective performance. Gormley (2003) 
writes that correcting information asymmetries and facilitating accountability between 
organizations and their various constituents are some of the key economic and political purposes 
of the report cards. Accordingly, the main rationale/driving force behind emergence of third-
party charity raters stems from the need to improve public accountability, protect donors’ 
interests, and guide informed donor decision making. For instance, Charity Navigator’s mission 
statement explicitly emphasizes that the agency “works to guide intelligent giving” (Charity 
Navigator, 2015); Charity Watch’s raison d'etre is in “providing donors with the information 
they need to make more informed giving decisions” (Charity Watch, 2020), and the BBB Wise 
Giving Alliance works to help “donors make informed giving decisions” (The BBB Wise Giving 
Alliance, 2015). The three major third-party charity evaluators as well as the new players in the 
field consistently claim their role is to increase allocative efficiency in the nonprofit sector.  
Improving organizational performance is another key purpose that organizational report 
cards share with other performance measurement systems (Gormley & Weimer, 1999). Even 
though the missions of the charity raters make less explicit emphasis on improving performance 
of rated organizations themselves, Gormley (2003)  explains that, ideally, organizations should 
“pay attention to report cards and adjust their behavior, in an effort to compete more effectively 
with other organizations that produce the same services” (p. 4). Evidence from the literature on 
the behavior of business firms, hospitals, and graduate schools supports this argument. Chatterji 
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& Toffel (2010) wrote that external ratings “beyond their stated objective of influencing 
investors, also influence the rated firms” (p. 918) helping reduce toxic emissions. Longo et al. 
(1997) concluded that “[p]ublic release of consumer reports may be useful not only in assisting 
consumers to make informed health care choices, but also in facilitating improvement in the 
quality of hospital services offered and care provided” (p. 1579) and described the observed 
improvements as “an important by-product” (p. 1579) of consumer reports. Gormley & Weimer 
(1999) argued that organizations’ behavior is the ultimate target of report cards to which 
organizational leaders “will attempt to respond in ways that advance the interests of their 
organizations” (p. 123). Nonetheless, scholars have “only begun to theorize how independent 
company ratings affect the organizations being rated, and have offered little guidance on how 
differences in firm characteristics influence response” (Chatterji & Toffel, 2010, p. 918) (p. 918). 
The evidence on what difference such information tools make is virtually nonexistent in relation 
to public charities that produce public goods.   
Although report cards have potential to improve organizational performance, targeted 
organizations do not always respond as expected (Gormley & Weimer, 1999). In addition to self-
improvement, reactions to report card may include nonresponse or a range of dysfunctional 
responses. Learning whether nonprofit report cards improve performance in public charities 
would fill a gap in the literature. Therefore, this research focuses on the following questions:  
1) Do public charities change behavior in response to external performance charity ratings? 
2) How do public charities respond to charity ratings? 
3) What factors influence how charities respond to public ratings? 
 
This study hypothesizes that public charities do pay attention to charity ratings and 
change in response to information that is released by raters. Externally provided performance 
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standards should facilitate organizational learning and stimulate performance adjusting behavior. 
However, it also anticipates that the responses are not uniform across public charities and may 
depend on managerial, organizational, and environmental characteristics.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section overviews the research 
on organizational responses to report cards in various fields and industries. After that, an 
overview of the theoretical frameworks that explain the mechanics behind the relationship 
between ratings and organizational change is provided. The paper continues by applying the 
theory to charitable organizations, presenting the models explicating how public charities adjust 
to charity ratings, and describing how the proposed theory can be tested empirically.  Then it 
presents the results of empirical analysis, conclusions, and limitations.  
 
 
4.2 Literature Review 
 
4.2.1 Do Organizations Change Behavior in Response to Ratings? Evidence from 
Education, Healthcare, and the Corporate Sector 
 
Evidence on how independent performance ratings affect organizational behavior 
emerged in the early 1990s. Many studies of corporate environmental ratings, hospital ratings, 
school/university ratings, corporate social responsibility ratings, corporate/municipal credit 
ratings evidence supports the claims of performance measurement theory that external 
performance monitoring systems affect organizational behavior and performance, although not 
always as intended.   
Much early research focused on educational institutions. Several studies on public 
schools in North Carolina, Florida, Texas, and Kentucky report that schools adjust to their public 
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ratings by improving performance (student test scores, pass rates, and various subject-specific 
skills) (Gormley, 2003). A qualitative study of how eight top business schools reacted to 
Business Week magazine's rankings of U.S. business schools provides a detailed account of how 
organizational members use cognitive tactics to cope with identity-threats created by unfavorable 
ratings. In particular, members selectively focused their attention on favorable aspects of their 
organizations’ identities to restore positive perceptions about their organizations and 
reinterpreted rankings as misleading representations (Elsbach & Kramer, 1996).  A quantitative 
study  of business schools in the context of the U.S. News and World Report rankings reported 
that schools responded to rankings through organizational change (Martins, 2005). The variation 
in change depended on the discrepancy between rankings and managers’ own beliefs about their 
schools’ standing as well as mangers’ perceptions of the impact of the rankings. Similarly, 
Espeland and Sauder (2007) also found evidence of behavioral adaptation in law schools in 
response to being evaluated by the U.S. News and World Report rankings.  
The hospital industry has also showed making performance adjustments in response to 
public rating information.  A series of articles reported that the introduction of rankings or 
ratings intended to increase consumer-patient awareness improved hospital policies, procedures, 
and outcomes, including declines in surgery mortalities in New York hospitals. Peterson, 
DeLong, Jollis, Muhlbaier, and Mark (1998) found that surgery outcomes improved 
significantly: mortality rates declined faster than the national average in New York after the New 
York State Department of Health started to publicly release scorecards/mortality reports, and 
“NY had the lowest risk-adjusted bypass mortality rate of any state in 1992” (p.993). Similarly, 
Longo et al. (1997) found that following the publication of a consumer report, hospitals adopted 
policy changes and implemented improvements, “especially in competitive markets and areas of 
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care identified as possibly ‘out of alignment’ with care provided by high-quality performing 
peers” (p.1582). 
A substantial body of literature examines market, social, or environmental performance 
of various for-profit firms. Graham (2000) describes several companies making rapid changes in 
products and completely legal practices in response to health and safety information in order to 
avoid public humiliation, even when they denied the rationale behind the disclosure 
requirements. Another piece of evidence comes from the restaurant market. When Los Angeles 
County required restaurants to publicly display grade cards of their hygiene inspections in the 
format of standard grade cards, Jin and Leslie (2003) found that restaurants responded with 
service quality improvement to avoid revenue loss. Firms also respond to corporate 
environmental ratings. Firms that initially scored poorly, improved more than firms that were not 
rated or initially rated higher (Chatterji & Toffel, 2010). Sharkey and Bromley (2014) found that 
even unrated firms improved in response to environmental performance ratings, which are 
capable of driving “field-wide change when only some firms are formally subject to evaluation” 
(p.64).  
In sum, organizations that produce privately consumed goods and services respond to 
being monitored and rated and those responses vary across organizations in terms of how they 
respond and how much change they demonstrate.  At the same time, the nonprofit literature is 
virtually silent with respect to organizations’ sensitivity to external performance monitoring and 
charity ratings. Sometimes, nonprofits advertise their high ratings in their communications with 
the public. For example, one charity writes on its website that it “strives to earn the highest 
charity ratings to give you assurance that your support will be used effectively and efficiently” 
(Environmental Defense Fund, 2020). Another charity’s message to its constituents states that its 
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“work earns wide recognition from independent charity evaluation agencies, including a 100% 
fundraising efficiency rating from Forbes, a spot on Charity Navigator’s list of the “10 Best 
Charities Everyone’s Heard Of” (Direct Relief, 2020). Nonetheless, we do not know whether 
such responses generalize to the whole population of rated charities. Therefore, research 
addressing charity response to performance report cards would greatly inform nonprofit sector 
theory and practice.   
The following sections explicate the theory of the relationship between external 
performance monitoring/rating and organizational behavior and applies the outlined theoretical 
statements to a subset of the nonprofit sector - public charities that produce public goods/services 
and are funded through voluntary public contributions. 
 
 
4.2.2 Theory of Organizational Response to External Performance Monitoring 
 
Economic theories of organizational behavior focus on ideas of information asymmetry, 
bounded rationality, organizational slack, agency problems, information search cost, attention 
focus, and customer response.  The “lemons” framework (Akerlof, 1970) explains how 
information asymmetry regarding product quality (when sellers have more information about 
their product than buyers) drives dishonesty and market inefficiency. The theory shows that 
dishonesty on behalf of sellers and the corresponding uncertainty of buyers “tend to drive honest 
dealings out of the market” (p. 495). In the markets with information asymmetry, the cost of 
dishonesty would “include the loss incurred from driving legitimate business out of existence.” 
(495). In the nonprofit sector, which is characterized by a high degree of information asymmetry 
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between those who produce goods and services and those who pay for them, this would also lead 
to deterioration in performance if cheating generated a surplus to those in control.  
Viewing the donor-nonprofit relationship through the prism of principal-agent theory 
yields similar predictions (Moe, 1984). The principal (donor) would expect the agent (charity) to 
produce outcomes that satisfy the principal’s objectives.  However, “there is no guarantee that 
the agent, once hired, will in fact choose to pursue the principal's best interests or to do so 
efficiently” (Moe, 1984). Information asymmetry between the two creates moral hazard for the 
agent to pursue their own agenda, which leads to a conflict of interest.  
By removing the residuals that could be distributed to the owners from the structure of a 
nonprofit organization, the nondistribution constraint is expected to counterbalance the incentive 
to engage in dishonest and compromise on quality.  But this does not solve the performance 
problem due to existence of organizational slack. Cyert and March (1963) define organizational 
slack as “payments to members of the coalition12 in excess of what is required to maintain the 
organization” (Cyert & March, 1963, p. 36), or, in other words, the difference between the actual 
spending and “the true minimum cost of service provision” (Moe, 1984, p. 763).  According to 
Hirschman (1970), slack can also be viewed as “a gap of a given magnitude between actual and 
potential performance of individuals” (p.14). 
Slack can exist in many forms. Unabsorbed slack can accumulate in uncommitted liquid 
resources, while absorbed slack can reflect excessive costs, such as production inefficiencies, 
policies, wages, services, and personal perquisites (Cyert & March, 1963; Singh, 1986). All the 
forms of it are documented in nonprofits (Kelly, 1998). Cyert and March (1963) argues that slack 
is “useful in dealing with the adjustment of firms to gross shifts in the external environment” 
 
12 Coalition may include managers, workers, other paid functionaries, suppliers, customers, lawyers, tax collectors, 
regulatory agencies, volunteers, donors, donees, etc. (Cyert & March, 1963, p. 27) 
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(p.37). In a favorable environment, a well-performing organization accumulates slack. However, 
when it faces adversity and potential failure, organizational slack provides a cushion that helps 
the organization to adapt to the shift in the environment and survive.  
To mitigate the effect of information asymmetry and restore optimality, the customer 
(principle) faces the challenge of how to identify quality (or reveal the agent’s privately held 
information). Therefore, the less informed party could employ performance monitoring. 
Information about an unsatisfactory quality of an organization’s output, could lead to customer 
reaction in the form of “exit” (causing a loss of revenue), or “voice” (through expressing 
complains) (Hirschman, 1970). Both reactions, as well as an emergence of external monitoring 
can become threatening exogenous events that would initiate organizational response to 
unfavorable conditions through attention focus mechanism, information search, upward 
adjustment of aspirations, and absorbing slack resources (Cyert & March, 1963; Singh, 1986). 
The empirical literature on the organizational effects of report cards supports the role of 
economic incentives, social/political pressure, and attention focus in determining organizational 
motivations to improve their performance in response to external performance monitoring. One 
strand examines information asymmetry, information search cost, reputation, embarrassment and 
shame as main mechanisms that stimulate organizational change in response to external 
assessments. Thus, Gormley (2003) argues that report cards influence the behavior of 
organizations and lead to service delivery improvements because they “shape the choices that 
consumers or purchasers make, resulting in a shift of organizational market shares” (p.13) and 
because public information on poor performance causes embarrassment in evaluated 
organizations. Using a number of examples from government mandatory disclosure regulations, 
Graham (2000) argues that release of negative, shaming information/ratings to consumers makes 
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companies change their products even if they disagree with such information: “The company's 
reputation, hard to build and easy to destroy, is at stake” (p.37). Jin and Leslie (2003) present 
empirical evidence that economic incentives stimulate restaurants with poor hygiene to improve 
after hygiene grade cards are mandatorily disclosed to consumers. This effect is expected 
through reducing search costs to consumers, mitigating information asymmetry, and altering the 
nature of competition among restaurants.  The researchers confirmed their arguments by 
presenting empirical evidence that restaurants indeed responded to the introduction of hygiene 
grade cards with hygiene quality improvements and, therefore, a correspondent average increase 
in inspection scores. Jin and Leslie (2009) show that restaurant hygiene grade cards can facilitate 
consumer learning about a firm’s unobservable characteristics (e.g. a restaurant’s hygiene 
quality) and its reputation formation process. Because increased reputation could be instrumental 
in generating resources for the firm, whereas a loss of reputation associated with poor 
performance could entail long-term costs (Lewis, 2014). In sum, the economic perspective 
predicts that external performance assessment, in the form of either embarrassing information or 
recognition of excellence, would cause subsequent performance improvement.   
Several behavioral models, drawing on organizational/social identity, performance 
feedback, behavioral, stakeholder, and institutional theories help understand how organizational 
perceptional mechanisms, information processing limitations, and environmental pressures shape 
organizational focus and reactions. Thus, two studies of the effects of rankings on behavior of 
US graduate schools of business, one qualitative and one quantitative, employ 
organizational/social identity perspective that focuses on microprocesses of organizational 
adaptation.  Drawing on social identity, self-affirmation, and impression management theories, 
Elsbach & Kramer (1996) explain organizational response to rankings by treating them as 
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“events that threaten their perceptions of their organization’s identity” (p. 442). In the absence of 
external rankings, schools’ members shape their own self-image that allows them to promote 
their own ideas about their organizations’ important identity attributes and relative standing in 
the industry. Business Week rankings emerged as powerful external institution that imposed 
evaluation of business schools against objective and uniform criteria, which challenged “the 
merit or importance of core distinctive and enduring organizational traits” (p. 444) and 
“dramatically disrupted the status quo that these schools had long enjoyed, creating an 
organizational identity threat” (p. 444). The organizational identity management framework 
suggests that such disruption and emergence of a threat is followed by members’ efforts to 
restore and protect positive perceptions of their organizational and social identity, which might 
range from ignoring or resisting rankings to using cognitive tactics to maintain positive sense of 
self. The latter is done through reinterpreting their standing relative to rankings using selective 
categorizations (strategies), favorable comparisons, or positive highlights of identity traits not 
captured by rankings. Although this analysis doesn’t uncover any measurable responses along 
quantitative metrics and focuses on perceptional, cognitive, and psychological ways to cope with 
external institutional pressures, it shows that organizational members “care about how their 
organizations are described and also how they compare with other organizations” (p. 468) and 
protect their personal and their organizations’ social identities. In addition, the discovered 
sensemaking activities help organizations focus attention on what they should be doing and why, 
thus pointing out the importance of a constructive change process and symbolic management. 
Elsbach & Kramer (1996)   write that “using selective categorization processes creatively can 
help organizations decide not only where emerging opportunities lie, but also what the 
appropriate and useful responses to them are” (p. 474). 
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 Drawing on behavioral and performance feedback theories, Lewis (2014) argued that 
managers often lack information to make optimal choices and need coping mechanisms to deal 
with uncertainty about the future. A third-party performance rating sets fixed standards for 
performance, which can reduce uncertainty. In the absence of complete information necessary to 
make a rational decision, a boundedly rational organization may adopt the rating as a decision 
rule. They write “following a performance standard established by a rating may be superior to 
alternative decision rules as it does not require firms to revisit the decision each year and thus 
reduces the costs of information search and cognitive processing” (p.11). Unfortunately, this 
theory also implies that an external performance benchmark can also cause a highly performing 
organization to lower it performance. As Lewis (2014) argues, “just meeting the benchmark may 
in fact be the optimal response” (p.11), so a positive recognition can decrease a firm’s 
performance aspirations and its further performance at least to the satisfactory level determined 
by the external benchmark.    
 Another useful theoretical lens that deepens our understanding of organizational reactions 
to external performance monitoring and provides additional arguments to expect organizational 
adaptation to ratings is presented by Espeland and Sauder (2007) and draws on the 
methodological concept of reactivity. Known since at least 1920s as the Hawthorne or observer 
effect, reactivity suggest that “individuals alter their behavior in reaction to being evaluated, 
observed, or measured” (Espeland & Sauder, 2007, p. 6). Reactivity is a well-known 
methodological concern in the social sciences, but Espeland and Sauder investigated the 
phenomenon in substantive terms by analyzing the reactivity of law schools to the U.S. News 
and World Report rankings. Taking a case-study approach to studying the consequences of 
reactivity for organizational behavior in presence of external rankings, they discovered such 
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organizational reactions as “redistribution of resources, redefinition of work, and proliferation of 
gaming strategies” (p.3). To explain the mechanisms of organizational reactivity to rankings, 
they used the notions of self-fulfilling prophecy and commensuration. Similarly to the earlier 
idea about “how economic theory shapes the economy” (p.6), rankings too “change how people 
make sense of situations” (p. 10). Specifically, they define self-fulfilling prophecies as 
“processes by which reactions to social measures confirm the expectations or predictions that are 
embedded in measures or which increase the validity of the measure by encouraging behavior 
that conforms to it” (p.11). According to the scholars, rankings create certain expectations about 
schools and those expectations amplify their effects.  
Whereas self-fulfilling prophesies affect behavior through altering expectations, 
commensuration alters individual cognition. Espeland and Sauder (2007) argue that 
“commensuration shapes what we pay attention to, which things are connected to other things, 
and how we express sameness and difference” (p. 16). Commensuration effects shape individual 
attention through cognitive mechanisms of simplifying information and unifying and 
distinguishing the targeted objects by constructing shared metrical relationships. Therefore, 
rankings “challenge … fragmentation by reducing distinctiveness to magnitude” (p.19) that 
makes it “much harder to make status claims not supported by rankings or to sustain identities 
that are not linked to rankings” (p.19). Finally, presence of rankings encourages people to reflect 
on the ontology and relationship between the numbers and what they measure. One stance of the 
“reality” often adopted by those who know little about the methodologies underlying rankings is   
that “the social relationship that is measured is as real as a physical object” (p.21). The scholars 
write that “most are uninterested in ranking methodology and simply assume that rankings 
measure something real about the schools” (p. 21).  
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Overall, by developing and empirically verifying this constructivist view of rankings, 
Espeland & Sauder (2007) show that such monitoring systems can create powerful behavioral 
effects in organization by merely altering and framing the views of the reality for targeted 
audiences in a certain way. It is also useful for studying external performance monitoring and 
public disclosure to note the results of adaptation to rankings discovered by the researchers. As 
they show, the studied schools responded with efforts to maximize rankings through budgetary 
reallocations, redefinition of policies and procedures, and manipulation strategies. At the same 
time, such responses may be dysfunctional stimulating achievement of formal improvements 
only on the metrics used to construct rankings. Performance measurement scholars have long 
noted that poorly designed performance measurement systems can encourage undesirable 
behaviors (Poister et al., 2014). The performance measurement literature is rich in examples of 
dysfunctional responses, including nonparticipation, goal displacement, gaming, number 
manipulating, outright cheating, or challenging the validity and usefulness of  the performance 
measures/system (Gormley, 2003; Gormley & Weimer, 1999; Poister et al., 2014). Organizations 
under pressure might engage in symbolic responses (Sauder & Espeland, 2009), or such goal 
displacement activities as  “teaching to the test” type of behavior when “students may know 
more facts, while their ability to interpret the facts suffers” (Gormley, 2003, p. 14). They might 
game the system or even get involved in outright cheating. Either way, the theory of reactivity 
predicts improvement on the metrics that affect ratings, although not necessarily beyond that.  
Finally, a consistent and overlapping with the discussed above theories approach to 
understanding the power of performance report cards is through the institutional perspective. The 
reviewed work has already recognized ratings and rankings as powerful institutions capable of 
stimulating organizational change.  Chatterji & Toffel (2010) admitted the importance of 
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institutional expectations for legitimacy and survival of an organization. Sharkey & Bromley 
(2015) explained indirect effects and diffusion through institutionally altered processes of social 
construction. Martins (2005) emphasized “theoretical connection between cognition and 
institutional research” (p. 704), recognizing “rankings as important sources of institutional 
isomorphic pressures” (701). The author blamed the institutionalization of rankings as a possible 
reason of his nonfinding that managers’ perceptions of rankings’ validity was not a significant 
determinant of organizational change.  He wrote that “the rankings have become institutionalized 
in this organizational field, rendering managerial assessments of the rankings secondary to 
institutional pressures from the rankings to conform” (p.714).  Institutions can impose intense 
pressures and expectations, thus threatening organizational survival and becoming constraining 
forces that modify organizational characteristics in the direction of environmentally determined 
homogenization, which DiMaggio and Powell (1983) call institutional isomorphism.  
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) describe three mechanisms driving institutional 
isomorphism: coercive, mimetic, and normative. Coercive isomorphism is associated with “both 
formal and informal pressures exerted on organizations by other organizations” (p.150), and can 
be pushed by a common policy environment, centralization or coordination processes in an 
organizational field, rituals of conformity to wider institutions, or even persuasion. Mimetic 
processes work through imitation and modeling on other organizations in response to uncertain 
environments. And, finally, the normative pressures are created by professionalization, 
suggesting that “organizational fields that include a large professionally trained labor force will 
be driven primarily by status competition” (p.154).  
Further, the institutional view suggests an idea of “institutional duality” (Hunter & 
Bansal, 2007), claiming that organizational formal and informal structures are often “loosely 
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coupled” (Sauder & Espeland, 2009). As a result, organizations develop policies to improve 
attributes captured by external assessments but may also engage in manipulating statistics, 
redefining goals, or innovating with gaming techniques.  They write that “To secure legitimacy 
and conform to general expectations, organizations may develop symbolic responses to 
environmental pressures without disrupting core technical activities” (Sauder & Espeland, 2009, 
p. 63). Manipulation strategies in a given field diffuse quickly as organizations are attentive to 
what others do to improve their standing in ratings. Only a few organizations that have little to 
lose and limited opportunities to improve may ignore publicized assessments and accept their 
inferior performance status, “reinterpreting the stigma of rankings as an honorable sacrifice” 
(p.78).   
In summary, the outlined theoretical account of the mechanisms through which external 
performance monitoring systems influence organizational behavior shows how institutionalized, 
objective, and shared metrics permeate boundaries between organizations, become internalized 
by organizations, and pressure organizations toward change. They explain how resource 
dependence, competition, uncertainty, sensemaking and the fact of being evaluated motivate 
organizations to improve their attributes or resist. These theoretical statements offer arguments 
for developing a theoretical framework describing adaptation of public charities to charity ratings 
as discussed in the following section.          
 
 
4.2.3 Public Charity Response to Third-Party Performance Ratings: Theory and 
Hypotheses 
 
The logic behind these theoretical mechanisms applies to the behavior of public charities 
facing third-party external evaluations, such as report cards/ratings are publicized, and informs a 
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framework of a charitable organization’s response to third-party ratings. Nonprofit charitable 
organizations may not accept the idea of ratings, may prefer different bases for performance 
evaluation, or have strategic priorities divergent from the dimensions emphasized by ratings, but 
ratings could still change their performance.  
 
Most of the reviewed literature admits the fundamental role of economic incentives in 
facilitating performance improvements with publicized rating information, even when other, less 
visible mechanisms may also be at work (Chatterji & Toffel, 2010; Gormley, 2003; Graham, 
2000; Jin & Leslie, 2003; Longo et al., 1997). As in markets of private goods (e.g. restaurants, 
healthcare, or education), information asymmetry is present in the relationship between 
nonprofits that produce public goods and their key funding stakeholders, which prevents funders 
“from knowing when to believe suppliers’ claims about product attributes that are not directly 
observable” (Chatterji & Toffel, 2010, p. 917).  As third party assessments are increasingly 
gaining public attention and valued by their audiences (Longo et al., 1997; Sauder & Espeland, 
2009), they can mitigate the depth of the information asymmetry problem and alter the nature of 
competition for resources (contributions) among charitable organizations. Third-party ratings 
provide easy-to-access evaluations that summarize performance using easy-to-comprehend 
aggregate measures and enable quick and simple comparisons across charities of interest.  
Thereby, third-party charity ratings reduce search costs and costs of learning for stakeholders and 
may influence funders’ decisions to contribute to some charities more than to others; in other 
words, introduction of independent ratings can influence organizational market shares (Gormley, 
2003; Jin & Leslie, 2003). Thus, to maintain or increase their market shares, organizations may 
try to improve their performance (Jin & Leslie, 2003; Longo et al., 1997). Publication of charity 
94 
 
performance ratings, therefore, can emerge as threatening event and influence charities to 
adjust/improve their subsequent performance on the publicized metrics.  
Public ratings can affect an organization’s reputation (Jin & Leslie, 2003), so regulation 
by shaming (Gormley, 2003; Graham, 2000) also applies in the nonprofit sector where trust 
goods and services are produced. Even without changes in market shares, a charity with a poor 
external assessment may face embarrassment and public humiliation with potential consequences 
for its reputation. Nonprofit managers will want to improve their organizations’ standing with 
their external evaluators. Other theories suggest similar basic expectations. Stakeholder theory 
dictates that “the identity of stakeholders and the nature of their requests influence firm 
responsiveness” (Chatterji & Toffel, 2010, p. 918). Nonprofits that depend on donations will 
want good external ratings, especially if those ratings influence giving. Boundedly rational 
nonprofit managers will not be able to determine the economically optimal level of performance, 
so they may redefine optimality in terms of charity ratings and use them as fixed performance 
standards that reduce uncertainty and require a lower cognitive effort. Finally, institutional and 
measurement reactivity theories also predict that publicizing of charity ratings will have 
significant effects on the charity performance scores. Hence, there are several compelling 
reasons to put forward the following hypothesis:  
 
H1: Nonprofits that receive a third-party rating will subsequently improve their 
measured performance13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13 Performance, as a multidimensional concept, is represented by several measures, as discussed in the Measures 
section. Therefore, each hypothesis breaks down into several sub-hypotheses – one for each operational indicator 
of performance    
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Variations in Charity Response to Third-Party Ratings 
 
Organizations vary in how they respond to external performance monitoring. 
Organizational, institutional, and environmental factors may condition the amount of change in 
performance that ratings elicit. For example, Chatterji & Toffel (2010) showed that regulatory 
stringency and organizational efficiency moderated the influence of corporate environmental 
ratings on firms’ subsequent environmental performance. Lewis (2014) found that normative 
pressures from local communities, industry-specific risk profiles, and prior financial performance 
conditioned the relationship between corporate social responsibility ratings and improvements in 
corporate social performance. These and other theories suggest a few contingencies relevant to 
the behavior of public charities under third-party performance monitoring. They suggest how a 
public charity’s response to external performance ratings should vary under various 
organizational or environmental conditions. 
First, economic theory suggests that performance improvement is costly and should be 
justified by expected benefits. Poorly measured performance of an organization may reflect a 
relatively large among of slack resources, on which to rely for improvements, compared to an 
organization with high performance grades. Chatterji & Toffel (2010) argue that organizations 
with different levels of performance face different sets of opportunities for improvement: poorly 
performing/rated organizations “face lower marginal costs of improving their performance” (p. 
922) and are more likely to implement lower cost but higher impact improvements that their 
more highly performing peers.  The higher the initial performance is, the harder and costlier it is 
to further improve and the smaller the increments are. Poorly rated firms face lower cost 
improvement opportunities and greater potential benefits than their more highly rated peers and 
therefore are more likely to improve or show greater levels of organizational change (Chatterji & 
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Toffel, 2010; Lewis, 2014; Martins, 2005). Thus, charities with poor initial ratings will “have a 
greater opportunity to exploit low-hanging fruit” (Chatterji & Toffel, 2010, p. 922) and improve 
performance more than those with higher initial ratings. Hence it is reasonable to hypothesize 
that: 
H2: Charities initially rated poor will demonstrate higher levels of improvement than 
those initially rated higher (except those initially rated excellent)14 
 
The second hypothesis is consistent with the behavioral and performance feedback 
theory, although taking its assumptions fully into account adds an additional contingency. 
Following the logic explicated in Lewis (2014), boundedly rational organizational managers will 
incorporate external ratings as decision rules that will help optimize performance. Such a 
decision rule will create stimuli for a charity to just meet a performance benchmark set by the 
rating institution. Hence, charities with low ratings will attempt to improve their performance 
indicators to the norm set by the rating agency. On the other hand, given that just meeting the 
standard is construed as the optimal performance level, an organization initially scoring above 
the mark is likely to somewhat reduce its subsequent performance through absorbing part of the 
resources as slack: 
 
H3: Charities that initially receive the highest rating will subsequently reduce their 
performance on measured indicators 
 
Confirming the logic advanced by economic theory, prior research emphasizes the role of 
market competition as a significant factor influencing organizational responsiveness to public 
ratings. For instance Jin and Leslie (2003) theorized that hygiene ratings cause improvements in 
restaurant quality through the competition mechanism. The changes in quality of hospital care 
 
14 The rating scales are outlined in the Methods section 
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found by Longo et al. (1997) were found to be especially pronounced in competitive markets.  
Given that nonprofits also compete for scarce charitable contributions, the nature of competition 
in a peer group (subfield) may determine how sensitive their behavior is to third party charity 
ratings. Specifically, the expectation is to see more performance improvement in response to 
ratings in more “crowded” fields of charitable activity – where competition for resources is 
fiercer. This expectation translates in the following hypotheses: 
 
H4.1: Nonprofits in fields with more competition will improve more in response to ratings 
than organizations in markets with less competition. 
H4.2: Charities that rely more on public contributions will improve more than 
organizations that rely on contributions to a lesser extent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. 1:  Research model 
 
 
 
4.3 Data  
To test the hypotheses about how third-party ratings influence monitored performance of 
public charities, this research uses a simple random sample of report cards for the rated charities 
Initial Charity 
Rating Issued 
Poor Rating 
Exceptional Rating 
Market Competition 
Revenue Portfolio 
Extent of 
subsequent 
performance 
improvement 
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from Charity Navigator. The sample contains 10345 observation for 841 charities between FY 
2000-2018.  
The choice of the rater for this analysis is strictly instrumental. Charity Navigator was 
founded in 2001 and, despite being one of the youngest third-party performance raters in the 
field, it still has a substantial history of producing ratings, which satisfies the data needs for this 
analysis. More importantly, it is the largest rater at this time grading over 9,000 public charities 
compared to 1,300 organization evaluated by the BBB Wise Giving Alliance, and about 575 
nonprofits rated by Charity Watch.  Additional factors that determined the choice of the rating 
context was availability of the historical rating data.  
Unlike Charity Watch, which provides access to most of its ratings to its paid members 
only, Charity Navigator ratings are open access. Thus, the CN report cards are cheaper and easier 
sources of information to charities’ constituents. Further, by funding its operations through 
public contributions and providing zero-cost access (Charity Navigator, 2013), Charity Navigator 
is preferable to BBB Wise Giving Alliance, which receives 82 percent of its income from 
Charity Seal license fees (BBB Wise Giving Alliance, 2013). Choosing a rating agency whose 
selection and evaluation methods are independent from motivations of rated organizations is 
important for minimizing potential self-selection issues.  
Finally, besides a simple four-star rating, the Charity Navigator uses a convenient for 
quantitative analysis interval level scale, as presented in Table 1. 
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Table 4. 1:  Charity Navigator’s grading scales 
Numeric 
Score 
No. of Stars Qualitative 
Rating 
Description 
91-100 
 
Exceptional Exceeds industry standards and outperforms most 
charities in its Cause. 
80-90 
 
Good Exceeds or meets industry standards and performs 
as well as or better than most charities in its 
Cause. 
70-80 
 
Needs 
Improvement 
Meets or nearly meets industry standards but 
underperforms most charities in its Cause. 
55-70 
 
Poor Fails to meet industry standards and performs well 
below most charities in its Cause. 
< 55 0-Stars Exceptionally 
Poor 
Performs far below industry standards and below 
nearly all charities in its Cause. 
 Donor 
Advisory 
No Rating Serious concerns have been raised about this 
charity which prevents the issuance of a star rating 
 
 
Charity Navigator issues three types of ratings: accountability and transparency ratings, 
financial ratings, and overall ratings. The star ratings are calculated based on a continuous 
performance score ranging 0 to 100. Accountability and transparency ratings are available since 
2011 – when they were introduced; financial ratings are available since at least 2002. A few 
charities with very serious concerns (like serious accusations or undergoing government 
investigations) receive Donor Advisory instead of ratings. In addition to discrete star ratings and 
continuous performance scores, the performance scorecard for each rated charity contains 
information on all the performance metrics that are used to calculate charity ratings. For instance, 
the financial performance section shows the data for a charity’s program expenses, 
administrative expenses, fundraising expenses, fundraising efficiency, working capital, and 
primary revenue and program expenses growth.  
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4.4 Methodology 
This section outlines how the charity-level data are analyzed to determine whether the 
performance scores and their components reported by Charity Navigator improve due to the 
release of charity ratings. Given that Charity Navigator, not a charity by itself, decides which 
organizations to rate based on explicit eligibility criteria, first issuance of the rating can be 
treated as a plausibly exogenous shock for the rated organization15. The Charity Navigator writes 
about the charities that they evaluate the following: “we are able to evaluate charities with or 
without their participation.”16 Even if a charity has been informed about the upcoming release of 
its rating, it is unlikely that it can undertake actions directed at affecting the results of the 
evaluation: a rating is calculated based on historical data a charity reports to IRS for a completed 
fiscal year. The Charity Navigator writes that it can obtain the Form 990 two to three months 
after it is filed; charities, in turn, have 135 days following the end of a fiscal year to file and often 
ask for extensions.17 Also, charities cannot opt out of being rated.18 As a result, following the 
issuance of the first rating, according to the theory, a rated organization can learn about its 
absolute and relative rating status and undertake rating improvement efforts.  This research 
proposal takes advantage of this exogenous shock at the first issuance of the rating and examines 
whether it is followed by subsequent improvements in performance measures incorporated in the 
rating system.  
 
15 Charity Selection Criteria 
http://www.charitynavigator.org/index.cfm?bay=content.view&cpid=32#.VamQKPlViko  
16 http://help.charitynavigator.org/kb/questions-about-the-charities-we-rate/can-i-request-to-have-my-charity-
removed-from-the-site  
17 http://www.charitynavigator.org/index.cfm?bay=content.view&cpid=441#.VamZAvlViko  
18 http://help.charitynavigator.org/kb/questions-about-the-charities-we-rate/can-i-request-to-have-my-charity-
removed-from-the-site  
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To test the proposed model, the analysis is conducted on a panel of charities rated based 
on their financial reports for fiscal years ended (FYE) 2001 to 2018. The time series includes two 
periods of data: fiscal years before the calendar year when the first rating was released (prerating 
period coded “0”) and the fiscal years staring the year when the first rating was released and 
organizational response became possible (rating period, coded “1”). The coding scheme for the 
main explanatory variable labeled “CN Rated” is presented in Table 2.  Because the rating 
agency evaluates charities using their past financial reports, there is a lag between the calendar 
year the first rating was released, and the fiscal year based on which it was released. In other 
words, a first-time rating issued to a charity in 2003 can be a grade for the FYE 2001 (two-year 
lag), which means that there is nothing the charity could do to improve its ratings for the FYE 
2001-2002. Also, given that Charity Navigator started releasing its Financial Ratings in 2002 and 
its Accountability and Transparency ratings in 2011, separate explanatory variables (“CN Rated” 
and “CN Rated Accountability & Transparency”) indicating the rating periods for the two 
measures are used in the analysis. The coding approach is presented in Table 4.2.  
 
Table 4. 2:  Coding scheme for time periods in the ratings dataset 
First Rating Release Year Y Y+1 Y+2 Y+3 Y+i 
Fiscal Year (FYE) Y-n Y+1-n Y+2-n Y+3-n Y+i-n 
First  
Fiscal Year (FYE) Response Possible 
  Y(n=i)   
CN Rated 
Variable Coding 
Prerating period (0) Rating period (1) 
 Example (n = 2) 
First Rating Release Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Fiscal Year (FYE) 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
First  
Fiscal Year (FYE) Response Possible 
  2003   
 Prerating period  
(FYE 2001-2002) 
Rating period 
(FYE 2003 - 2005) 
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First hypothesis (H1) determines whether performance scores and their components 
improve after the release of performance ratings for the first time. Similarly to Jin and Leslie 
(2003), the following estimating equation is used to test the hypothesis: 
 
PERF.SCOREit = β1CNRatedit + β2Xit + αi + i + eit (1) 
       
In this equation: 
PERF.SCOREit – performance scores for the charity i at time t  
CNRatedit – coded “1” for the fiscal years after a charity was first rated (rating period) 
Reference group – the years in the prerating period 
Xit - the vector of control variables 
αi – organization fixed effects 
1 – year fixed effects 
 
As the theory suggest that charities will respond by improving on the measured 
performance metrics, PERF.SCOREit is operationalized using each of the following variables 
included in the CN report cards:  
- Overall score 
- Financial Score 
- Accountability and Transparency Score 
- Program Expenses (percent of total expenses) 
- Administrative Expenses 
- Program Expenses Growth (percent) 
- Fundraising Efficiency 
- Working Capital Ratio 
 
As in the analysis conducted by Jin and Leslie (2003), there is no unrated control group 
in this model and the effects of issuing external ratings is estimated relying on time series 
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variation with year fixed effects capturing year-specific changes that would also be expected in 
unrated organizations. 
  Hypotheses H2-H3 test whether the improvement after issuance of ratings varies for 
charities initially rated differently. For H2, the differences in effects are captured by interacting 
the variable indicating the rating period with the variable indicating the initial rating a charity 
received.  The hypotheses are tested using the following specification: 
PERF.SCOREit = β1CNRatedit + β2* (CNRatedit*Init.Rated.Poori) +  
β3* (CNRatedit*Init.Rated.NeedsImpri)+ β4Xit + αi + i + eit 
 
(2) 
 
 
In this equation, Init.Rated.Poori, Init.Rated.NeedsImpri, and Init.Rated.Goodi are dummy 
variables created to distinguish between charities initially rated “Poor” (0-1 stars), “needs 
Improvement” (2 stars) , and “Good” (3 stars) by the rater. For instance, the variable 
Init.Rated.Poori is coded “1” for charities that received the grade “Poor” when they were rated 
for the first time.  The group initially rated “Good” is set as the hypothetically least responsive 
reference category. The agencies that receive the initial rating Excellent (4 stars) are excluded 
from this analysis. For testing H3, the specification from (1) is used on the sub-sample restricted 
to only the charities that received the excellent rating at the time they became rated. 
The differences in the effects across fields with different levels of competition described 
in H4.1 are estimated by interacting the indicator of a charity being rated with a set of indicators 
of the competition category it belongs to. There are a few ways to operationalize the extent of 
competition in the nonprofit sector. One way is to measure the number of nonprofits in a defined 
group competing for a charitable dollar. The operational measure is the number of public 
charities in a category normalized by the size of the market in dollars. Charities can be 
distinguished by categories using the Charity Navigator’s own categorization.  
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A second way to approach an organization’s motivation to compete for resources is 
through revenue concentration. According to Trussel & Parsons (2007), “A firm that is 
dependent on one or a few revenue providers is vulnerable to declines in the economic health or 
changes in the donation preferences of those providers” (p.269). Research shows this measure 
predicts nonprofit organization financial vulnerability. Therefore, the fewer revenue sources a 
charity has, the more motivated it will be to compete for those sources and, therefore, improve its 
charity ratings. The operational definition of the measure is the sum of the squared shares of each 
revenue source out of total revenue.  
To make the coefficients meaningful in the context of the hypothesis, the reference group 
in the indicator of the nonprofit category was set to the category with the lowest value on the 
calculated field competition, and the categories in the facto r variable were arranged in the order 
of increasing competition.  
PERF.SCOREit = β1CNRatedit + β2* (CNRatedit*Categoryi) + 
+ β3Xit + αi + i + eit 
 
(3) 
 
Finally, H4.2 is estimated by interacting the main explanatory variable with one of four 
dummies indicating a charity’s share of public contributions in its revenue portfolio. The 
indicator’s levels correspond to the quartiles in the distribution of the shares of public 
contributions in the population of rated charities, with the lowest quartile (Q1) representing the 
reference category: 
PERF.SCOREit = β1CNRatedit + β2* (CNRatedit* Share.Contrib.Q2) + β3* (CNRatedit* 
Share.Contrib.Q3)+ β4* (CNRatedit* Share.Contrib.Q4) + β4Xit + αi + i + eit 
(4) 
 
 
This analysis controls for a number of factors that can affect financial performance 
scores, transparency, and accountability.  Time-invariant organizational characteristics (such as 
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corporate culture) and unobserved time-variant environmental factors that affect all charities are 
controlled by including charity-level fixed effects and year fixed effects accordingly (Chatterji & 
Toffel, 2010; Lewis, 2014). Additional time-variable factors are also incorporated in the analysis 
following the insight from (Saxton & Guo, 2011; Trussel & Parsons, 2007). These include Total 
Revenue and Organizational size. The latter is operationalized as the size of current assets and 
reflects reputation. 
 
4.5 Findings 
Table 4.3 below presents the results of testing hypothesis H1 for the nine response 
variables of interest, including the overall performance score, financial score, accountability and 
transparency score, and five financial metrics that make up the financial score. According to the 
theory, nonprofit agencies are expected to improve their composite performance scores during 
the years after they became rated, by improving on at least some of the variables that determine 
those scores. The analysis of the available data, however, presents results that are contrary to the 
expectations. First, the coefficient on CN Rated Financial variable indicating the fiscal years for 
which an agency received its financial ratings and could react to them is statistically insignificant 
and is close to zero even in the sample. The finding suggests that during the years following the 
issuance of the first charity rating, rated nonprofits, on average, did not improve their financial 
scores.  
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Table 4. 3:  Agency measured performance after initial Charity Navigator’s rating 
 
1 
Overall 
Score 
2 
Overall 
Score 
3 
Financial 
Score 
4 
Account. 
& 
Transp. 
Score 
5 
Program 
Expenses 
(Percent) 
6 
Administrative 
Expenses 
(Percent) 
7 
Fundraising 
Efficiency 
8 
Program 
Expenses 
Growth 
(Percent) 
9 
Working 
Capital 
Ratio 
CN Rated 
Financial  
0.27 
0.25 
 
-0.21 
0.28 
 
0.45 * 
0.21 
-0.26 
0.15 
0.02 
0.02 
-4.73 *** 
0.66 
-0.06 
0.05 
CN Rated 
Accountability 
 1.10 ** 
0.35 
 2.43 *** 
0.29 
     
Total Revenue 0.01 *** 
0.00 
0.01 *** 
0.00 
0.01 *** 
0.00 
-0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
-0.00 
0.00 
-0.00 
0.00 
0.02 *** 
0.00 
-0.00 *** 
0.00 
Assets -0.00*** 
0.00 
-0.00*** 
0.00 
-0.00*** 
0.00 
-0.01* 
0.00 
-0.00*** 
0.00 
0.00*** 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
-0.00 
0.00 
0.00*** 
0.00 
Agency Fixed 
Effects 
Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
FYE [2001] 0.59 
1.10 
0.59 
1.10 
0.31 
1.25 
 
-0.78 
0.92 
0.09 
0.68 
0.02 
0.09 
-1.29 
2.90 
0.33 
0.21 
FYE [2002] 0.86 
1.08 
1.01 
1.07 
0.91 
1.23 
 
0.21 
0.90 
-0.26 
0.67 
0.00 
0.09 
-0.99 
2.84 
0.15 
0.20 
FYE [2003] -2.05 * 
1.05 
-1.89 
1.03 
-2.06 
1.19 
 
-0.32 
0.87 
-0.30 
0.65 
-0.01 
0.09 
-3.39 
2.76 
0.31 
0.20 
FYE [2004] -2.49 * 
1.04 
-2.30 * 
1.02 
-2.43 * 
1.19 
 
-0.30 
0.87 
-0.52 
0.65 
-0.01 
0.09 
-3.67 
2.74 
0.21 
0.19 
FYE [2005] -2.06 * 
1.05 
-1.79 
1.02 
-1.92 
1.20 
 
0.07 
0.88 
-1.00 
0.65 
-0.02 
0.09 
-4.39 
2.78 
0.33 
0.20 
FYE [2006] -0.79 
1.05 
-0.52 
1.02 
-0.66 
1.20 
 
0.08 
0.88 
-0.69 
0.65 
-0.03 
0.09 
-3.50 
2.77 
0.39 * 
0.20 
FYE [2007] -0.39 
1.05 
-0.11 
1.02 
-0.30 
1.20 
 
0.67 
0.88 
-1.14 
0.65 
-0.03 
0.09 
-2.31 
2.77 
0.36 
0.20 
FYE [2008] -0.09 
1.05 
0.19 
1.02 
0.03 
1.20 
 
0.90 
0.88 
-1.24 
0.65 
0.01 
0.09 
-1.82 
2.77 
0.43 * 
0.20 
FYE [2009] -1.43 
1.04 
-1.14 
1.00 
-1.09 
1.18 
0.36 
3.90 
0.80 
0.86 
-1.11 
0.64 
0.07 
0.09 
-5.96 * 
2.73 
0.79 *** 
0.19 
FYE [2010] -0.08 
1.04 
0.20 
1.00 
-1.24 
1.18 
3.22 
3.90 
1.32 
0.87 
-1.32 * 
0.65 
0.01 
0.09 
-8.81 ** 
2.74 
0.91 *** 
0.19 
FYE [2011] 0.75 
1.03 
0.08 
1.05 
-1.12 
1.18 
2.92 
3.90 
1.28 
0.86 
-1.31 * 
0.64 
-0.03 
0.09 
-10.31 *** 
2.73 
0.95 *** 
0.19 
FYE [2012] 1.51 
1.03 
0.84 
1.05 
-0.39 
1.18 
3.64 
3.90 
1.61 
0.86 
-1.65 * 
0.64 
-0.02 
0.08 
-10.30 *** 
2.72 
0.88 *** 
0.19 
FYE [2013] 1.69 
1.03 
0.94 
1.05 
-0.24 
1.18 
3.55 
3.91 
1.68 
0.86 
-1.83 ** 
0.64 
-0.02 
0.09 
-8.45 ** 
2.73 
0.92 *** 
0.19 
FYE [2014] 2.34 * 
1.03 
1.50 
1.06 
0.58 
1.18 
3.31 
3.91 
1.87 * 
0.86 
-1.73 ** 
0.64 
-0.04 
0.09 
-7.68 ** 
2.72 
0.98 *** 
0.19 
FYE [2015] 3.50 *** 
1.04 
2.65 * 
1.07 
1.79 
1.19 
4.50 
3.91 
1.88 * 
0.87 
-1.85 ** 
0.65 
-0.03 
0.09 
-7.91 ** 
2.75 
0.97 *** 
0.20 
FYE [2016] 3.76 *** 
1.05 
2.86 ** 
1.08 
1.82 
1.19 
4.98 
3.91 
1.84 * 
0.88 
-1.78 ** 
0.65 
-0.03 
0.09 
-7.84 ** 
2.76 
0.94 *** 
0.20 
FYE [2017] 3.71 *** 
1.07 
2.79 * 
1.10 
1.41 
1.22 
5.07 
3.92 
1.67 
0.90 
-1.94 ** 
0.67 
-0.02 
0.09 
-9.16 ** 
2.83 
1.01 *** 
0.20 
(Intercept) 78.39*** 
1.97 
78.36*** 
1.97 
88.71*** 
2.25 
64.46*** 
4.23 
84.42*** 
1.65 
11.92*** 
1.23 
0.06 
0.16 
14.86** 
5.20 
1.55*** 
0.37 
Observations 10241 10241 10241 6944 10241 10233 10241 10170 10241 
R2 / R2 
adjusted 
0.522 / 
0.477 
0.523 / 
0.478 
0.502 / 
0.456 
0.734 / 
0.696 
0.739 / 
0.715 
0.707 / 0.679 0.210 / 0.135 0.261 / 
0.190 
0.804 / 
0.786 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05   ** p<0.01   *** p<0.001 
 
Second, even though the coefficient on CN Rated Accountability indicating the fiscal 
years following the year when accountability and transparency ratings became publicly available 
for a particular charity is, as expected, positive and highly significant, the magnitude of the 
improvement in the accountability score based on the obtained point estimate (2.43 points with 
se = 0.29 points) has little practical significance. The difference between neighboring star-grades 
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is 10 points,  and there were only 7.26 percent of observations in the population of rated charities 
(as of 2018) with financial scores between 88 and 90 – the cases where 2.43-point increase in 
accountability and transparency score would improve the overall star-grade by one star.  
Similarly, the positive and significant coefficient on Program Expenses (percent) 
indicates a statistically significant at five percent increase in the fraction of charities’ total budget 
spent on their program activities after they became publicly rated, but the point estimate of 0.45 
percent improvement has little practical significance, given the variation in this variable ranging 
from 10 percent to literally 100 percent and the median of 81.30 percent (see Figure C.1 and 
Table C.1 in the Appendix C).  
In addition to that, a charity's annual program expenses growth rate shrank by the 
estimated 4.73 percentage points, which is close to the median Program Expenses Grow (see 
Figure C.2 and Table C.2 in the Appendix C), so the Overall Score during the rating period does 
not become statistically different from the preparing period. 
 Hypothesis H2 posited that initially rated “Poor” agencies would demonstrate higher 
levels of improvement than those initially rated good or average. The differences in charity 
performance changes during the rating period depending on the level of the initial rating are 
reflected by the coefficients on the interaction terms between CN Rated Financial / CN Rated 
Accountability and the indicator of the initial rating for each agency Initial Rating coded as 
[Poor] (0-1 stars) / [Needs Improvement] (2 stars) / [Good] (3 stars). The agencies that receive 
the initial rating Excellent (4 stars) are excluded from this analysis. As the distribution of initial 
ratings provided in the Appendix C (Figure C. 3 and Table C. 3) show, the most frequent initial 
rating is three stars [Good] accounting for 41.53 percent of all initial ratings; poor initial ratings, 
on the other hand, represent only 9.07 percent in the population of CN rated agencies as of 2018. 
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The regression results are presented in Table 4.4. The coefficients on CN Rated Financial 
show the performance scores for the reference group (the charities initially rated “Good”) 
decreased after becoming rated relative to the prerating period by the estimated 1.24  points on 
the Overall Score and 1.54  points on the Financial Score. Both changes are statistically 
significant, although appear to be negligible from the perspective of practical significance. The 
observed decrease in performance appears to be driven by a slight decrease in Program Expenses 
and a significant slowdown in the annualized Program Expenses Growth. The Accountability 
and Transparency Score, however, increased by the estimated 2.20 (0.36) points.  
In contrast to the reference group that showed minuscule negative changes in the 
measured performance indicator, the response for the groups that received lower initial ratings 
appears to be significantly stronger and in line with the laid-out theory. In the first model, which 
estimates the changes in the Overall Score after an agency becomes publicly rated, both 
interaction terms estimating the differences in the coefficients for initially low-rated agencies 
relative to initially highly rated agencies are statistically significant, positive, and also practically 
significant.  Unlike the initially rated “Good” (three stars) reference group that did not show any 
meaningful improvement after becoming publicly rated, the group that initially received the label 
“Needs Improvement” (two stars) added the estimated 5.03 points to the difference in the 
expected response in performance scores of the reference group. As predicted by the theory, the 
strongest response is observed in the group initially rated “Poor” (0-1 star) with the estimated 
difference in the coefficients of highly significant 10.26 points. The response of such magnitude 
is enough to move a charity one step up on the star scale and thus leave its initial grade-category.  
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Table 4. 4:  Agency measured performance after initial Charity Navigator’s rating depending on 
the value of the initial rating (reference group for Initial Rating = “Good”) 
  1 
Overall 
Score 
2 
Financial 
Score 
3 
Account. 
& 
Transp. 
Score 
4 
Program 
Expenses 
(Percent) 
5 
Administrative 
Expenses 
(Percent) 
6 
Fundraising 
Efficiency 
7 
Program 
Expenses 
Growth 
(Percent) 
8 
Working 
Capital 
Ratio 
CN Rated  
Financial 
-1.24 *** 
0.35 
-1.54 *** 
0.40 
 
-0.62 * 
0.31 
0.43  
0.24 
0.02 *** 
0.00 
-6.26 *** 
0.98 
-0.01  
0.06 
CN.Rated.Fin * 
Initial.Rating.[Poor] 
10.26 *** 
0.70 
9.29 *** 
0.80 
 6.67 *** 
0.62 
-3.66 *** 
0.47 
-0.05 *** 
0.01 
10.35 *** 
1.99 
0.08  
0.11 
CN.Rated.Fin * 
Initial.Rating.[NeedsImpr] 
5.03 *** 
0.50 
4.86 *** 
0.57 
 2.01 *** 
0.45 
-1.77 *** 
0.34 
-0.02 * 
0.01 
8.39 *** 
1.41 
-0.04  
0.08 
CN Rated 
Accountability  
  2.20 *** 
0.36 
     
CN.Rated.Acc * 
Initial.Rating.[Poor] 
  2.31 *** 
0.60 
     
Rated.Acc * 
Initial.Rating.[NeedsImpr] 
  1.74 *** 
0.42 
     
Total Revenue 0.01 ** 
0.00 
0.01 * 
0.00 
-0.00  
0.00 
-0.00  
0.00 
0.00  
0.00 
-0.00  
0.00 
0.02 *** 
0.01 
-0.00 * 
0.00 
Assets 0.03 *** 
0.01 
0.05 *** 
0.01 
-0.03 ** 
0.01 
0.02 *** 
0.01 
-0.01 *** 
0.00 
-0.00 * 
0.00 
0.08 *** 
0.02 
0.01 *** 
0.00 
Agency Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
FYE [2001] 1.66  
1.39 
1.22  
1.60 
 
-0.84  
1.24 
-0.43  
0.95 
0.03  
0.02 
6.06  
3.92 
-0.07  
0.22 
FYE [2002] 2.43  
1.36 
2.28  
1.57 
 
0.44  
1.22 
-0.69  
0.93 
0.02  
0.02 
7.57 * 
3.83 
-0.25  
0.22 
FYE [2003] -0.35  
1.32 
-0.75  
1.52 
 
-0.04  
1.18 
-0.86  
0.90 
0.02  
0.02 
6.21  
3.72 
-0.30  
0.21 
FYE [2004] -0.25  
1.31 
-0.69  
1.51 
 
-0.30  
1.17 
-0.80  
0.89 
0.02  
0.02 
5.14  
3.70 
-0.24  
0.21 
FYE [2005] -0.43  
1.32 
-0.78  
1.53 
 
0.18  
1.19 
-1.53  
0.90 
0.02  
0.02 
3.58  
3.74 
-0.17  
0.21 
FYE [2006] 1.65  
1.32 
1.26  
1.53 
 
0.61  
1.19 
-1.33  
0.90 
0.01  
0.02 
4.36  
3.73 
-0.07  
0.21 
FYE [2007] 1.48  
1.33 
1.04  
1.53 
 
1.09  
1.19 
-1.76  
0.90 
0.01  
0.02 
5.65  
3.74 
-0.23  
0.21 
FYE [2008] 1.17  
1.32 
0.76  
1.53 
 
1.28  
1.19 
-1.69  
0.90 
0.02  
0.02 
5.63  
3.74 
-0.08  
0.21 
FYE [2009] 1.08  
1.30 
0.62  
1.51 
0.63  
3.93 
1.67  
1.17 
-1.89 * 
0.89 
0.01  
0.02 
1.10  
3.68 
0.27  
0.21 
FYE [2010] 2.19  
1.31 
0.11  
1.51 
3.09  
3.92 
2.32 * 
1.17 
-2.07 * 
0.89 
0.01  
0.02 
-1.78  
3.69 
0.34  
0.21 
FYE [2011] 3.50 ** 
1.30 
1.04  
1.51 
2.14  
3.93 
2.42 * 
1.17 
-2.23 * 
0.89 
0.00  
0.02 
-2.78  
3.68 
0.43 * 
0.21 
FYE [2012] 4.41 *** 
1.30 
1.90  
1.50 
2.88  
3.93 
2.77 * 
1.16 
-2.48 ** 
0.89 
0.01  
0.02 
-2.09  
3.66 
0.33  
0.21 
FYE [2013] 4.65 *** 
1.30 
2.19  
1.51 
2.86  
3.93 
2.86 * 
1.17 
-2.68 ** 
0.89 
0.01  
0.02 
-0.25  
3.68 
0.39  
0.21 
FYE [2014] 5.34 *** 
1.30 
2.84  
1.50 
2.71  
3.93 
3.14 ** 
1.17 
-2.61 ** 
0.89 
0.00  
0.02 
0.74  
3.67 
0.43 * 
0.21 
FYE [2015] 6.54 *** 
1.31 
4.10 ** 
1.52 
4.03  
3.93 
3.15 ** 
1.18 
-2.76 ** 
0.90 
-0.00  
0.02 
0.40  
3.71 
0.45 * 
0.21 
FYE [2016] 6.79 *** 
1.32 
4.06 ** 
1.52 
4.50  
3.94 
3.17 ** 
1.18 
-2.70 ** 
0.90 
-0.00  
0.02 
0.14  
3.72 
0.40  
0.21 
FYE [2017] 7.06 *** 
1.35 
3.92 * 
1.55 
4.91  
3.94 
2.92 * 
1.21 
-2.87 ** 
0.92 
0.00  
0.02 
-0.95  
3.80 
0.46 * 
0.22 
(Intercept) 77.06 *** 
2.09 
87.84 *** 
2.41 
65.24 *** 
4.26 
84.31 *** 
1.87 
12.13 *** 
1.42 
0.04  
0.03 
8.16  
5.89 
2.03 *** 
0.34 
Observations 7190 7190 5002 7190 7182 7190 7136 7190 
R2 / R2 adjusted 0.560 / 
0.515 
0.526 / 
0.478 
0.760 / 
0.724 
0.730 / 
0.703 
0.701 / 0.671 0.537 / 0.491 0.261 / 
0.186 
0.807 / 
0.788 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05   ** p<0.01   *** p<0.001 
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The coefficients on interaction terms for Accountability and Transparency Score show 
similar patterns but with substantially smaller magnitudes. Whereas the estimated improvement 
in the group initially rated “Good” is estimated be 2.20 points, the group rated “Poor” added 
estimated 2.31 points to the expected difference. This analysis shows that the described 
improvements in the Overall Score are driven largely by improvements in the Financial Score, 
which, in turn, results from a significant increase in the reported Program Expenses and 
Program Expenses Growth, as well as a cutback in Administrative Expenses. Overall, the 
findings confirm the hypothesis with respect to the Overall Performance score including its both 
components. 
Testing hypothesis H3, which argues that charities that initially receive the highest rating 
will subsequently reduce their measured performance, is based on a subsample restricted to the 
charities that initially received a four-star overall performance grade with the “Excellent” label. 
As hypothesized, the analysis of the data shows a statistically significant decrease in the 
expected Overall Score by the estimated 3.87 points after a charity becomes rated (Table 4.5). 
This change reflects a statistically significant drop of comparable magnitude in the expected 
Financial Score and no change in the Accountability and Transparency score. The change in the 
Financial Score appears to be driven by a significant slowdown in the annualized Program 
Expenses Growth by the estimated expected 11.72 percentage points.  
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Table 4. 5:  Agency measured performance after initial Charity Navigator’s rating for initially 
top-rated charities 
  1 
Overall 
Score 
2 
Financial 
Score 
3 
Account. 
& 
Transp. 
Score 
4 
Program 
Expenses 
(Percent) 
5 
Administrative 
Expenses 
(Percent) 
6 
Fundraising 
Efficiency 
7 
Program 
Expenses 
Growth 
(Percent) 
8 
Working 
Capital 
Ratio 
CN Rated 
Financial 
-3.87*** 
0.45 
-4.16 *** 
0.52 
 
-0.76 * 
0.33 
0.72** 
0.24 
0.06  
0.07 
-11.72*** 
1.11 
-0.15  
0.12 
CN Rated 
Accountability 
  -0.46  
0.66 
     
Total Revenue 
(Mil. Dollars) 
0.02 *** 
0.00 
0.03 *** 
0.00 
-0.01  
0.01 
0.00  
0.00 
0.00  
0.00 
-0.00  
0.00 
0.02 * 
0.01 
-0.00 *** 
0.00 
Assets  
(Mil. Dollars) 
-0.00 *** 
0.00 
-0.01 *** 
0.00 
-0.00  
0.00 
-0.00 * 
0.00 
0.00 ** 
0.00 
0.00  
0.00 
-0.00  
0.00 
0.00 *** 
0.00 
Agency Fixed 
Effects 
Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
FYE [2001] 0.04  
1.61 
-0.05  
1.83 
 
-0.40  
1.17 
0.64  
0.84 
-0.00  
0.26 
-10.52 ** 
3.92 
0.85 * 
0.42 
FYE [2002] -0.06  
1.57 
0.14  
1.79 
 
0.01  
1.15 
0.11  
0.82 
-0.03  
0.25 
-11.02 ** 
3.84 
0.69  
0.41 
FYE [2003] -2.28  
1.54 
-2.08  
1.75 
 
-0.18  
1.12 
0.10  
0.80 
-0.09  
0.25 
-15.02 *** 
3.76 
1.16 ** 
0.40 
FYE [2004] -3.70 * 
1.54 
-3.34  
1.75 
 
0.38  
1.12 
-0.66  
0.80 
-0.07  
0.25 
-13.85 *** 
3.75 
0.76  
0.40 
FYE [2005] -2.84  
1.56 
-2.54  
1.78 
 
0.00  
1.14 
-0.36  
0.81 
-0.11  
0.25 
-14.07 *** 
3.81 
0.95 * 
0.41 
FYE [2006] -3.28 * 
1.56 
-3.01  
1.78 
 
-0.94  
1.14 
0.27  
0.81 
-0.11  
0.25 
-13.09 *** 
3.81 
0.91 * 
0.41 
FYE [2007] -2.20  
1.56 
-1.99  
1.78 
 
-0.41  
1.14 
-0.04  
0.81 
-0.10  
0.25 
-12.78 *** 
3.81 
1.11 ** 
0.41 
FYE [2008] -0.63  
1.56 
-0.38  
1.78 
 
-0.02  
1.14 
-0.55  
0.81 
-0.02  
0.25 
-11.13 ** 
3.81 
1.06 ** 
0.41 
FYE [2009] -4.12 ** 
1.53 
-3.07  
1.75 
 
-0.96  
1.12 
0.16  
0.80 
0.19  
0.25 
-13.93 *** 
3.75 
1.44 *** 
0.40 
FYE [2010] -2.38  
1.54 
-2.62  
1.76 
3.72 *** 
0.66 
-0.81  
1.13 
-0.08  
0.81 
-0.00  
0.25 
-16.78 *** 
3.77 
1.64 *** 
0.41 
FYE [2011] -2.33  
1.54 
-4.08 * 
1.76 
6.25 *** 
0.88 
-1.09  
1.12 
0.27  
0.80 
-0.09  
0.25 
-19.10 *** 
3.77 
1.57 *** 
0.41 
FYE [2012] -2.05  
1.54 
-3.74 * 
1.76 
6.98 *** 
0.89 
-0.91  
1.12 
-0.20  
0.80 
-0.09  
0.25 
-20.67 *** 
3.77 
1.57 *** 
0.41 
FYE [2013] -2.34  
1.54 
-4.43 * 
1.76 
6.70 *** 
0.91 
-1.02  
1.13 
-0.21  
0.81 
-0.09  
0.25 
-19.62 *** 
3.78 
1.54 *** 
0.41 
FYE [2014] -1.77  
1.53 
-3.22  
1.74 
6.31 *** 
0.91 
-1.04  
1.12 
-0.06  
0.80 
-0.11  
0.25 
-19.67 *** 
3.74 
1.62 *** 
0.40 
FYE [2015] -0.84  
1.55 
-2.28  
1.77 
7.18 *** 
0.94 
-1.09  
1.13 
-0.05  
0.81 
-0.10  
0.25 
-19.84 *** 
3.79 
1.53 *** 
0.41 
FYE [2016] -0.39  
1.56 
-2.00  
1.78 
7.75 *** 
0.96 
-1.21  
1.14 
0.00  
0.81 
-0.10  
0.25 
-18.81 *** 
3.82 
1.53 *** 
0.41 
FYE [2017] -1.20  
1.61 
-3.09  
1.84 
7.09 *** 
1.03 
-1.15  
1.18 
-0.17  
0.84 
-0.07  
0.26 
-20.86 *** 
3.94 
1.63 *** 
0.42 
(Intercept) 93.57 *** 
1.93 
93.35 *** 
2.20 
88.51 *** 
1.51 
75.78 *** 
1.41 
14.90 *** 
1.01 
0.10  
0.31 
41.87 *** 
4.72 
0.12  
0.51 
Observations 3051 3051 1942 3051 3051 3051 3034 3051 
R2 / R2 
adjusted 
0.405 / 
0.352 
0.438 / 
0.388 
0.564 / 
0.503 
0.756 / 
0.735 
0.730 / 0.706 0.204 / 0.133 0.321 / 0.261 0.804 / 
0.787 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05   ** p<0.01   *** p<0.001 
 
The results of testing the last two hypotheses that address the moderating effect of 
competition for donated revenue are provided in Tables 4.7 and 4.8.  Hypothesis H4.1 posits that 
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nonprofit agencies in fields with more competition will demonstrate a greater level of 
improvement in response to ratings than organizations in markets with less competition. The 
variable measuring the extend of market competition among rated charities was computed as the 
average over the fiscal years 2000 – 2018 number of public charities in a category normalized by 
the size of the market in dollars in that category. Table 4.6 presents the values on the measure for 
the different charity categories arranged in the descending order. To test the hypothesis, the 
binary variables indicating each charitable category were included in the regression as part of the 
interaction term with the indicator of the period during which a charity was rated. The results of 
the multiple regression analysis are presented in Table 4.7. The “International” category showing 
the lowest value on the competition measure is the reference group and the regression 
coefficients are listed in the order of increasing competition.  
 
Table 4. 6:  Computed average competition by category of charitable activity (sorted from the 
highest competition to the lowest) 
Category Average Competition (2000-2018) 
Human and Civil Rights 134.30 
Environment 123.66 
Religion 91.00 
Health 87.68 
Animals 81.85 
Education 74.73 
Arts, Culture, Humanities 70.50 
Research and Public Policy 58.08 
Human Services 55.77 
Community Development 48.51 
International 31.63 
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Table 4. 7:  Moderating effect of the competition across fields of activity 
  1 
Overall 
Score 
2 
Financial 
Score 
3 
Account. 
& 
Transp. 
Score 
4 
Program 
Expenses 
(Percent) 
5 
Administrative 
Expenses 
(Percent) 
6 
Fundraising 
Efficiency 
7 
Program 
Expenses 
Growth 
(Percent) 
8 
Working 
Capital 
Ratio 
CN Rated Financial -0.23  
0.67 
-0.88  
0.77 
 
0.09  
0.56 
0.89 * 
0.42 
0.01  
0.06 
-11.58 *** 
1.78 
-0.05  
0.13 
CN Rated Financial * 
Community 
Development 
0.98  
0.93 
0.60  
1.06 
 0.55  
0.78 
-1.31 * 
0.58 
0.01  
0.08 
6.58 ** 
2.45 
0.02  
0.17 
FinPostRated1 * 
Human Services 
0.96  
0.75 
1.35  
0.86 
 -0.04  
0.63 
-0.81  
0.47 
0.00  
0.06 
9.34 *** 
1.99 
0.07  
0.14 
FinPostRated1 * 
Research.&.Public Policy 
-5.38 *** 
1.46 
-5.23 ** 
1.66 
 -0.56  
1.22 
-0.33  
0.91 
-0.00  
0.12 
1.78  
3.83 
-0.43  
0.27 
FinPostRated1 * 
Arts, Culture, 
Humanities 
0.95  
0.83 
1.43  
0.95 
 1.22  
0.69 
-2.39 *** 
0.52 
0.01  
0.07 
8.34 *** 
2.20 
-0.14  
0.16 
FinPostRated1 * 
Education 
1.07  
1.01 
0.93  
1.16 
 -0.21  
0.85 
-0.73  
0.63 
-0.00  
0.08 
7.69 ** 
2.68 
0.20  
0.19 
FinPostRated1 * 
Animals 
-0.37  
1.10 
0.61  
1.25 
 1.12  
0.92 
-0.90  
0.68 
0.00  
0.09 
-13.68 *** 
2.89 
0.10  
0.21 
FinPostRated1 * 
Health 
-1.16  
0.86 
-1.55  
0.98 
 -0.79  
0.72 
-0.50  
0.54 
0.11  
0.07 
7.25 ** 
2.28 
-0.00  
0.16 
FinPostRated1 * 
Religion 
1.78  
1.08 
3.69 ** 
1.23 
 3.45 *** 
0.90 
-3.43 *** 
0.67 
-0.02  
0.09 
10.77 *** 
2.83 
-0.32  
0.20 
FinPostRated1 * 
Environment 
1.55  
1.05 
0.76  
1.19 
 1.20  
0.87 
-1.13  
0.65 
-0.02  
0.09 
7.84 ** 
2.75 
0.01  
0.20 
FinPostRated1 * 
Human and Civil Rights 
-0.15  
1.25 
-0.47  
1.42 
 0.12  
1.04 
-2.10 ** 
0.78 
0.00  
0.10 
5.97  
3.31 
-0.18  
0.23 
AccPostRated1   5.62 *** 
0.59 
     
AccPostRated1 * 
Community 
Development 
  -3.58 *** 
0.74 
     
AccPostRated1 * 
Human Services 
  -3.13 *** 
0.59 
     
AccPostRated1 * 
Research and Public 
Policy 
  -4.83 *** 
1.18 
     
AccPostRated1 * 
Arts, Culture, 
Humanities 
  -4.51 *** 
0.66 
     
AccPostRated1 * 
Education 
  -2.72 ** 
0.84 
     
AccPostRated1 * 
Animals 
  -2.82 ** 
0.89 
     
AccPostRated1 * 
Health 
  -2.59 *** 
0.68 
     
AccPostRated1 * 
Religion 
  -2.70 ** 
0.86 
     
AccPostRated1 * 
Environment 
  -2.58 ** 
0.84 
     
AccPostRated1 * 
Human & Civil Rights 
  -3.43 *** 
1.00 
     
Total Revenue 0.01 *** 
0.00 
0.01 *** 
0.00 
-0.00  
0.00 
0.00  
0.00 
-0.00  
0.00 
-0.00  
0.00 
0.02 *** 
0.00 
-0.00 *** 
0.00 
Assets -0.00 *** 
0.00 
-0.00 *** 
0.00 
-0.01 * 
0.00 
-0.00 *** 
0.00 
0.00 *** 
0.00 
0.00  
0.00 
-0.00  
0.00 
0.00 *** 
0.00 
Agency Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
(Intercept) 78.82 *** 
2.10 
88.48 *** 
2.39 
64.56 *** 
4.24 
83.80 *** 
1.75 
11.68 *** 
1.31 
0.07  
0.17 
30.91 *** 
5.52 
1.42 *** 
0.39 
Observations 10241 10241 6944 10241 10233 10241 10170 10241 
R2 / R2 adjusted 0.524 / 
0.479 
0.505 / 
0.457 
0.736 / 
0.698 
0.740 / 
0.715 
0.709 / 0.681 0.210 / 
0.135 
0.269 / 
0.198 
0.805 / 
0.786 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05   ** p<0.01   *** p<0.001 
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Although the expectation was to see the coefficients on the interacting terms to steadily 
increase, this does not appear to be what the data show. Except one coefficient, the differences 
among the categories on the measure of the Overall Score appear to be statistically insignificant 
and close to zero even in the sample. The pattern is similar on the measure of the Financial 
Score. The regression output shows some small but statistically significant differences on the 
interaction terms for the Accountability and Transparency score, but these differences do not 
reflect the hypothesized expectations. For instance, the last two interaction terms with the 
categories having the highest values on the measure of competition (Environment and Human 
and Civil Rights) are expected to have the largest significant coefficients as opposed to the 
coefficients on the terms at the top of the list. Overall, the analysis of the available data fails to 
confirm Hypothesis 4.1.  
Finally, the results of the regression analysis testing the competition hypothesis H4.2 are 
presented in Table 4.8. The proposed theory argues that charities with a greater share of public 
contributions in their revenue portfolios will demonstrate a greater level of improvement in 
response to ratings than organizations that rely on contributions to a lesser extent. The 
descriptive analysis of the share of public contributions in the in nonprofit income portfolios is 
presented in the Appendix C (Figure C4 and Table C4). It shows that the population of charities 
at the Charity Navigator includes the whole spectrum of agencies from those having practically 
no public contributions in a given fiscal year to those that rely on them entirely. The distribution 
is, however, heavily skewed to the left with the median share of public donations in the revenue 
portfolio being equal to 86 percent. 
To conduct the hypothesis test, the numeric values of the share of contributions in each 
charity’s income portfolio was recoded into one of four categories based on the distribution 
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quartiles and interacted with the indicator of the rating period. The group of organizations that 
belongs to the lowest quartile on this measure was set as the reference group. Table 6 shows how 
the response to being rated changes for the charities in the higher quartiles of the distribution 
relative to the reference group. Contrary the theoretical arguments, all the interaction terms in the 
model for the Overall Score and in the model for the Financial Score are near zero and 
statistically insignificant. In other words, charities across different levels of reliance on charitable 
contributions in their revenue portfolios appear to be equally unresponsive to being rated in 
terms of expected improvements in their performance scores.  
In the model for Accountability and Transparency score, the group of agencies in the top 
quartile on the studied measure (96-100 percent reliance on charitable contributions) 
demonstrates the estimated 2.46 point higher improvement in the score in addition to the 1.13 
point improvement estimated for the reference group. Still, despite being statistically significant, 
the responses observed in the accountability and transparency score have quite little substantive 
value and have minimal impact on the Overall Score. Therefore, it can be concluded that the 
empirical tests find no support for the competition hypothesis 4.2. 
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Table 4. 8:  Moderating effect of the share of public contributions on agency response to ratings 
  1 
Overall 
Score 
2 
Financial 
Score 
3 
Account. 
& 
Transp. 
Score 
4 
Program 
Expenses 
(Percent) 
5 
Administrative 
Expenses 
(Percent) 
6 
Fundraising 
Efficiency 
7 
Program 
Expenses 
Growth 
(Percent) 
8 
Working 
Capital 
Ratio 
CN Rated Financial 0.47  
0.47 
0.65  
0.54 
 
0.73  
0.39 
-0.79 ** 
0.29 
0.02  
0.04 
0.87  
1.23 
0.03  
0.08 
CN Rated Financial * 
Share.Contrib.Q2 
-0.60  
0.59 
-1.31  
0.67 
 -0.23  
0.49 
0.46  
0.36 
0.01  
0.05 
-8.49 *** 
1.53 
-0.08  
0.10 
CN Rated Financial * 
Share Contrib. Q3 
0.21  
0.61 
-0.33  
0.70 
 0.70  
0.51 
-0.28  
0.38 
-0.02  
0.05 
-2.75  
1.59 
-0.19  
0.11 
CN Rated Financial * 
Share.Contrib.Q4 
-0.24  
0.59 
-1.14  
0.67 
 -1.31 ** 
0.49 
1.72 *** 
0.37 
-0.02  
0.05 
-7.56 *** 
1.55 
-0.08  
0.11 
CN Rated A&T 
 
  1.13* 
0.45 
     
CN Rated A&T * 
Share Contrib. Q2 
  0.74  
0.49 
     
CN Rated A&T * 
Share Contrib. Q3 
  0.53  
0.50 
     
CN Rated A&T * 
Share Contrib. Q4 
  2.46 *** 
0.48 
     
Total Revenue 0.01 *** 
0.00 
0.01 *** 
0.00 
-0.00  
0.00 
0.00  
0.00 
-0.00  
0.00 
-0.00  
0.00 
0.02 *** 
0.00 
-0.00 *** 
0.00 
Assets -0.00 *** 
0.00 
-0.00 *** 
0.00 
-0.01 * 
0.00 
-0.00 *** 
0.00 
0.00 *** 
0.00 
0.00  
0.00 
-0.00  
0.00 
0.00 *** 
0.00 
Agency Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
FYE [2001] 0.56 
1.11 
0.23  
1.26 
 
-1.02  
0.93 
0.31  
0.69 
0.01  
0.09 
-1.38  
2.89 
0.33  
0.20 
FYE [2002] 0.88  
1.09 
0.81  
1.24 
 
0.09  
0.91 
-0.00  
0.67 
-0.00  
0.09 
-1.79  
2.83 
0.30  
0.19 
FYE [2003] -1.81  
1.06 
-1.98  
1.20 
 
-0.51  
0.88 
-0.14  
0.65 
0.01  
0.09 
-3.84  
2.75 
0.31  
0.19 
FYE [2004] -2.60 * 
1.05 
-2.67 * 
1.19 
 
-0.44  
0.87 
-0.41  
0.65 
-0.01  
0.09 
-4.84  
2.73 
0.28  
0.19 
FYE [2005] -2.14 * 
1.06 
-2.16  
1.21 
 
-0.07  
0.89 
-0.88  
0.66 
-0.02  
0.09 
-5.48 * 
2.76 
0.38 * 
0.19 
FYE [2006] -0.86  
1.06 
-0.90  
1.21 
 
-0.01  
0.88 
-0.57  
0.66 
-0.03  
0.09 
-4.46  
2.76 
0.40 * 
0.19 
FYE [2007] -0.43  
1.06 
-0.51  
1.21 
 
0.51  
0.89 
-1.02  
0.66 
-0.02  
0.09 
-3.64  
2.76 
0.41 * 
0.19 
FYE [2008] 0.06  
1.06 
-0.00  
1.21 
 
0.79  
0.89 
-1.18  
0.66 
0.01  
0.09 
-3.38  
2.76 
0.53 ** 
0.19 
FYE [2009] -1.23  
1.05 
-1.01  
1.19 
0.16  
3.90 
0.76  
0.87 
-1.03  
0.65 
0.08  
0.09 
-6.90 * 
2.73 
0.84 *** 
0.19 
FYE [2010] -0.14  
1.05 
-1.48  
1.20 
3.11  
3.89 
1.15  
0.88 
-1.21  
0.65 
0.01  
0.09 
-10.01 *** 
2.73 
0.94 *** 
0.19 
FYE [2011] 0.72  
1.05 
-1.34  
1.19 
3.23  
3.90 
1.13  
0.87 
-1.20  
0.65 
-0.02  
0.09 
-11.26 *** 
2.72 
0.98 *** 
0.19 
FYE [2012] 1.43  
1.04 
-0.67  
1.19 
3.81  
3.90 
1.46  
0.87 
-1.53 * 
0.64 
-0.02  
0.09 
-11.31 *** 
2.71 
0.89 *** 
0.19 
FYE [2013] 1.58  
1.05 
-0.45  
1.19 
3.61  
3.90 
1.55  
0.87 
-1.71 ** 
0.65 
-0.02  
0.09 
-9.58 *** 
2.72 
0.92 *** 
0.19 
FYE [2014] 2.40 * 
1.04 
0.54  
1.19 
3.48  
3.90 
1.84 * 
0.87 
-1.68 ** 
0.64 
-0.04  
0.09 
-8.36 ** 
2.71 
0.99 *** 
0.19 
FYE [2015] 3.51 *** 
1.05 
1.62  
1.20 
4.74  
3.90 
1.80 * 
0.88 
-1.81 ** 
0.65 
-0.03  
0.09 
-8.65 ** 
2.74 
0.98 *** 
0.19 
FYE [2016] 3.69 *** 
1.06 
1.58  
1.21 
5.17  
3.90 
1.65  
0.88 
-1.67 * 
0.65 
-0.03  
0.09 
-8.82 ** 
2.75 
0.96 *** 
0.19 
FYE [2017] 3.78 *** 
1.09 
1.34  
1.24 
5.33  
3.91 
1.51  
0.90 
-1.83 ** 
0.67 
-0.02  
0.09 
-9.96 *** 
2.82 
1.05 *** 
0.19 
(Intercept) 78.22 *** 
2.00 
88.09 *** 
2.28 
65.46 *** 
4.22 
84.29 *** 
1.67 
12.31 *** 
1.24 
0.06  
0.17 
10.68 * 
5.20 
1.44 *** 
0.36 
Observations 9603 9603 6457 9603 9595 9603 9536 9603 
R2 / R2 adjusted 0.520 / 
0.472 
0.499 / 
0.449 
0.743 / 
0.704 
0.736 / 
0.709 
0.709 / 0.680 0.221 / 0.143 0.273 / 
0.200 
0.819 / 
0.801 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05   ** p<0.01   *** p<0.001 
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4.6 Conclusion 
One of the key goals of nonprofit report cards is to improve the efficiency of 
philanthropic activities. Report cards could increase allocative efficiency both by reallocating 
donations to more efficient charities (and weeding out inefficient charities) and by getting 
charities to improve their own performance. By drawing on economic theory of organizational 
behavior, performance management theory, and institutional theory, this paper proposes a 
framework predicting that a public charity will respond to an exogenous shock - the release of its 
charity rating by improving its measured performance, especially if it (1) initially gets a poor 
rating, (2) is in a highly competitive subfield, (3) relies more heavily on donations.  
The empirical tests only partially confirmed the proposed hypotheses. The theory posits 
that after becoming rated, charities would improve on the measures that affect their public 
performance scores so that their public performance scores/ratings improve. At the same time, 
the charities that were top rated would lower their externally measured reported performance.  
Yet, the analysis of the data, besides confirming the latter argument by finding modest but 
significant decline in the performance scores of the top rated charities, finds that only the 
charities that received the lowest two rating grades of 0 and 1-star (labelled by CN 
“Exceptionally Poor” and “Poor” ) meaningfully improved their expected Overall Performance 
score after becoming publicly rated. The group that initially received a two-star rating labelled 
“Needs Improvement” showed a statistically significant but modest expected gains in its 
performance scores. The group that was initially given three stars and labelled “Good”, despite 
being expected to further improve, demonstrated an immaterial decline in its expected financial 
and overall performance scores. All the improvements in the expected Accountability and 
Transparency Score, despite their statistical significance, also appear to be only peripheral. 
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Thereby, only the initial rating has proven to be a significant moderator of a charity’s subsequent 
response. The analysis finds no evidence that competition (operationalized by a measure of 
industry crowdedness) and the extent of reliance on public contributions, could influence the 
effects of charity ratings on the behavior of a rated nonprofit organization. 
Overall, public charities only respond in a limited way to being publicly rated, meaning 
limited effectiveness of the existing tool to elicit performance improvements in nonprofits. At the 
same time, the statistically and practically significant findings for the charities that initially 
receive the lowest ratings show that nonprofit performance monitoring has some potential. 
Hence, this research points to some important factors that could potentially explain and influence 
the observed behaviors of rated charities including informational content of charity ratings, 
performance standards and thresholds applied, or even reporting and publicizing approaches. An 
essential continuation of this research would be a further attempt to understand how performance 
ratings are perceived and reactions formed from within third-sector organizations. These insights 
might have significant implications for the methodologies used by the performance monitoring 
community and also for the nonprofit management practice.  
 
4.7 Limitations and Future Research Directions 
This study has an exploratory character and several limitations to the significance and 
generalizability of its findings, which also point to opportunities for further research. The most 
critical limitations are the following:  
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First, out of 286,420 public charities that reported to IRS in 201219, a relatively small 
number - only about 9,089 organizations were rated by Charity Navigator as of 2018 and only 
8640 received meaningful performance grades. These rated organizations are treated as the 
population of interest here, and the random sample used in this study was drawn from it. In other 
words, the results of the inference tests and findings presented in this study are valid for the 
population of rated charities and their validity is limited outside of the described scope. Due to 
the limited external validity of this analysis, it is important to admit that charities that are not 
rated at this time and statistically different from the population of currently rated charities may 
exhibit different patterns of behavior from those that this analysis uncovered. Also, nonprofit 
organizations’ behaviors in response to charity ratings may change over time as more charities 
receive ratings and rating methodologies evolve.  
Second, the estimates of charity response to being rated relies on time series variation in 
the performance scores assigned by the rater and their driver-variables due to introduction of 
ratings. This study does not take advantage of an unrated comparison group, to estimate a 
stronger, from the perspective of internal validity, difference-in-difference model. Such analysis 
could potentially be conducted by splitting the sample of rated charities into cohorts based on the 
year they were first rated, constructing a statistically similar comparison group for each cohort, 
and, finally, estimating and averaging each cohort’s responses to public ratings. Given the 
findings of this study, however, this step seems to be excessive for all but initially poorly rated 
nonprofit agencies.  
 
19 Source: http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/413277-The-Nonprofit-Sector-in-
Brief--.PDF  
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Third, the analysis of charity response on the measure of accountability and transparency 
is limited. This study estimates the change in the Accountability and Transparency score, after 
the charity becomes rated, but does not analyze changes in the variables that determine the score. 
Unlike is the case with the Financial Score, the is no data available on the accountability and 
transparency components of the metric to allow such analysis. 
Finally, the measure of sub-field competition used in this study is weak, which could 
explain the findings. Developing a stronger measure leaves room for further research.      
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APPENDIX A 
 
Figure A. 1:  The distribution of the 102,534 charity ratings for the 8640 charities rated by the 
Charity Navigator 
 
 
Figure A. 2:  The distribution of the 595 charities rated by the Charity Watch 
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Figure A. 3:  The distribution of performance grades assigned by Charity Navigator 
 
 
 
Figure A. 4:  The distribution of performance grades assigned by Charity Watch 
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Table A. 1:  Grade Conversion Scheme 
Charity Navigator 
Star-Grades 
Charity Navigator 
Converted Numeric 
Grades 
Charity Watch 
Letter-based 
Scale 
Charity Watch 
Converted 
Numeric Scale 
(native) 
Charity Watch 
Converted 
Numeric Scale 
(adapted to CN) 
0 stars 0 F 0 0 
1 stars 1 D 1 0 
2 stars 2 C- 2 0 
3 stars 3 C- 3 1 
4 stars 4 C+ 4 1 
 B- 5 2 
B 6 2 
B+ 7 3 
A- 8 3 
A 9 4 
A+ 10 4 
 
 
 
Figure A. 5:  Overall published rating scores against overall recalculated scores before and after 
cleaning the dataset.  
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APPENDIX B 
Table B. 1:  Charities selected for the experiment and performance report cards presented 
Low Rating & High Program Expenses High Rating & Low Program Expenses 
 
CHILDREN’S RELIEF MISSION 
Category: International 
Cause: Humanitarian Relief Supplies 
Mission: The organization endeavors to provide 
clothing, medical supplies, and educational 
materials to recipients in Third World countries. 
It also provides cash grants to charitable foreign 
locations. 
Self-described accomplishments: 
Grants/shipments of goods to villagers of various 
Third World countries. 
Total Revenue (FYE 2014): $3,137,634 
Program Expenses: (FYE 2014): 99.1 % 
Overhead expenses: 0.8% 
The Charity’s Overall Performance Rating: 
 
(Aug 2015) 
STAND FOR CHILDREN LEADERSHIP CENTER 
Category: Education 
Cause: Education Policy & Reform 
Mission: To ensure that all children, regardless of 
their background, graduate from high school 
prepared for, and with access to, a college 
education.   
Self-described accomplishments: Our national 
programs educate and empower parents, 
teachers, and community members to demand 
excellent public schools. We educate the public 
about, and advocate for, effective state and 
district level education policies. We ensure that 
new policies and funding reach classrooms and 
help students. Our staff provides parents and 
others concerned about children’s issues with 
tools to achieve long-lasting improvements for 
children with one unified voice. 
Total Revenue (FYE 2014): $18,537,796 
Program Expenses: (FYE 2014): 64.7 % 
Overhead expenses: 35.2% 
The Charity’s Overall Performance Rating: 
 
(Sep 2015) 
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Table B.1 (continued) 
GLOBAL SOLUTIONS FOR INFECTIOUS DISEASES 
Category: Health 
Cause: Medical Research 
Mission: We are a non-profit global health 
organization engaged in the development of 
diagnostic and preventive tools for infectious 
diseases, including HIV. We also provide 
assistance to, and collaborate with, global public 
health organizations, private foundations, other 
non-governmental organizations and for-profit 
entities focused on public health issues and 
infectious diseases. 
Self-described accomplishments: Conducting 
research and developing vaccines and 
diagnostics for life-threatening infectious 
diseases, including HIV. Providing assistance to 
and collaborating with other global public health 
organizations, private foundations, and for-profit 
entities focused on public health issues, for the 
purpose of facilitating access to affordable health 
solutions which benefit the people in developing 
countries, who are the most in need. 
Total Revenue (FYE 2013): $1,980,374 
Program Expenses (FYE 2013): 90.2% 
Overhead expenses: 9.8% 
The Charity’s Overall Performance Rating: 
 
(Aug 2015) 
FREE TO BREATHE 
Category: Health 
Cause: Diseases, Disorders, and Disciplines 
Mission: To ensure surviving lung cancer is the 
expectation, not the exception. To turn this vision 
into reality, we focus on: 
funding research with the greatest potential to 
save lives; increasing the number of lung cancer 
patients participating in clinical trials; building and 
empowering the lung cancer community. 
Self-described accomplishments: Providing 
grants to 12 research institutions across the US; 
administering the lung cancer mutation 
consortium; providing funds to member 
institutions to offset the cost of tumor testing; 
organizing free to breathe community events in 
more than forty locations; hosting the lung cancer 
advocacy summit. 
Total Revenue (FY 2014): $3,704,535 
Program Expenses (FY 2014): 67.7% 
Overhead expenses: 32.3% 
 
The Charity’s Overall Performance Rating: 
  
(Jun 2016) 
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Table B. 2:  Demographic characteristics of the study sample by treatment groups 
Demographics Qualtrics sample T1 T2 T3 T4 
n (count) 873.0  208 225  214 226  
Gender (%)      
Female  72.6  74.0  75.6  70.1  70.8  
Male  27.4  26.0  24.4  29.9  29.2  
Age (mean)  43.0  42.5  43.7  42.6  43.3  
Age (%)      
Under 25  10.1  12.5  8.9  8.9  10.2  
25-34  25.4  24.0  24.0  24.8  28.8  
35-44  20.4  20.7  22.2  22.9  15.9  
45-54  16.6  16.3  15.6  18.7  15.9  
55-64  18.1  18.3  20.0  19.2  15.0  
65-74  8.6  7.7  8.4  5.1  12.8  
75 and above  0.8  0.5  0.9  0.5  1.3  
Education (%)      
Less than High School  1.9  2.9  0.9  1.9  2.2  
High School Grad  20.0  16.8  22.7  20.6  19.9  
Some College or Assoc. Degree  36.3  37.0  35.6  34.6  38.1  
Bachelor’s Degree  28.9  30.8  28.9  29.0  27.0  
Graduate of Professional  12.8  12.5  12.0  14.0  12.8  
Income (%)      
Less than $10,000  5.2  5.8  5.3  6.5  3.1  
$10,000 to 29,999  20.6  20.7  20.9  19.6  21.2  
$30,000 to 49,999  21.8  20.2  21.8  20.6  24.3  
$50,000 to 69,999  20.0  21.6  19.1  17.8  21.7  
$70,000 to 89,999  12.4  14.4  14.2  8.9  11.9  
$90,000 to 149,999  15.6  14.9  12.9  20.6  14.2  
$150,000 and more  4.5  2.4  5.8  6.1  3.5  
 
Table B. 3: Question items for the measure of trust in a charity 
How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statements about [CHARITY 
NAME] ? 
  Trust (α of 0.94) 
1. I would trust this nonprofit to always act in the best interest of the cause 
2. I would trust this nonprofit to conduct their operations ethically 
3. I would trust this nonprofit to use donated funds appropriately 
4. I would trust this nonprofit not to exploit their donors 
5. I would trust this nonprofit to use fundraising techniques that are appropriate and 
sensitive  
 
Table B. 4:  Question items for the measure of dispositional (personality) trust 
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How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following as statements that apply to 
you? 
 Dispositional (Personality) Trust (α =0.83) 
1. I believe that others have good intentions 
2. I trust what people say 
3. I believe that people are basically moral 
4. I believe in human goodness 
5. I think that all will be well 
6. I suspect hidden motives in others (Reverse coded) 
7. I am wary of others (Reverse coded) 
8. I believe that people are essentially evil (Reverse coded) 
 
Table B. 5:  Question items for the measure of altruism 
How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following as statements that apply to 
you? 
 Altruism (α = 0.79) 
1. I anticipate the needs of others 
2. I love to help others 
3. I am concerned about others 
4. I have a good word for everyone 
5. I am indifferent to the feelings of others (Reverse coded) 
6. I make people feel uncomfortable (Reverse coded) 
7. I turn my back on others (Reverse coded) 
8. I take no time for others (Reverse coded) 
 
Table B. 6:  Question items for the measure of trust in nonprofits in general 
How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statements about nonprofits in 
general? 
 Trust in nonprofits in general (α = 0.86) 
1. Generally, nonprofits operate effectively. [competence] 
2. Nonprofits in general are capable in carrying out their missions. [competence] 
3. Nonprofits in general care about citizens’ well-being. [benevolence] 
4. In general, nonprofits honor their commitments. [honesty] 
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Table B. 7:  Question items for the measure of perceived performance 
How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statements about [CHARITY 
NAME]? 
 Perceived Performance of the Organization (α = 0.68 - 0.73) 
1. This nonprofit is most likely to have an impact on this cause 
2. This nonprofit efficiently spends money on this cause 
 
Table B. 8:  Question items for the measure of emotional utility 
 Emotional Utility (α = 0.86 - 0.91) 
1. I give to this nonprofit because I would feel guilty if I didn’t 
2. If I didn’t give to this nonprofit, I would feel bad about myself 
 
Table B. 9:  Question items for the measure of familial utility 
Table C-7. 
 Familial Utility (α = 0.75 – 0.76) 
1. I give money to this nonprofit in memory of a loved one 
2. I felt that someone I know might benefit from my support 
3. My family had a strong link to this nonprofit 
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APPENDIX C 
 
 
Figure C. 1:  Charity program expenses for 8640 charities rated during 2000-2018 (percent) 
 
 
 
Table C. 1:  Charity program expenses for 8640 charities rated during 2000-2018 (percent) 
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu.     Max. NA's  
 
   0.10    75.10    81.30 80.07 86.70 100.00 83 
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Figure C. 2:  Charity program expenses average annual growth for 8640 charities rated during 
2000-2018 (percent) 
 
Table C. 2:  Charity program expenses average annual growth for 8640 charities rated during 
2000-2018 (percent) 
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu.     Max. NA's  
 
   -93.40 -0.20 4.90 6.97 11.40 1007.40      792 
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Figure C. 3:  Distribution of initial overall ratings for 8640 charities rated during 2000-2018 
(measured in stars) 
 
 
Table C. 3:  Distribution of initial overall ratings for 8640 charities rated during 2000-2018 
(measured in stars) 
 0 1 2 3 4     
n 102 682 1855 3588 2413 
% 1.18 7.89 21.47 41.53   27.93 
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Figure C. 4:  Distribution of the mean share of public contributions in nonprofit agency income 
portfolios for 8640 charities rated during 2000-2018. 
 
 
Table C. 4:  Descriptive statistics for the distribution of the mean share of public contributions in 
nonprofit agency income portfolios for 8640 charities rated during 2000-2018. 
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu.     Max. 
 0.00 0.62 0.86 0.77 0.96 1.0     
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